成唯識論述記 5.919

5.919

述曰：第三禪中近分、根本二，俱有樂，如《顯揚》第二，引經等廣解。以安靜適悅故，無分別適悅，故名樂。尤重故名樂，即是在意，名樂所以。彼論自說，以喜動勇，第三定悅安靜，故是樂。然或有義，初二近分有樂，如《顯揚》第二引經云，根本、近分俱有離生喜樂言故。五根雖無遍悅，何不名樂？五十七說初門顯未至亦有喜、樂等。何故有喜之言即證有喜，有樂之言非證有樂？《顯揚論》第二云，初二定根本、近分，一一皆云有喜、樂故；第三近分，亦言有樂。此說即有。何故初、二近分不令有樂？今解正者，非近分中不許有樂，然未至定言十一根者，少故不說，相未明滿故不說之。今此論中同十一根文，下文以此例解地獄有憂之義，亦即苦故；以悅根少，但得喜名；以迫心強，亦得名苦受。苦受中等，若言樂受、苦受，即通喜、憂，文言寬故。若言苦根者，唯一受也。

The Commentary states: In the third dhyāna, both the threshold stage and the fundamental [absorption] have pleasure (sukha), as explained extensively in Fascicle Two of the Prakaraṇāryavācā, citing sūtras, etc. Because of its serene agreeableness and because it is non-conceptual agreeableness, it is called pleasure. Because it is especially weighty, it is called pleasure; that it resides in the mental [consciousness] is precisely the reason it is called pleasure. That treatise itself explains: because joy (prīti) is agitated and energetic, whereas the agreeableness of the third absorption is serene, it is therefore pleasure. However, another opinion holds that the threshold stages of the first and second [dhyānas] have pleasure, as cited in Fascicle Two of the Prakaraṇāryavācā where a sūtra states that both the fundamental and threshold stages have the words 'joy and pleasure born of detachment.' Even though there is no pervasive agreeableness across the five faculties, why should it not be called pleasure? Fascicle Fifty-Seven states that the initial gateway shows that the threshold stage to the first dhyāna also has joy, pleasure, and so forth. Why should the phrase 'has joy' prove that there is joy, while the phrase 'has pleasure' does not prove that there is pleasure? Fascicle Two of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states, for each of the fundamental and threshold stages of the first and second absorptions, that there are joy and pleasure; of the threshold stage of the third dhyāna, it also states that there is pleasure. As this is stated, it indeed exists. Why would one deny pleasure to the threshold stages of the first and second? The correct explanation now given is: it is not that pleasure is disallowed in the threshold stages; rather, when the threshold stage to the first dhyāna mentions eleven faculties, [pleasure] is not stated because it is minor, and because its characteristics are not fully clear and complete, it is not mentioned. Now, in this treatise, in accordance with the text mentioning eleven faculties, the subsequent text draws an analogy from this to explain the sense that hell has sorrow (daurmanasya), which is precisely pain (duḥkha); because it pleases few faculties, it only receives the name of joy; and because it oppresses the mind intensely, it also can receive the name of the sensation of pain. Within the sensation of pain, etc., if one speaks of the sensation of pleasure and the sensation of pain, they then encompass joy and sorrow, because the wording is broader. If one speaks of the faculty of pain (duḥkhêndriya), it is exclusively a single sensation.