成唯識論述記 5.640

5.640

述曰：經部宗言，過去無體，假說用者；難云：汝之現在無正思量，假法何立？假法必有法可似故。無有現在實正思量，假依何立？大乘前破衛世外道假依真事，如此理，難乖前義者不然，據理而說，不依於真方有似轉。經部所計，現在正思，過去似此，假名為意。就彼宗難，無違教失，故前所說，存自就他難，今者癈，已從他難。又前約勝義難，真實義中不依於真，而辨假故。今依世俗難，世俗之中有真、似故。

The Commentary states: The Sautrāntika school says that the past has no entity, and its function is metaphorically designated. We challenge them, saying: In your [system], the present lacks real ratiocination; how can a metaphorical dharma be established? A metaphorical dharma must have an actual dharma to resemble. If there is no real, direct ratiocination in the present, on what would the metaphor be based? If someone objects that the Mahāyāna earlier refuted the Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists' view that metaphor depends on a real thing (dravya), and that this objection contradicts our earlier position, it is not so: speaking in accordance with reason, it is not the case that a resemblance occurs only by depending on something real. The Sautrāntika posits that the present is directly ratiocinating and the past resembles this, being metaphorically called manas. Refuting them in accordance with their own school incurs no error of contradicting doctrine; hence the earlier explanation maintained our own view to refute the other, whereas now we temporarily set aside our own view to follow the other's system in refuting them. Furthermore, earlier we refuted them from the perspective of ultimate truth (paramārtha), for in the ultimate truth metaphor is not differentiated by relying on what is real; now we refute them based on conventional truth (saṃvṛti), for within conventional truth there exist the real and the resembling.