成唯識論述記 5.513

5.513

述曰：此第三，智緣何法境。於佛地時緣無垢識等，即緣無垢第八淨識一切有為及真如，故言等。菩薩見修道位，緣異熟識及真如故。問：若許菩薩亦緣真如，即第七識一心之中雙緣真俗，有漏、無漏二境界失。答：若在真見道及一切緣真如無分別智，此第七識一向緣如，不緣第八，唯理觀故。其相見道，及修道中後得智品，平等性智或唯緣第八，或亦緣似真如，其實唯有為，通緣有漏、無漏為境，由第六識引生別故。今此總言緣異熟等，等真如等故，以後得智不親緣真如，不名真俗雙行。至五地中方合此難，合合令相應，故亦無妨。又解若在佛果，此平等智雙緣真俗，若在十地唯緣異熟，未能緣如，無如前失。此亦不然。十平等中許緣真如，《佛地論》中第五卷說，初地即得，故知因中亦緣真俗。前解為勝。或第八未捨名，得言緣賴耶，性未離故。故復言等，即是識字及一等字，通在無垢及異熟識。此解難知，既無能藏，藏義應暫捨。問：二執俱起，何故分位前後不同？初廣前人執。

The Commentary states: This is the third part: which dharmas and objects this wisdom takes as its object. At the stage of Buddhahood, it takes the taintless consciousness and so forth as its object—that is, it takes as its object all conditioned dharmas of the taintless eighth pure consciousness and tathatā; hence it says "and so forth". In the bodhisattva's stages of seeing and cultivation, it takes the ripening consciousness and tathatā as its object. Question: If it is conceded that the bodhisattva also takes tathatā as its object, then within a single mind of the seventh consciousness it would doubly take both ultimate and conventional, both sāsrava and anāsrava objects, which is a flaw. Answer: If in the true path of seeing and in all non-conceptual wisdom that takes tathatā as its object, this seventh consciousness exclusively takes tathatā as its object and does not take the eighth [consciousness], because it is purely a contemplation of principle. Its counter-path of seeing (darśanamārga-prātirūpika) and the category of subsequent wisdom in the path of cultivation, [where] the equality nature wisdom either exclusively takes the eighth [consciousness] as object or also takes an appearance resembling tathatā as object, in reality is only conditioned, universally taking both sāsrava and anāsrava as its object, because of the distinction induced by the sixth consciousness. Now it states generally that it "takes ripening and so forth as object", where "and so forth" encompasses tathatā and so on, because subsequent wisdom does not directly take tathatā as its object, so it is not called "double operation of ultimate and conventional". Only upon reaching the fifth bhūmi does it combine with this objection, bringing them together to make them correspond, so there is no fault. Another explanation says: if in the fruit of Buddhahood, this equality wisdom doubly takes both ultimate and conventional; if in the ten bhūmis, it only takes ripening as object and is not yet able to take tathatā as object, so there is no such flaw as mentioned before. This also is not correct. Among the ten equalities, it is conceded to take tathatā as object; fascicle five of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states that it is attained in the first bhūmi, hence we know that in the causal stage it also takes both ultimate and conventional as object. The former explanation is superior. Or, before the eighth [consciousness] has shed its name, one may say it takes the ālaya as object, because its nature has not been separated from it. Therefore it says "and so forth" again, which means the word "consciousness" and a single "and so forth" apply generally to both the taintless and ripening consciousnesses. This explanation is difficult to understand: since there is no storehouse ability (ālaya), the meaning of "storehouse" should be temporarily relinquished. Question: Since the two attachments arise together, why are their stages and order different? First, the previous attachment to person is elaborated.