成唯識論述記 8.610

8.610

述曰：此論主答：若作此解有四問答，若作後二解，但有三文。今以法喻却解前難，謂如諸異生煩惱所拘礙故，馳流生死，不趣涅槃。彼趣寂者，心樂趣滅，為此心拘，馳流無相，不趣無上正等菩提，如諸異生拘煩惱故。雖有所知障，不能成佛，如諸異生雖有無漏種，不趣涅槃。第八十說：由種姓別，故不能趣，如無種姓人拘煩惱故，馳流生死。又，若所知障助無漏業，至此異生拘煩惱文，有義：總是難外伏計，謂有伏計，以無漏業正感生死，為生死因如善惡業。今此難彼。若由無漏正感生死所知障助，二乘定性應不永入無餘涅槃，恒起無漏為生死因，有所知障恒為緣助，拘二乘故不得趣寂，如諸異生善惡業因煩惱力，助拘煩惱故不得涅槃，返顯既知有趣寂者，雖有無漏及所知障，不皆迴心，故知無漏非為生死正感因也。又解此文乃至如何道諦實能感苦，總是難文，有二難意。若所知障助無漏業能感生死，二乘定性應不永入無餘涅槃，以所知障招於生死，拘彼二乘不令趣寂，如諸異生拘諸煩惱不得涅槃，第一問也，故下答云：彼所知障無能發業潤生之用，但為緣助感於生死，有種姓者起無漏定願所知障助有變易生，非正發業潤生能感，故有定性入涅槃者，雖有所知障，不能發業等故，如何道諦實能感苦，第二問也。下文先答此第二問，後答第一問。然雖三解此一段文，初解同《瑜伽》、《佛地》俱有此問，其第二解設難伏計亦有此理。第三解下准有答，文勢不違，亦無過失。

The Commentary states: The treatise master answers: If interpreted this way, there are four questions and answers; if interpreted according to the latter two explanations, there are only three passages. Now, by means of a doctrinal metaphor, the preceding objection is resolved in turn: it means that just as various ordinary persons are bound and obstructed by defilements and so rush through birth-and-death without proceeding toward nirvāṇa; so those who incline toward quiescence have minds that delight in tending toward cessation, and being bound by this mind, they rush along in the signless without proceeding toward unsurpassed, complete enlightenment—just as ordinary persons are bound by defilements. Although they possess the cognitive hindrance, they cannot achieve Buddhahood, just as ordinary persons, though possessing undefiled seeds, do not proceed toward nirvāṇa. Fascicle 80 states: because of the difference in spiritual lineage (gotra), they cannot proceed, just as persons without gotra are bound by defilements and rush through birth-and-death.

Alternatively, from "If the cognitive hindrance assists undefiled karma..." down to this text "ordinary persons are bound by defilements," there is an interpretation holding that the whole passage is an objection against a hidden assumption of an outsider. That is, there is a hidden assumption that undefiled karma directly induces birth-and-death and serves as a cause of birth-and-death, like good and bad karma. Now this objects against them: If undefiled karma directly induces birth-and-death with the assistance of the cognitive hindrance, then the two vehicles of determinate nature should never enter permanently into nirvāṇa without remainder, because they constantly give rise to undefiled karma as a cause of birth-and-death, and the cognitive hindrance constantly serves as a contributing condition, binding the two vehicles so that they cannot proceed toward quiescence—just as the defilement force of ordinary persons' causes of good and bad karma assists and binds them through defilements, so that they cannot attain nirvāṇa. This inversely shows that since we know there are those who incline toward quiescence, who, despite possessing undefiled karma and the cognitive hindrance, do not turn their minds around, we know that undefiled karma is not the direct, inducing cause of birth-and-death.

Yet another interpretation holds that this passage down to "How can the truth of the path actually induce suffering?" is entirely an objection text, having two objections in its intent. First: If the cognitive hindrance assists undefiled karma to induce birth-and-death, then the two vehicles of determinate nature should never enter permanently into nirvāṇa without remainder, because the cognitive hindrance beckons birth-and-death and binds those of the two vehicles, preventing them from proceeding toward quiescence, just as ordinary persons are bound by defilements and cannot attain nirvāṇa. This is the first question. Hence the answer below states: that cognitive hindrance has no function of initiating karma or moistening rebirth; it merely serves as a contributing condition to induce birth-and-death; those who possess the gotra give rise to undefiled concentration and vows, and assisted by the cognitive hindrance have transformative birth, yet it does not directly initiate karma or moisten rebirth to induce it. Therefore, there are those of determinate nature who enter nirvāṇa, because although they possess the cognitive hindrance, it cannot initiate karma and so forth. Second: "How can the truth of the path actually induce suffering?" This is the second question. The text below first answers this second question, and subsequently answers the first question.

Although there are these three explanations for this single passage: the first explanation agrees with the Yogācāra and Buddhabhūmi, which both have this question; the second explanation, positing an objection against a hidden assumption, also contains this principle; and the third explanation matches the answers below, its textual momentum does not conflict, and it is also without fault.