成唯識論述記 5.171

5.171

述曰：下申正義。但緣見分，非餘相分、種子、心所。所以者何？唯識見分無始時來麁細一類，似常似一不斷故似常。簡彼境界，彼色等法皆間斷故。種子亦然，或被損伏，或時永斷故。由此亦遮計餘識為我。似一故，簡心所，心所多法故。何故不緣餘分？夫言我者，有作用相，見分受境作用相顯似於我，故不緣餘分；自證等用，細難知故。問：何故不俱緣一受等為我？亦常一故。為答此問：

The Commentary states: Below, he sets forth the correct doctrine. It takes only the darśanabhāga as object, not the remaining nimittabhāga, seeds, or mental factors. Why is this? The darśanabhāga of consciousness-only has from beginningless time been of a uniform category, subtle or coarse, resembling permanence and unity: because it is uninterrupted, it resembles permanence. This excludes those objective realms, for form and other such dharmas are all interrupted. Seeds are also like that, because they are either suppressed and impaired, or at times eternally severed. By this, conceiving other consciousnesses as the self is also precluded. Because it 'resembles unity', mental factors are excluded, for mental factors are multiple dharmas. Why does it not take the other parts as object? Now, what is called a 'self' has the mark of activity; the darśanabhāga's receiving of objects exhibits a conspicuous mark of activity resembling a self, and therefore it does not take the other parts as object; the functions of self-verification and the rest are subtle and difficult to discern. Question: Why does it not take a single [factor] such as sensation collectively as the self, since it is also permanent and unitary? To answer this question: