成唯識論述記 9.436

9.436

述曰：不覆二乘轉依果故，二乘無學可現行故，非彼無學說染現行故名無覆。若望菩薩亦是有覆，覆所知境障菩提故。亦彼二乘通無覆攝，故於菩薩乃有亦言。然破計中《佛地論》說：有執不可導彼空智，異熟心非所熏、能遍計唯意識等。已如前卷遍計中解，此中不說。《佛地論》說，前師難云：若善、無覆無法執者，何故不能了達法空？後師質云：亦無我執云何不能了達生空？彼言第七識人執俱故，今言我亦爾，第七識法執俱故。二難既齊，然前師不許第七識中有法執不爾，違自比量，法空、我空二難齊故。既有相、見分，何故非執者，如前卷解。此總第四，三性破計分別訖。

The Commentary states: Because it does not conceal the fruit of the basis-transformation of the two vehicles, and because it can actively manifest in the non-learners of the two vehicles—and active defilement is not said to exist in those non-learners—it is called unveiled. In view of bodhisattvas, it is also veiled, because it conceals the realm of the knowable and obstructs bodhi. It is also subsumed under unveiled for those of the two vehicles, and thus with respect to bodhisattvas the word 'also' is used. However, among refutations of imputations, the Fodi lun says: 'Some hold that it cannot lead to that wisdom of emptiness; the maturation mind is not that which is perfumed; universal conceptualization is solely the mental consciousness, and so forth.' As already explained in the previous fascicle under universal conceptualization, it is not mentioned here. The Fodi lun states that the earlier master objected: 'If the wholesome and the unveiled lack dharmagrāha, why can they not comprehend dharma-emptiness?' The later master questioned in return: 'They also lack ātmagrāha, so why can they not comprehend the emptiness of sentient beings?' That [earlier master] said that the seventh consciousness is accompanied by personal grasping; now I say the same for myself: the seventh consciousness is accompanied by dharmagrāha. Since the two objections are equal, but the earlier master did not accept that dharmagrāha exists in the seventh consciousness, if it were not so, it would contradict his own inference, because the two objections of dharma-emptiness and personal emptiness are equal. As for why, since nimitta- and darśana-bhāga exist, it is not a grasping, this was explained in the previous fascicle. This concludes the fourth overall section, distinguishing the refutation of imputations via the three natures.