成唯識論述記 3.637

3.637

述曰：此第八論主難。體既本有，用亦應然，以體、用無別故。量云：所計作用，未來應有；不離體故；猶如於體。所計體法，應未來無，即是用故，亦如作用。汝去來法，應是無為，許有法體，無作用故，如無為法。又相未相法，應是無為，許有法體非相遷故，如無為法。設彼救前難，言未來用、體雖皆具有，緣不合故，用不起者。應難彼云：既言諸法本來皆有，所待之緣亦應本有。緣既許本有，未來應起用。量云：未來一切法，用應常起；因緣具故；如現在法。若言緣等或未來無，即非未來有一切法。又說未來有生相用，過去說有與果用者，過、未有用應名現在。彼救不然，今言用者，謂取與用。難云：等無間緣過去取果，《婆沙》正說，即應過去有半作用，有取果用故。又言未來世有三法作用，光明、生相及苦法忍，《婆沙》正文，應名現在。彼與果用滅，復滅失；取果之用生，復生過。若言與果但是功能非謂作用，即阿羅漢末後之心，應不名現在，無取果用故。又若此心初無作用，應名已滅，如何後時更復言滅？又彼功能，改名作用，而復何異？若言非是無學末心不能取果，彼後念緣闕故，果不生者，此亦非理，違汝宗故，汝說後心非無間緣故，廣如《婆沙》第十文說。終心後果既定不生，如何定知現在之法有能生用？若言後果若緣不闕，定從此生者，因既緣不闕，故有作用，何不能生果？若因不能生果，即是無用故。

The Commentary states: This is the eighth [argument], where the author of the treatise raises objections. If the substance is originally existent, the function should also be so, because substance and function are not different. The syllogistic formulation is: The posited function should exist in the future; because it is not separate from the substance; just like the substance. The posited substance should be nonexistent in the future; precisely because it is the function; also just like the function. Your past and future dharmas should be unconditioned; because you accept that they possess a substantive entity while lacking function; just like unconditioned dharmas. Furthermore, dharmas that have not yet undergone the marks [of conditioned existence] should be unconditioned; because you accept that they possess a substantive entity and are not transformed by marks; just like unconditioned dharmas. Suppose they rescue themselves from the former objection by saying that although both function and substance are fully present in the future, because conditions do not come together, the function does not arise. One should object to them: Since you say that all dharmas are originally existent, the conditions relied upon should also be originally existent. Since the conditions are admitted to be originally existent, the function should arise in the future. The syllogistic formulation is: The functions of all future dharmas should constantly arise; because their causes and conditions are complete; just like present dharmas. If you say that conditions and the like may be nonexistent in the future, then it is not the case that all dharmas exist in the future. Furthermore, if you say that the future has the function of the mark of arising, and the past is said to have the function of giving results, then the past and future possessing function should be called the present. Their defense is incorrect. Now when they speak of "function", they mean the functions of grasping and giving [results]. One objects: An immediately contiguous condition in the past grasps its result, as the Mahāvibhāṣā explicitly states; thus the past would have half of a function, because it has the function of grasping a result. Furthermore, they say that in the future period three dharmas have function—illumination, the mark of arising, and the [first moment of] acceptance of the Dharma regarding suffering—which is the explicit text of the Mahāvibhāṣā; these should then be called the present. If their function of giving a result ceases, it would cease again, which is an error; if their function of grasping a result arises, it would arise again, which is an error. If you say that giving a result is merely a capacity and does not mean function, then the final mind of an arhat should not be called the present, because it lacks the function of grasping a result. Moreover, if this mind had no function from the start, it should be called already ceased; how could it subsequently be said to cease again? Furthermore, what difference is there merely by changing the name "capacity" to "function"? If you say it is not that the final mind of one beyond training cannot grasp a result, but rather that because conditions are deficient in the subsequent moment, the result does not arise, this is also illogical, because it contradicts your own school: for you state that the final mind is not an immediately contiguous condition, as explained at length in the text of the tenth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Since the result following the final mind definitely does not arise, how can one know with certainty that a present dharma has the function capable of producing it? If you say that if conditions were not deficient, the subsequent result would definitely arise from it, then since the causes and conditions are not deficient and thus function exists, why can it not produce the result? If a cause cannot produce a result, it is precisely without function.