成唯識論述記 4.425

4.425

述曰：三破救也。若彼言名四蘊中，識謂五識身，所與相依識是第六識。若爾羯邏藍時無五識故，說誰為名中識。大小共許羯邏藍位七日已來並無五識，故於此位無名中識。若彼難言，汝亦七日無五識身，彼名中識，其體是何？第七識也。又除初念，餘時亦許第六識起，意識即是名中識蘊，有何所違？其大眾部諸識並生，七日已前身識等未起，七日已後身識等生，為名中識。遂復解云：經言名色互為緣者，除初七日，餘長時位，如汝大乘說第六意為名中識。初念許無，已後俱起說互為緣，從多位說。我亦如是，七日猶如初念，餘位亦復長時，據長時說亦互為緣，無爽於理。此亦不然，我之初念亦互為緣，別有末那為名中識。第二念後意識復生，無相違失。經中非據長時有說，故非識證。

The Commentary states: The third part refutes the rejoinder. If they say that among the four aggregates of name, 'consciousness' refers to the group of five consciousnesses, and the consciousness with which they are mutually dependent is the sixth consciousness, then since there are no five consciousnesses at the time of the kalala, what can be spoken of as the consciousness within name? The Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna jointly acknowledge that during the kalala stage, for the first seven days, there are no five consciousnesses whatsoever; therefore, in this stage there is no consciousness within name. If they object, saying: 'You too acknowledge that there is no group of five consciousnesses for seven days; what is the essence of that consciousness within name?', [we reply:] it is the seventh consciousness. Furthermore, except for the first moment, the sixth consciousness is also conceded to arise at other times; the mental consciousness is itself the consciousness aggregate within name, so what contradiction is there? In the Mahāsāṃghika school, the various consciousnesses arise concurrently; the body-consciousness and the others have not arisen prior to the seventh day, but after seven days, the body-consciousness and the others arise and serve as the consciousness within name. They then further explain: 'When the sūtra states that name and form are mutually conditioning, this excludes the initial seven days and refers to the subsequent prolonged period, just as your Mahāyāna explains that the sixth mental consciousness is the consciousness within name: conceding its absence in the first moment, its simultaneous arising thereafter is spoken of as mutual conditioning, speaking in terms of the majority of stages. We do the same: the seven days are like the first moment, while the other stages are also a prolonged period; stating mutual conditioning based on the prolonged period does not violate reason.' This too is incorrect. For us, in the very first moment they are also mutually conditioning, because there is separately the manas as the consciousness within name. After the second moment, mental consciousness arises again, so there is no fault of contradiction. The sūtra does not speak merely in terms of a prolonged period; therefore this does not substantiate their consciousness.