成唯識論述記 4.4

4.4

述曰：此即外問：不言阿賴耶言「第八識」者，此言通故。不退菩薩、三乘無學，皆得有故。彼名既局，無學等無故。舉第八不言賴耶，如是諸處准此應知。如斷、常中言「阿賴耶」者，此從因為名。復言「至轉位」，即通二乘、菩薩十地為論，故非一向依此例說。此顯依初捨為名，彼意顯通諸位為文，故有二別。何故言「離眼等識有別自體」者？小乘等計阿賴耶名我，教亦有，如下別辨。然即六識更無別體，故今問言：云何得知離眼等識有別自體？若言識等，舉識等取餘色等法，今言等識，唯取餘識不取色等。又准下說一切有中，破五取蘊非愛著處，計離色等無別自體，不唯在色。今者應言「眼等識」者，等取心所、及色法等。不離識，故略不言色。舉王取臣，不言心所。舉實取假，不言得等。涅槃非愛境，故此不論。是雖共許五取蘊外，無別有體，此離識蘊，不共許故。

The Commentary states: This is an outside question. The reason it does not say "ālaya" but says "the eighth consciousness" is that this term is general, because non-retrogressing bodhisattvas and the trainees of the three vehicles without more to learn all come to have it. Since that name [ālaya] is restricted—those without more to learn, etc., do not have it—it cites the eighth and does not say ālaya; all such passages elsewhere should be understood by conforming to this. When it speaks of "ālaya" in the discussion of annihilation and permanence, it takes its name from its status as a cause. When it further says "up to the stage of transformation," this is discussed as extending across the two vehicles and the ten stages of a bodhisattva; therefore, it is not consistently stated according to this precedent. The former indicates its naming according to its initial abandonment, while the latter's intent is a phrasing that extends through all stages; hence there are these two distinctions. Why does it say "apart from the eye and other consciousnesses, there is a distinct intrinsic nature"? The Hīnayāna and others assert that the name ālaya is a self, and scriptures also have this, as will be distinguished separately below. Yet for them, it is merely the six consciousnesses and there is no other distinct entity; hence now it asks: how is it to be known that apart from the eye and other consciousnesses there is a distinct intrinsic nature? If it had said "the consciousnesses, etc.," citing consciousnesses and so forth would include the remaining dharmas of form and so on. Now, saying "and other consciousnesses" takes only the remaining consciousnesses and does not take form and so on. Furthermore, conforming to what is said below regarding the Sarvāstivāda, in refuting their claim that the five appropriation aggregates are not what is clung to with craving, they assert that apart from form, etc., there is no other distinct substance, which does not pertain only to form. Now it should say "the eye and other consciousnesses" to include caitasikas, form-dharmas, and so on. Because they are not separate from consciousness, it briefly omits mentioning form. In citing the king, it takes the ministers, so it does not mention caitasikas. In citing the real, it takes the nominal, so it does not mention prāpti and so forth. Nirvāṇa is not an object of craving, so it is not discussed here. Although it is mutually accepted that outside the five appropriation aggregates there is no other distinct substance, that there is one apart from the aggregate of consciousness is not mutually accepted.