成唯識論述記 5.155

5.155

述曰：種子是彼現識功能，非實有物，體是假有。論言：緣識正當二種，種子、現行皆名識故。於諸論中不簡現行及種子故，故得緣種，即緣識故，不緣餘法，不違聖教，名我所故。明緣彼種，言緣識故，不緣餘法。問：彼何故計種無別物？若計別體，即五蘊種子是五蘊攝，第七亦緣五蘊為所故，不可簡別緣此種子非彼種故。說種為假前第二卷已述此義，但本識上有彼能生五蘊功能，名種識故，故無有失。問：何故《大論》五十二、《攝論》第二，皆言種別有物？此簡遍計所執，彼無體故，非有為故。對彼言有，非如五蘊現行是實有物，故不相違。問：前三師曰，何故五十一、《顯揚》第十七等，皆云唯有我見，不言有所？彼文略故，非實無所。

[The Commentary states:] Seeds are the functional capacities of that actualized consciousness; they are not real entities, but are nominally existent in substance. The treatise's statement 'takes consciousness as cognitive object' precisely corresponds to these two kinds, because both seeds and actualization are called 'consciousness'. In various treatises, no distinction is made between actualization and seeds, so it can take seeds as cognitive objects, which is just taking consciousness as cognitive object without taking other dharmas as cognitive objects, thus not contradicting the sacred teaching. Because it is called 'what belongs to a self', it is clear that it takes those seeds as cognitive objects; because it says 'takes consciousness as cognitive object', it does not take other dharmas. Question: Why does he posit that seeds are not separate entities? If posited as separate substances, the seeds of the five aggregates would be subsumed under the five aggregates, and the seventh would also take the five aggregates as cognitive objects as what belongs to a self; hence one could not distinguish taking these seeds and not those seeds as cognitive object. The statement that seeds are nominal was already explained above in fascicle two: it is only that upon the basic consciousness there are functional capacities capable of producing the five aggregates, called the seed consciousness; hence there is no flaw. Question: Why do fascicle 52 of the Great Treatise and chapter 2 of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha both say that seeds are distinct entities? This excludes the parikalpita-svabhāva, which has no substance and is not conditioned. Stating that they exist is said in contrast to that, not that they are real entities like the actualizations of the five aggregates; thus there is no contradiction. Question: The previous three masters asked, why do fascicle 51, Prakaraṇāryavācā fascicle 17, etc., all say there is only ātmadṛṣṭi and do not mention what belongs to a self? Those texts are abbreviated, not that there is really no what belongs to a self.