成唯識論述記 5.231

5.231

述曰：我所及邊見，依我見後生，此識相應不依彼起，任運緣內，相續而生，不假他後起故，不起我所及邊見也。其我所見何見所攝？此非我見，我見局故；薩迦耶見攝，以名通故。若爾，何故不與我所、邊見二種互相續生？以恒內執無有間斷，不容餘見互相續起故。論說言恒內執我，又前二見通緣內外；此唯恒內執有我，故要有我見，而餘四見非此相應。何故不起疑等？

The Commentary states: The view of what belongs to a self (ātmīyadṛṣṭi) and extreme view arise after self-view; what is associated with this consciousness does not arise dependent on those, but spontaneously cognizes internally, arising in unbroken continuity without relying on arising subsequent to anything else; hence it does not give rise to the view of what belongs to a self or extreme view. Under which view is this view of what belongs to a self subsumed? This is not self-view, because self-view is narrower; it is subsumed under the view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), because the name is broader. If so, why does it not arise in mutual succession with the two—the view of what belongs to a self and extreme view? Because it constantly grasps internally without interruption, not allowing the other views to arise in mutual succession. The treatise states that it constantly grasps a self internally; furthermore, the former two views generally cognize both internal and external [objects], whereas this [consciousness] solely and constantly grasps internally that there is a self; therefore, it must necessarily have self-view, and the remaining four views are not associated with it. Why does it not give rise to doubt (vicikitsā) and the like?