成唯識論述記 5.356

5.356

述曰：下會違也。「諸疑理者」，此念之時於苦等事必無猶豫，即一心緣事、理二境，於理可疑，於事必印；無有獨緣理不於事印故；如薩婆多十遍行中，勝解疑心如何俱耶！即此理證，彼宗說是遍行故。今者大乘於事生疑，此念決定除此疑事，不於餘境生決印故。勝解之數非遍行攝，於理疑是煩惱，於事中必印持，謂此苦事生其印可，苦理有無方生疑故，故疑相應定有勝解。問：印是定，疑不定，相違得俱起？見是決，疑不決，相返得俱生？答：疑時解用劣，相返得俱生。疑、見行俱增，相違不並起。問：事決理猶豫，疑、解二俱生。事決不生疑，所緣應不一，如何得說同一所緣？答：據二行相增，事決無疑相，論其體同取，理疑亦解生。問：若於理疑必於事印，若於事疑則無所印，此疑相應便無邪解，邪解之法不遍染也。

The Commentary states: Below is the resolution of apparent contradiction. 'Those who doubt principles': at this moment of thought, toward matters such as suffering, there is definitely no hesitation. That is, a single mind takes both matter and principle as its two objects; while the principle may be doubted, the matter must be ascertained. There is never taking only the principle as an object without ascertaining the matter. Just as among the ten universal factors of the Sarvāstivādin, how could resolve and a doubting mind coexist? It is precisely by this principle that it is proven, for that school states that it is a universal factor. Now in the Mahāyāna, when doubt arises toward a matter, this thought definitely excludes this doubted matter, not generating a decisive ascertainment toward other objects. The factor of resolve is not included among universal factors: doubt toward the principle is an affliction, while toward the matter there must be ascertainment—meaning that toward this matter of suffering an approval is generated, and only then does doubt arise as to the presence or absence of the principle of suffering. Therefore, association with doubt definitely has resolve. Question: Ascertainment is definite, while doubt is indefinite; can mutually opposed factors arise together? View is decisive, while doubt is indecisive; can opposites arise together? Answer: At the time of doubt, the function of resolve is weak, so opposites can arise together. The modes of activity of doubt and view are both intensified, so being mutually opposed they do not arise simultaneously. Question: If the matter is determined and the principle is hesitated over, both doubt and resolve arise together; if the matter is determined without generating doubt, the objects grasped should not be one—how can they be said to share the same object? Answer: Based on the two intensified modes of activity, the matter is determined without the mark of doubt; but examining their substantial taking of the object together, when the principle is doubted, resolve also arises. Question: If doubt toward the principle must involve ascertainment of the matter, then if one doubts toward a matter there would be nothing ascertained, and in association with this doubt there would be no evil resolve, so the phenomenon of evil resolve would not pervade all defilements.