成唯識論述記 8.217
成唯識論述記 8.217
- Language
- Classical Chinese
8.217
述曰:淨八識聚若自、他身,自、他八識為緣,皆增所緣緣,以淨八識皆得緣他及自身者互得相緣故,即淨八識皆得互緣。同時心、心所,亦得互自緣同時心、心所,以彼功能遍現影故。識自證分與相應法見分,同緣緣自見分,餘淨心所義例亦然。又,或能緣彼相分故,若不現彼影,應非知一切。又有解者,上文所言勿見分境不同質故,即識見分與相應見分定必同緣。如何自證與相應法見分,同緣識之見分不自緣也?若自緣者與自證分何別?若不緣者,便違上文。今有二解:一云:前依因位非依果說,依果說者,見分之境亦不必同。又,識等見分與相應法亦定同緣,亦自緣見分,亦緣自證分,與相應法見境齊故。然與自證作用各別,自證唯內緣更不別變,其見分自緣等亦更別變。然相分攝,與相應法同外取故,相應法緣識,既不外取別變相分,識之見分例亦應然,亦不違上見分境同,此義雖勝然稍難知。
The Commentary states: If [we take] the pure cluster of the eight consciousnesses, whether belonging to oneself or to another person's body, the eight consciousnesses of oneself and another serve as conditions [for each other], all augmenting the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya); for the pure eight consciousnesses can all take another as well as oneself as object and can mutually take each other as object, meaning that the pure eight consciousnesses can all take one another as object. Simultaneously arisen citta and caitasikas can also mutually take simultaneously arisen citta and caitasikas as objects themselves, because their functionality completely manifests images [of them]. The self-witnessing part (svasaṃvittibhāga) of a consciousness and the vision part (darśanabhāga) of its associated dharmas simultaneously take [the same object], taking its own vision part as object; the principle is the same for the remaining pure caitasikas. Furthermore, or because they can take its mark part (nimittabhāga) as object: if they did not manifest its image, they would not be all-knowing. There is also another explanation: what the text above stated about avoiding the objects of the vision parts not sharing the same underlying reality (dravya) means that the vision part of a consciousness and the vision parts of its associated [caitasikas] must definitely take the same object. How could the self-witnessing part and the vision part of an associated dharma together take the vision part of the consciousness as object without [the vision part] taking itself as object? If it took itself as object, how would it differ from the self-witnessing part? If it did not take itself as object, it would contradict the text above. Now there are two explanations: The first says: The earlier [statement] was based on the causal stage, not on the stage of fruition; if speaking based on fruition, the objects of the vision parts also do not necessarily have to be identical. Furthermore, the vision parts of consciousness and so forth definitely take the same object as the associated dharmas: they also take their own vision part as object and also take their own self-witnessing part as object, being equal in the realm seen with the associated dharmas. However, their functions are distinct from the self-witnessing part: the self-witnessing part only takes [what is] internal as object and does not additionally transform, whereas its vision part taking itself as object and so on also additionally transforms. Yet it is subsumed under the mark part, and since together with the associated dharmas it externally apprehends: when an associated dharma takes the consciousness as object, since it does not externally apprehend [directly] but additionally transforms a mark part, the vision part of the consciousness should by analogy be the same; nor does this contradict the earlier [statement] that the objects of the vision parts are identical. Although this meaning is superior, it is somewhat difficult to understand.
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- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation