成唯識論述記 4.367

4.367

述曰：前者我言恒持用理，顯三法中所說識言非詮轉識。意目第八恒有用故，汝舉煖不遍，豈壞我前理？我前所言識不遍者，可以煖為例；我以識無恒用，何得以煖為理？彼救意言：識有間故，無恒持用，煖無色無，亦應如識。論主意解，具有三法處，可有恒持用。在欲、色界為難於汝，此則不可具三法處，唯識間轉，壽、煖不然。非於無色唯說煖無，便則例令具三法處，許識間轉有恒持用，故我前說其理極成。

The Commentary states: Previously, my reasoning of the perpetual sustaining function showed that the word "consciousness" spoken among the three dharmas does not designate the evolving consciousnesses. The intention points to the eighth having perpetual function; you bringing up warmth not pervading—how could that destroy my previous reasoning? What I said previously about consciousness not pervading can use warmth as an example; but when I argued from consciousness lacking perpetual function, how could warmth be used as a justification? The purport of their rescue is: Because consciousness has interruption, it lacks a perpetual sustaining function; warmth is absent in the formless, so it should also be like consciousness. The treatise master's intended explanation is: In a place where the three dharmas are fully present, there can be a perpetual sustaining function. Stating the objection against you in the desire and form realms, here it is inadmissible that in a place where the three dharmas are fully present, consciousness alone should have interruption and changing while life and warmth do not. It is not that because in the formless realm only warmth is said to be absent, one may then parallel this to make consciousness in a place where the three dharmas are fully present be permitted to have interruption and changing yet have a perpetual sustaining function; therefore, what I previously stated is completely established in its reasoning.