成唯識論述記 9.297

9.297

述曰：初性是無，非所緣緣。所緣緣體具二義故，必有體故。若爾，佛智應不緣彼，緣與不緣皆有過失。不緣，不知無故，如何復言：此應遍知？若緣者，如何成所緣緣？解云：親所緣緣即不緣彼，非有法故，以為本無質，別變似無名應知，緣無如緣他心，不爾，即違聖教道理。如緣他心，《二十唯識》說：不知如佛不可思議境。雖爾，下言親緣，上來論意不許親緣故。解彼文云：然稱實知，佛親證相故，名現量，明淨圓極勝二乘故，乃至緣過、未，天眼、宿命亦爾，佛智生時有此相起。佛親證相圓明、圓極，勝聲聞等名之為知，非親證也。言不思議者，是勝義，圓明、圓極義故，非謂親證彼心，心外取故，聖者以此達為無。心外無無故，但見自心之上依他起相，不見心所取上實我、實法。實我、實法都無所有，作此無相，故名應知。此護法義，如《二十唯識》、《抄》二解。七十四說：初性非凡、聖智行，以無相故，然說應知，故此解勝。彼論依他、圓成，說境同此，依他然是世間無漏聖智之境，非出世智，有為法故。《佛地》第七引《瑜伽》等說，初非聖境，後非凡境，中是二境。初性是無，非聖所證，復不執故；後性勝義，非凡智親緣。若爾，聖智不知一切，彼既是無，智何所知？若知為有，則成顛倒；若知為無，則非初性。心所現無，依他起攝；真如理無，圓成實攝。是故聖智雖知有、無，而不緣彼初性為境，與前說同，非不證無，便非聖智，勿心外法亦能緣故。凡雖緣如，不得實故，說非彼境。總有三文：一、初非凡、聖所行，後非凡所行；二、初非聖所行；三、通凡、聖智所行，後亦應疎所取故。

The Commentary states: The first nature is nonexistent and is not an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). Because the substance of an objective condition possesses two meanings, it must have substance. If so, the Buddha's wisdom ought not to take it as an object; yet both taking it as an object and not taking it as an object incur faults. If it does not take it as an object, it would not know its nonexistence; how then could it be said: "This should be completely known"? If it takes it as an object, how does it constitute an objective condition? The explanation is: as an immediate objective condition (pratyakṣālambanapratyaya), it does not take it as an object, because it is not an existent dharma; taking what is originally nonexistent as a substratum, it separately transforms and resembles nonexistence, which is called "should be known." Taking nonexistence as an object is like taking another's mind as an object; otherwise, it would contradict the reasoning of the noble teachings. As for taking another's mind as an object, the Viṃśikā says: "It is not known like the Buddha's inconceivable scope." Even so, although it says below that it directly takes it as an object, the treatise's intent up to this point does not permit directly taking it as an object. Explaining that text: however, knowing in conformity with reality, because the Buddha directly realizes the marks, it is called direct perception (pratyakṣa); because its clarity, purity, and perfection surpass the two vehicles, and even up to taking the past and future as objects through the divine eye and knowledge of past lives, it is likewise so: when the Buddha's wisdom arises, this mark appears. The Buddha directly realizes marks in a fully luminous and ultimate manner, surpassing the śrāvakas and others, and this is called "knowing," not that he directly realizes [another's mind as an external object]. When it says "inconceivable," it means ultimate, fully luminous and ultimate, not that he directly realizes that other mind by apprehending outside the mind; the noble one, through this, penetrates it as nonexistent. Since outside the mind there is no nonexistence, he merely sees the marks of dependent arising upon his own mind, and does not see a real self or real dharmas upon what is apprehended by the mind. A real self and real dharmas do not exist at all; forming this signlessness is therefore called "should be known." This is Dharmapāla's position, as found in the two explanations in the Viṃśikā and the Notes. Fascicle seventy-four [of the Yogācārabhūmi] states: "The first nature is not the scope of activity of either ordinary or noble wisdom, because it lacks marks; however, it is said that it should be known," hence this explanation is superior. That treatise speaks of the dependent and the perfected as objects in the same way as here. However, the dependent nature is the object of mundane and anāsrava noble wisdom; it is not [the object of] supramundane wisdom, because it is a conditioned dharma. Fascicle seven of the Buddhabhūmi cites the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts saying: "The first is not a noble object; the last is not an ordinary object; the middle is the object of both." The first nature is nonexistent, is not realized by the noble one, and is furthermore not grasped; the last nature is the ultimate, and is not directly taken as an object by ordinary wisdom. If so, noble wisdom would not know everything: since that [imagined nature] is nonexistent, what does the wisdom know? If it knows it as existent, it would be inverted; if it knows it as nonexistent, it is not the first nature. The nonexistence manifested by the mind is subsumed under the dependent nature; the principle of nonexistence that is tathatā is subsumed under the perfected nature. Therefore, although noble wisdom knows existence and nonexistence, it does not take that first nature as its object, which is consistent with the previous statement. It is not that if one does not realize nonexistence one is not a noble wisdom, lest dharmas outside the mind could also be taken as objects. Although ordinary beings take tathatā as an object, because they do not grasp reality, it is said not to be their object. In all, there are three texts: first, the first is not the scope of activity of either ordinary or noble beings, while the last is not the scope of activity of ordinary beings; second, the first is not the scope of activity of noble beings; third, it penetrates the scope of activity of both ordinary and noble wisdom, because the last may also be taken as a remote object.