成唯識論述記 5.632

5.632

述曰：「極成意識」是有法，言「極成」者，簡諸部計最後身菩薩有漏不善意識，及他簡自、他方佛意。若俱立此一切意，宗便有他、自所別不成過，故今簡之。次論復言：「必有不共，顯自名、處等無間不攝，增上生所依」，是法不共者，簡現第八識，以是共依故，非親生故，非相近故。今對五轉識生所依說故，但言不共；若不簡之，便成有共依，所立不成過，又無同喻，他不許五依第八故。設許五喻，所立不成。「顯自名、處」者，此即顯是十二處中意處所攝，簡上座部胸中色物以為意根，彼是法處，非意處故。唯第六識得微細之色，法處所收。此理不爾，應外處攝，為簡外處故置，顯自名、處所攝，意言「顯是意處所攝」，恐無同喻，但可總說顯自名、處，彼非所立，違自宗故，對上座師立已成故。「等無間不攝」，簡次第滅意等無間緣。今成俱有依，若不簡者，便非所立，立已成過。過去之意，一切小乘皆許有故。「增上」者，簡因緣即種子依。若對餘宗，便非所立；若對經部，便立已成。若舉五識以為同喻，所立不成。生「所依」者，簡第七識與八、五識為依，是八染淨依，非親生故，非相近故。是五染淨依，非生依攝。今顯第七為六生依，以近勝故。又簡俱時心所亦第六識依故。前無同喻過；後立已成過。又所依言，簡餘依法，彼但是依，非所依故，立已成過。此中一一互相簡略，然思可知，故不可說。因云：極成六識隨一攝故，此簡如前，如極成眼等識喻。此上宗中極成之言，通下喻故。此中問曰：五根別有體，意別立第七。五塵體實有，法亦實有耶？答：經云「從六二緣」，不言有體無體故。問：法雖無體，亦意得生，為例不成者，亦應從二緣生，根現無體亦得成，以過去意而為意故。答：不然。根能順生，同世一處有力故，現無體故即不成，法但為境即生心故。法無時，不例五，此如五十二中說，問難大好。

The Commentary states: "Universally established mental consciousness" is the subject (dharmin). The word "universally established" (prasiddha) is used to exclude what various schools posit as the sāsrava, unwholesome mental consciousness of a bodhisattva in his final lifetime, and to exclude the others' qualification of the minds of buddhas in this and other directions. If one posits all such minds together, the thesis would incur the fallacy of the locus being unestablished for the other or for oneself (para-/svato-'dharmi-asiddhi); therefore, it is now qualified. Next, the treatise also says: "Must have a unique, sovereign supporting basis of arising that manifests its own name and base (āyatana) and is not subsumed under the immediately preceding [condition]"—this is the predicate (sādhya-dharma). "Unique" excludes the present eighth consciousness, because it is a common supporting basis, not an immediate producer, and not closely proximate. Here, speaking in contrast to the supporting basis of arising for the five active consciousnesses, it is merely called "unique"; if one does not qualify it, it would incur the fallacy of the property to be proved being unestablished due to having a common supporting basis, and there would also be no positive example, as the opponent does not accept that the five depend on the eighth. Even if the example of the five were allowed, the property to be proved would not be established. "Manifests its own name and base" indicates that it is subsumed under the mental base (manāyatana) among the twelve bases, excluding the Sthavira school's positing of the material entity in the chest as the mental faculty, for that belongs to the base of phenomena (dharmāyatana) and not the mental base. Only the sixth consciousness grasps subtle matter, which is subsumed under the base of phenomena. This reasoning does not hold, for [such matter] would be subsumed under an external base; in order to exclude external bases, he states, "subsumed under that which manifests its own name and base." If one explicitly said "manifests that which is subsumed under the mental base," he feared there would be no positive example; one can only state generally that it manifests its own name and base; that [material entity] is not what is to be established, because it contradicts one's own tenet, and against the Sthavira master it would be proving what is already established (siddhasādhana). "Not subsumed under the immediately preceding" excludes the mental faculty of sequential cessation as an immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). Here we are establishing a coexistent basis (sahabhū-āśraya); if not qualified, it would not be what is to be established, incurring the fallacy of proving what is already established, for all Hīnayāna schools accept that past mind exists. "Sovereign" (adhipati) excludes the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya), namely the seed basis (bīja-āśraya). Against other schools it would not be what is to be established; against the Sautrāntika it would be proving what is already established. If one were to cite the five consciousnesses as a positive example, what is to be established would not be established. "Supporting basis (āśraya) of arising" excludes the seventh consciousness acting as a basis for the eighth and the five consciousnesses, because it is the defiled-pure basis for the eighth, but not an immediate producer nor closely proximate; and it is the defiled-pure basis for the five, not subsumed under the basis of arising. Here it shows that the seventh is the basis of arising for the sixth, because it is proximate and superior. Furthermore, it excludes the simultaneous caitasikas from also being a basis for the sixth consciousness; otherwise, the former would incur the fallacy of lacking a positive example, and the latter would incur the fallacy of proving what is already established. Moreover, the word "supporting basis" (āśraya) excludes other supporting dharmas (āśrita-dharma), for they are merely bases (āśrita) and not supporting bases (āśraya); [without this qualification,] it would be proving what is already established. The individual mutual qualifications herein can be known upon reflection, so they need not be stated in detail. The reason (hetu) states: "Because it is included among any of the universally established six consciousnesses"; this qualification is as explained before, like the example of the universally established eye-consciousness and the rest. The word "universally established" in the thesis above applies to the example below as well. Here someone asks: "The five faculties have distinct entities, and the mind distinctly establishes the seventh. The five dust-objects (viṣaya) have real entities; do mental phenomena (dharmāyatana) also have real entities?" The answer is: The sūtra says "arising from the two conditions of the six [pairs]," without speaking of having an entity or lacking an entity. The questioner asks: "Even if dharmas lack an entity, the mind can still arise. If the analogy fails, then it should also arise from two conditions, and even if the faculty currently lacks an entity, it should also be established, using the past mind as the mental faculty." The answer is: It is not so. A faculty can facilitate arising, possessing power in the same realm and same locus; hence if it currently lacks an entity, it cannot be established, whereas dharmas give rise to citta merely by serving as an object. When a dharma is absent, it does not parallel the five [faculties]; this is as explained in the fifty-second [fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi], and the objection is very good.