成唯識論述記 9.121

9.121

述曰：第五難也。從緣所生不離於識內之二分，非依他起。二分所依依他起識體，例亦應爾。無異所以，彼此可別。若心外二分非因緣生，可非依他起。然彼師計：能生之種有二，能生、所生現行及計所執，故以自證為例。例之應立量云：因緣所生二分是依他起，因緣種子生故，如自證分。又唯自證分，如何緣證自證？如何緣種？豈一心中亦量、非量？得自緣故，許有見分即無此失。若更立分者，即初自證不自內緣，亦見分攝。

The Commentary states: The fifth objection. The two internal parts that are born from conditions and not separated from consciousness would not be other-dependent. The substance of the other-dependent consciousness upon which the two parts rely should also, by analogy, be like this. There is no different reason why one and the other could be distinguished. If the two parts outside the mind were not born of causes and conditions, it would be acceptable that they were not other-dependent. However, that master asserts: the seeds that can produce have two [aspects]—the samudācāra that can produce and is produced, and the imagined; therefore he takes the self-verifying part as an analogy. By analogy, one should formulate the inference: 'The two parts born of causes and conditions are other-dependent; because they are born from seeds of causes and conditions; just like the self-verifying part.' Furthermore, if there is only a self-verifying part, how could it cognize the verification of the self-verifying part? How could it cognize seeds? Could there be, within a single mind, both valid cognition (pramāṇa) and invalid cognition (apramāṇa)? Because it can cognize itself, if one accepts that there is a darśana-bhāga, there is no such fault. If one establishes further parts, the initial self-verifying part does not cognize itself internally, and is also subsumed under the darśana-bhāga.