成唯識論述記 9.137

9.137

述曰：「遍」簡自相，諸法自相局法體故，不通於餘。若通於餘，便非自相，故唯真如能遍諸法。「常」顯何義？常簡共相。諸法無常、空、無我等，雖遍諸法，體非實有，謂諸法上無體、無用，名空、無我，非有實體貫通諸法，唯有觀心無共相體，如前已說。既爾，不應說彼體性是常法，故言「真如常」，簡彼共相。又「非虛謬」言，意顯何等義？非虛謬簡虛空、我等，小乘、外道執虛空、我亦體是常，能遍諸法，說彼虛謬非法實性，故「非虛」言簡異虛空；「非謬」之言即簡我等，等妄執故。又言等者，等衛世師「大有」、「和合」，僧佉「自性」，雖彼計遍，又體是常。今言彼體是虛謬性，非定有體故。復言等，即唯真如具此三義，圓成實言如次配屬。問曰：若爾，淨分依他體非常、遍，如何亦是圓成實攝？

The Commentary states: 'Omnipresent' excludes particular characteristics, because the particular characteristics of phenomena are restricted to the individual substances of phenomena and do not extend to others; if they extended to others, they would no longer be particular characteristics. Therefore, only suchness can be omnipresent to all phenomena. What meaning does 'permanent' express? 'Permanent' excludes common characteristics. The impermanence, emptiness, non-self, and so on of all phenomena, although omnipresent to all phenomena, are not real existents in substance; that is, the absence of substance and function upon phenomena is called 'emptiness' and 'non-self'—it is not that there is a real substance pervading all phenomena, but only that the contemplating mind possesses no objective substance of common characteristics, as previously explained. Since this is so, one should not say that their nature is a permanent phenomenon; thus, saying 'suchness is permanent' excludes those common characteristics. Furthermore, what meaning is intended by the words 'neither illusory nor erroneous'? 'Neither illusory nor erroneous' excludes space, the self, and so forth. Hinayāna and non-Buddhists grasp space and the self as also being permanent in substance and capable of pervading all phenomena; we declare them to be illusory and erroneous, not the real nature of phenomena. Thus the word 'not illusory' excludes space, while the word 'not erroneous' excludes the self and so forth, because they are equally false attachments. Moreover, the word 'and so forth' encompasses the Vaiśeṣika's 'great existence' (mahāsattā) and 'inherence' (samavāya), as well as the Sāṃkhya's 'primordial nature' (prakṛti); although they posit them as omnipresent and permanent in substance, we now state that their substance is of an illusory and erroneous nature, as they lack definitively real substance. The word 'and so forth' is repeated, meaning that only suchness possesses these three meanings, and the words of 'consummated' (pariniṣpanna) are apportioned accordingly. Question: If so, since the pure part of the other-dependent is neither permanent nor omnipresent in substance, how is it also subsumed under the consummated nature?