成唯識論述記 9.303

9.303

述曰：此第二，性有實、有假。假有三種：一、聚集假，如瓶、盆、有情等是聚集法，多法一時所集成故，能集成雖實，所成是假。二、相續假者，如過、未等，世唯有因果是相續性，多法、多時上立一假法，如佛說言：「昔者鹿王，今我身是。」所依五蘊剎那滅者，雖體是實，於此多法相續，假立一有情，至今猶在故。三、分位假者，如不相應行是分位性，故皆是假，一法一時上立。如一色上名有漏，可見有對，亦名色等，並是於一法上假施設故，若彼實者應有多體，其忿、恨等皆此假攝。心、心所、色從因緣種生，故說為實，若清辨等依勝義諦，依他等並名假者，依他之中自無實法，假法亦無，一種類中，假法必依實因而施設故。《顯揚》十六三性中說：不應宣說諸法唯是假有，何以故？假法必有所依因故，非無實法、假法成立。若異此者，無實物故，假亦應無，即應破壞假、實二法，二法壞故應無雜染。雜染既可得，當知必有依他起性。又云：依他不如施設決定是有，亦非一切決定是無，故一切種非有非無。然許皆可言說，謂若有若無、亦有亦無、非有非無，此性通假、實，由世俗故說為有，若勝義中非有、非非有，不可說故。《對法》第三說，待名言故，一切皆假；不待名言故，一切皆實。真諦三藏《解拳論》成此三假，陳那菩薩造，如別章說。問：第二卷吠世師難假法必依真事、似事共法而立，彼皆破之，何故此中假依實法，無實假無？答：彼計真事即實等句義，似事依此真故成，共法是德，又真事是法自相。今破彼實等句義非真事，真事無故似事亦無，德句共法亦無，非於自相有似名起。今於法共相方有似名生，然共相中要須稍有體法，如青、黃，心、心所等，方可假說長、短。不相應為假法，非無彼實有此假故。前破他真，真非實故，於彼所執，體全無故。今言實事，稍擬宜故。問：若爾，何故說依他名似我法？我法實事無故。答：前言依他，似彼妄情能執實我、實法說為假，還是依實說假我、法，非依妄情之境說假我、法，我、法無故。

The Commentary states: This second nature has both the real and the nominal. The nominal has three varieties: First, the aggregation-nominal (saṃghāta-prajñapti): phenomena such as jars, basins, and sentient beings are aggregated phenomena, because they are formed simultaneously by the aggregation of multiple phenomena; though that which is capable of aggregating is real, what is formed is nominal. Second, the continuum-nominal (santāna-prajñapti): as in the past and future, wherein the temporal worlds have continuity consisting solely in cause and effect, where a single nominal entity is established upon multiple phenomena and multiple times—as when the Buddha said, 'The deer king of the past is now my very body.' Although the five aggregates that serve as the basis, which perish moment by moment, are real in substance, upon this continuum of multiple phenomena a single sentient being is nominally established, continuing down to the present day. Third, the state-nominal (avasthā-prajñapti): phenomena such as the formations unassociated [with citta] are by nature states and are therefore all nominal, established upon a single phenomenon at a single time. Just as upon a single form (rūpa) one designates 'sāsrava', 'visible', 'possessing resistance', and also designates 'form', and so forth—all of these are nominal designations upon a single phenomenon; if they were real, they would entail multiple substances. Wrath (krodha), enmity (upanāha), and so on are entirely subsumed under this [category of] nominal. Citta, caitasikas, and rūpa are produced from causal condition seeds, and therefore are said to be real. If Bhaviveka and others, relying on the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), maintain that the dependent [nature] and so on are all nominal, then within the dependent nature itself there would be no real phenomena, and nominal phenomena would also be absent; for within a single category, a nominal phenomenon must be designated in reliance upon a real cause. The Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle sixteen, states under the three natures: 'One should not declare that all phenomena are merely nominal existents. Why? Because a nominal phenomenon must possess a causal basis; without real phenomena, nominal phenomena cannot be established. Were it otherwise, since real entities would be absent, nominal ones would also have to be absent, which would destroy both nominal and real phenomena. With the destruction of both phenomena, defilement would not exist. Since defilement is indeed found, one should know that there must be the other-dependent nature.' It further states: 'The other-dependent is not determinately existent in the manner of designation, nor is it determinately non-existent in every respect; therefore in all modes it is neither existent nor non-existent. Yet it is accepted that all can be spoken of—namely, as existent or non-existent, both existent and non-existent, neither existent nor non-existent.' This nature applies to both nominal and real; in terms of the conventional, it is spoken of as existent, but in the ultimate truth it is neither existent nor non-non-existent, being ineffable. The Abhidharma-samuccaya, fascicle three, states that in dependence upon nominal expression, everything is nominal; without dependence upon nominal expression, everything is real. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha's Jiequan lun establishes these three nominalities; it was composed by Bodhisattva Diṅnāga, as explained in a separate chapter. Question: In the second fascicle, the Vaiśeṣika objection that a nominal phenomenon must be established in reliance upon a real entity, a resembling entity, and a common property was refuted entirely; why is it that here a nominal phenomenon relies on a real phenomenon, such that without the real the nominal is absent? Answer: They posited that the 'real entity' is the category of substance (dravya) and the like, that the resembling entity is established based on this real entity, and that the common property is quality (guṇa); furthermore, their 'real entity' is the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of phenomena. Now we refute their categories of substance and the like as not being real entities; because real entities are absent, resembling entities are also absent, and the common property of the category of quality is also absent—a resembling name does not arise with respect to a particular characteristic. Here, it is only with respect to the common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of phenomena that a resembling name arises; yet within common characteristics, one must have phenomena that possess some degree of substance—such as blue, yellow, citta, and caitasikas—before one can nominally speak of long, short, and unassociated formations as nominal phenomena; it is not that this nominal exists without those real entities. What was refuted previously was their 'real,' because their 'real' was not actual reality, since what they posited was entirely devoid of substance. What is here called 'real entity' is provisionally and properly designated. Question: If so, why is the other-dependent called 'resembling the self and phenomena'? Because the real entities of self and phenomena do not exist. Answer: Earlier it was said that the other-dependent resembles that deluded consciousness capable of grasping a real self and real phenomena and is spoken of as nominal; it is still in reliance on the real that nominal self and phenomena are spoken of, not in reliance on the object of deluded consciousness that nominal self and phenomena are spoken of, because self and phenomena do not exist.