成唯識論述記 7.510
成唯識論述記 7.510
- Language
- Classical Chinese
7.510
述曰:此指解也。真諦論云:「定處等義成,如夢,如餓鬼續不定,一切同見膿河等,如夢害作事。復次,如地獄一切見獄卒及共受逼害」。菩提流支論云:「處.時等諸事,無色等外法,人夢及餓鬼,依業虛妄見,如夢中無女,動身失不淨,獄中種種主,為彼所逼惱」。新翻論云:「處、時定如夢,身不定如鬼,同見膿河等,如夢損有用」。此之一頌,以三事喻釋前四難。彼論云:「謂如夢中雖無實境,而或有處見有村園、男女等物,非一切處」,此答處定難。立量質云:「汝夢於是處見有村園等,應非處定,汝許夢境非實有故,如餘夢中所不見處,餘不見處,例所見處,比量亦爾。此中雖有世間、自宗,二相違過,置汝言故,以簡之也」。正解量云:其非夢時境雖無實,而所見事,其處亦定。許如是境,皆無實故,如夢所見,以因言許,無隨一失,言如是故,無以真如亦不實過。彼論云:即於是處或時,見有彼村園等,非一切時。此答時定難。立量准前,此以一喻釋處及時二種定難。彼論云:「謂如餓鬼同業異熟,多身共集皆見膿河,非於此中定唯一見,此諸餓鬼或見糞等,及見有情執持刀杖,遮捍守護,不令得食」,此答相續不決定難。立量解云:同於一時,同於一處,相續不定,其理得成,許境無實故,猶如餓鬼見膿河等,經部等小乘及外道等。皆信鬼見膿河等非實仍身不定,故以為喻。彼論云:「又如夢中境雖無實,而有損失精血等用」,此答作用不決定難。立量解云:有翳無翳所見髮等,有用、無用其理亦成,許無實境故,如夢失精等。上來一頌以三種喻釋四難訖。彼論次有一頌,以一種喻合釋四難,頌云:「一切如地獄,同見獄卒等,能為逼害事,故四義皆成」。彼長行云:「謂地獄中,雖無真實有情數,攝獄卒等事,而彼有情同業異熟增上力故,同處、同時眾多相續,皆共見有獄卒、狗、鳥、鐵山等物,來至其所,為逼害事」。立量解云:「餘位處定等,非不得成,許無實境此識生故,如地獄人等,此四事得成」,外許非有情故,得以為喻,由此雖無離識實境。而處定等,四義皆成。廣如《唯識二十》中說:今舉一夢境,等餘別二喻,及一種喻,應釋汝疑。
The Commentary states: This points to the explanation. Paramārtha's translation of the treatise says: "The determination of place and so forth is established like a dream; as with hungry ghosts whose continuities are undetermined, all together seeing rivers of pus and the like; and as in dreams harming functions as an activity. Furthermore, like hell, where all see the hell-wardens and together suffer torment." Bodhiruci's translation of the treatise says: "Matters such as place and time lack external phenomena such as matter; humans in dreams and hungry ghosts see falsely based on karma; just as without a woman in a dream, one moves the body and emits impurity; in hell there are various masters, and one is tormented by them." The newly translated treatise says: "Determination of place and time is like a dream; the indetermination of persons is like ghosts, all seeing rivers of pus and the like; like a loss in a dream, there is efficacy." This single stanza explains the previous four objections by means of three illustrative examples. That treatise states: "That is to say, just as in a dream, although there are no real objects, yet in some places one sees villages, gardens, men, women, and so forth, and not in all places"—this answers the objection regarding the determination of place. Setting up a syllogism to challenge them: "Your dream seeing villages and gardens in this place should not be determinate in place, because you admit that dream objects are not real, like other places not seen in a dream. The other places not seen, by analogy with the places seen, are likewise in the inference. Although here there would be the fallacies of contradicting worldly consensus and one's own doctrine, by inserting the word 'your', they are excluded." The correct syllogistic explanation says: When not dreaming, although the object is unreal, the matter seen is also determinate in its place, because it is admitted that such objects are all unreal, like what is seen in a dream. Because of using the word 'admitted' in the reason, there is no fallacy of being unshared by one party; and because of saying 'such', there is no fallacy of tathatā also being unreal. That treatise states: "At that very place at some times one sees those villages, gardens, and so forth, and not at all times"—this answers the objection regarding the determination of time. The syllogism is framed according to the previous one; this explains the two objections of the determination of place and time with a single example. That treatise states: "Namely, as hungry ghosts with common karmic maturation, many persons gathered together, all see rivers of pus, and it is not determined that only one sees it among them; these hungry ghosts also see feces and the like, as well as beings holding swords and clubs, barring, guarding, and not letting them obtain food"—this answers the objection regarding the indetermination of continuities. Setting up a syllogistic explanation: At the same time and in the same place, the indetermination of continuities is logically tenable, because the object is admitted to be unreal, just as hungry ghosts see rivers of pus and the like. The Hinayana schools such as the Sautrāntika and non-Buddhist traditions all believe that hungry ghosts seeing rivers of pus and the like is unreal, yet their bodies are undetermined, so it is taken as an example. That treatise states: "Furthermore, just as in a dream, although the object is unreal, there is the function of the loss of semen, blood, and so forth"—this answers the objection regarding the indetermination of function. Setting up a syllogistic explanation: That what is seen by those with eye-cataracts and those without eye-cataracts, whether hair or the like, has efficacy or lacks efficacy, is also logically tenable, because it is admitted that there is no real object, like the loss of semen in a dream. Above, one stanza finishes explaining the four objections with three examples. That treatise next has a stanza that explains all four objections together with a single example; the stanza says: "All is like hell, all seeing hell-wardens and the like, capable of performing the acts of torment; therefore the four points are all established." Its prose commentary states: "Namely, in hell, although there are no hell-wardens and so forth included among real sentient beings, yet by the sovereign power of the common karmic maturation of those sentient beings, at the same place and at the same time, many continuities all together see hell-wardens, dogs, birds, iron mountains, and the like coming to their presence and inflicting torment." Setting up a syllogistic explanation: "In other states, the determination of place and so forth is not incapable of being established, because this consciousness arises admitting that there are no real objects, just as with the beings in hell, these four matters can be established." Because the opponent admits that they are not sentient beings, it can be taken as an example. Thus, although there are no real objects apart from consciousness, the four points such as the determination of place are all established. It is explained in detail in the Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā; now, mentioning a single dream object includes the other two distinct examples and the one comprehensive example, which should resolve your doubt.
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Linked texts (1)
- 唯識二十論 — Classical Chinese