成唯識論述記 5.847

5.847

述曰：上總舉；下引證。彼第三說，識能了別事之總相，不言取別，以是主故。若取別相，即心所故，作意了此所未了相。此者，即識所取總相，作意取此總相，及亦取識所未了相。未了相者，即是別相，即餘心所所取之別相，皆識所未了。作意一法，獨能取彼眾多別相，如彼論第三云：即此所未了別能了別者，說名作意。所未了境相，即是別相故；能了別者，名為作意；能緣別相者，即作意也。故知，心所取總、別相，王唯取總，如一懸令，唯知懸之總事，懸承稟命明府，雖為副貳，取總相已；後取一切別相，自餘懸尉亦取各別之相。此舉作意，例餘可知。由作意能令心、心所取境功力勝故，有此總取，多法別相也。故《瑜伽》以作意為初，此論以觸為初，和合勝故，各據一義。

The Commentary states: Above was the general presentation; below is citing proof. The third [fascicle of] that treatise says: Vijñāna can cognize the general mark of an affair; it does not say that it grasps specifics, because it is primary. If it grasped specific marks, it would be a caitasika. Attention cognizes that which is not yet cognized by this: 'this' means the general mark grasped by vijñāna; attention grasps this general mark, and it also grasps the marks not yet cognized by vijñāna. 'The marks not yet cognized' are precisely the specific marks—namely, the specific marks grasped by the other caitasikas, all of which are not yet cognized by vijñāna. The single dharma of attention alone can grasp those manifold specific marks. As that treatise says in its third [fascicle]: 'That which can cognize what is not yet cognized with respect to this is called attention.' Because the object-marks not yet cognized are precisely the specific marks, that which can cognize them is called attention; that which can take the specific marks as object is precisely attention. Therefore we know that caitasikas grasp both general and specific marks, whereas the king only grasps the general. It is like a district magistrate who only knows the general affairs of the district; the assistant magistrate receives orders from the magistrate, and though a subordinate, having grasped the general mark, he subsequently grasps all the specific marks; the remaining district lieutenants also grasp their respective specific marks. This adduces attention as an example, by which the rest can be known. Because attention has superior power to make citta and caitasikas grasp objects, it has this general grasping as well as the specific marks of many dharmas. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi takes attention as the first, while this treatise takes contact (sparśa) as the first; because harmonious combination is superior, each relies on one perspective.