成唯識論述記 4.349

4.349

述曰：自下別破經部、薩婆多色等執受。謂經部師計，有心色互持種子及能受熏，如前已破。今破色根亦不能執有漏色身；無所緣故；如虛空等。謂薩婆多心能執受，前已破訖，若謂命根、同分為能執受，今此亦非。不相應行雖舉總名，意取命根、及眾同分，餘不計故。或設遮餘，並不能執有漏色身；無所緣故；如虛空等。此設許有體，不爾即應言無體性故。今正非無體，亦得以無所緣為因。

The Commentary states: Below separately refutes the appropriation by matter and so forth maintained by the Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivādins. That is, the Sautrāntika master posits that mind and matter mutually hold seeds and can receive perfuming, which was already refuted earlier. Now it refutes that material faculties also cannot appropriate the tainted material body; "because they lack a cognitive object"; "just like space and the like". Regarding the Sarvāstivādin's claim that mind can appropriate, that was already refuted earlier. If they assert that the life-faculty and nikāya-sabhāga (group-homogeneity) are capable of appropriating, now this is also rejected. Although the non-associated formations are mentioned by a general name, the intention refers to the life-faculty and nikāya-sabhāga, since the others are not posited [as appropriating]. Or, conceding to preclude the rest, none of them can appropriate the tainted material body; "because they lack a cognitive object"; "just like space and the like". This supposes one concedes they have real substance; otherwise, one should say "because they lack substantial nature". Now, without directly asserting that they lack substance, one can also take "lacking a cognitive object" as the reason.