成唯識論述記 5.371

5.371

述曰：下申理。申理中有二：初顯遍隨；後此識俱。初中有二：初破前；後顯遍。此破前說。且難第三十遍家云：汝言於理生疑必帶事印，如五十八等說。疑由五相，謂於他世、作用、因果、諸諦、寶中心懷猶豫，即於事生疑，亦是煩惱；汝何故言：於事疑非煩惱？既於事疑是疑惑者，如何有欲、勝解二數？若謂彼言「於他世疑」，必於現在而生印可，未來世中而生希望，為無或有故，於現在為罪、為福有差別故，於疑他世中亦迷彼理，非不迷理而唯迷事，故於現印亦有勝解者，難言疑未來為無。此應有我見，我見是推求，疑推求時無我見。印持是決定，疑時無勝解。又於他世等疑，一心有勝解；疑杌為人時，此心應有解。若爾許者，應是遍行。若此疑心相違故無者，彼疑理心如何得有？亦相違故。其尋、伺相違，貪、瞋相返等，皆應難之。二云：然於去、來若事、若理生猶豫者，心不緣現在，但緣去、來，於何生印？於釋種涅槃中生猶豫者，有何印相？故知欲、解不遍染心。此亦去、來，理、事雙疑，前解但緣事疑，以疑理所引亦見道斷；不可難言：緣事起故非見道斷；行相迷理緣事故；如見取等。此行相深不同疑杌，彼行相淺，非是煩惱。此破第三師十遍義。若爾，何故說十俱耶？如初師解。

The Commentary states: Below is the presentation of the correct reasoning. Within the presentation of the correct reasoning there are two parts: first, explaining the universal secondary afflictions; second, their coexistence with this consciousness. Within the first, there are two parts: first, refuting the previous positions; second, explaining universal presence. This refutes the previous explanations. First, to challenge the third master, the proponent of ten universals: You say that when doubt arises regarding principle, it must carry a ascertainment of facts, as stated in the fifty-eighth [fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi] and elsewhere. Doubt arises from five aspects, namely, holding hesitation in mind with respect to other worlds, functioning, cause and effect, the noble truths, and the jewels. This means that doubting facts is also an affliction; why, then, do you say that doubting facts is not an affliction? Since doubting facts is indeed doubt, how could there be the two mental factors of desire and resolution? If you say that the statement "doubting other worlds" must entail producing an ascertainment regarding the present and generating an aspiration regarding the future world—because regarding whether it does not exist or exists, there are distinctions regarding what constitutes evil or merit in the present—and thus within doubting other worlds one is also deluded about that principle, and it is not that one is not deluded about principle but only deluded about facts, so that regarding ascertainment of the present there is also resolution; then one may challenge this: Doubting that the future is non-existent should entail having a view of self. The view of self is an investigation; while doubting and investigating, there is no view of self. Ascertainment is determination; when doubting, there is no resolution. Furthermore, when doubting other worlds and the like, a single mind would have resolution; when doubting whether a post is a person, this mind should also have resolution. If this were conceded, [resolution] should be universally functioning. If it is absent because this doubting mind is contradictory [to resolution], how could that mind doubting principle possess it? They are equally contradictory. Its contradiction between vitarka and vicāra, the mutual opposition between rāga and dveṣa, and so forth, should all be challenged in this manner. Second, it says: However, when hesitation arises regarding the past or future, whether concerning facts or principle, the mind does not cognize the present, but cognizes only the past and future; regarding what could it produce an ascertainment? When hesitation arises concerning the nirvāṇa of the Śākyan lineage, what mark of ascertainment is there? Therefore we know that desire and resolution do not universally pervade defiled minds. Here too, both principle and facts in the past and future are doubted; the previous explanation only involved doubting facts, and since it is induced by doubting principle, it is also severed by the path of seeing; one cannot challenge by saying: "Because it arises cognizing facts, it is not severed by the path of seeing," for its mode of activity is deluded about principle while cognizing facts, as in the case of attachment to views and the like. This mode of activity is profound, unlike doubting a post, which has a shallow mode of activity and is not an affliction. This refutes the third master's position of ten universals. If so, why does [the text] speak of ten being conjoined? As explained by the first master.