成唯識論述記 9.257

9.257

述曰：《辨中邊》說：世間所成唯初性攝，一切世間多共依此一處執故，體即依他，假名所執。又解，即共所執我、法為初真實，世間執實故，名初性攝。若約前解，體是有法，同《瑜伽》等四真實皆有法，假名所執，後解即通有法、無法，為四真實體亦不相違。第二真實即道理，是三性所攝，道理之法通執、無執。執中有所、能執。所執是初性，能執是染依他，無執中通雜染及清淨，雜染是依他，清淨是成實，後二真實與此等同。前唯約異生，為道理真實，故唯依他，此通約凡、聖，故通三性。初真實中，此約有體法故，唯依他，彼據無法執所執語，故唯初性，不相違也。舊《中邊》上頌說：一處世俗成，三處道理成，清淨境二種，攝在於一處。新翻《中邊》第二卷云：「世極成依一，理極成依三」，淨所行有二：依一圓成實，義皆同也，應取諸論出四實體及諸門義。

The Commentary states: The Madhyāntavibhāga states that worldly established reality is subsumed exclusively under the first nature, because all worldly beings mostly adhere to this single locus together; thus its substance is the other-dependent, but it is nominally designated as the imagined. Another explanation is that it is precisely the mutually clung-to self and dharmas that constitute the first reality; because the worldly cling to them as real, it is said to be subsumed under the first nature. According to the former explanation, its substance is an existent entity; like the Yogācārabhūmi and others, all four realities are existent entities, nominally designated as the imagined. According to the latter explanation, it encompasses both existent entities and non-existent entities; having them serve as the substances of the four realities likewise involves no contradiction. The second reality—rationality—is subsumed under the three natures; the phenomenon of rationality encompasses both what has clinging and what is free from clinging. Within clinging, there are the grasped and the grasper: the grasped is the first nature, and the grasper is the defiled other-dependent. Within freedom from clinging, it encompasses defilement and purification: defilement is the other-dependent, and purification is the thoroughly established. The latter two realities are equivalent to this. Previously, taking only ordinary worldlings as having rationally established reality, it was exclusively the other-dependent; here, applying commonly to both ordinary beings and nobles, it encompasses the three natures. In the first reality, because [the former] considers existent entities, it is exclusively the other-dependent; whereas [the Madhyāntavibhāga] relies on the clung-to objects of clinging to non-existent entities, and thus it is exclusively the first nature. There is no contradiction. The older verse translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga states: 'Worldly convention is established in one locus; rationality is established in three loci; the two kinds of purified objects are subsumed in one locus.' The second fascicle of the newly translated Madhyāntavibhāga states: 'The worldly established depends on one; the rationally established depends on three; the purified scopes are two, depending on one, the thoroughly established.' The meanings are identical; one should consult the various treatises to determine the substances of the four realities and the various doctrinal classifications.