成唯識論述記 6.552

6.552

述曰：若非影說及隨轉者，即五十八迷四諦中，如滅諦下，非滅計滅，非勝計勝，故應是見取；迷道諦中，非道計道，亦得淨故，應名戒取。彼非因計因，亦是邪見，如前邪見中說。既是邪見，明不執見、戒等故；及雖計勝，不計為能得淨，及雖計能得，不計為勝，故非見戒、取，此大小二乘別也。若爾，何故《大論》第八，三種四倒見倒中云：非淨計淨是見取，非樂計樂是戒取？今釋之言，彼亦計諸見、眷屬，不淨為淨及能得淨，故名見取。然文但明是見取故，略不言諸見及眷屬能得淨，但言非淨計淨故。戒取亦然，謂計戒所受拔髮等苦為樂、勝、能得淨，是戒取，略不言戒及眷屬、能得淨，但言計苦為樂也。若非見、眷屬、非淨為淨及非戒、眷屬、非樂為樂，即非見、戒取，但是邪見也，如非道計道等。諸門分別中，大以十二門分別，若細者即十五門。

The Commentary states: If it were not an elliptical expression or an accommodation [to the Hīnayāna], then in [the Yogācārabhūmi,] fascicle 58, in delusion regarding the four noble truths: under the truth of cessation, taking what is not cessation to be cessation and taking what is not supreme to be supreme should be the grasp of views; under the truth of the path, taking what is not the path to be the path because it also attains purity should be called the grasp of precepts and vows. But their taking what is not a cause to be a cause is also wrong view, as stated above under wrong view. Since it is wrong view, it clearly does not grasp [wrong] views, precepts, and so forth; and although it considers something supreme, it does not consider it capable of attaining purity, and although it considers it capable of attaining purity, it does not consider it supreme; therefore, it is neither the grasp of views nor the grasp of precepts—this is the distinction between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna. If so, why does the Great Treatise [Yogācārabhūmi], fascicle 8, say regarding the view-inversions among the three kinds of four inversions: 'taking what is impure to be pure is the grasp of views, and taking what is suffering to be pleasure is the grasp of precepts'? We now explain this: that text also refers to taking the various views and their retinues—which are impure—to be pure and capable of attaining purity; hence it is called the grasp of views. However, because the text merely clarifies that it is the grasp of views, it abbreviates and does not state that the views and their retinues can attain purity, but only says 'taking the impure to be pure.' The grasp of precepts is also like this: namely, taking the suffering of plucking hair and the like undergone for the sake of precepts to be pleasure, supreme, and capable of attaining purity is the grasp of precepts; it abbreviates and does not state the precepts, their retinues, and the ability to attain purity, but merely says 'taking suffering to be pleasure.' If it does not take views and their retinues and what is impure to be pure, and does not take precepts and their retinues and what is suffering to be pleasure, then it is neither the grasp of views nor the grasp of precepts, but simply wrong view, just like taking what is not the path to be the path and the like. Among the distinctions by various categories, broadly there are twelve categories of distinction; if distinguished in detail, there are fifteen categories.