成唯識論述記 9.487

9.487

述曰：謂一切法名之與義，既於前位緣法義境，其中「似文」文名之義唯是意言，依此文名之義亦唯意言。無性第六釋云：此中名者，謂色、受等，亦攝名因、名果等尋思。名因者，謂字、字身、多字身及聲等。名果者，句及名身、多名身、句身、多句身等，皆名之果。《對法》第十一云：謂推求諸法名身、句身、文身自相皆不成實，名召法勝，但說尋名。義者，如名身等所詮表，得蘊、處、界等。若體、若義，總名為義，以義寬，故不說自體。推求此能詮、所詮定不相應，此中唯觀妄情所執能詮、所詮唯意言性。意言之中，依他文義不說無故，即依所取能詮、所詮，今觀唯是意言性也。《對法》等說：此在煖、頂位，此位唯觀所取無故，觀計所執無，非依他也。不爾，即成顛倒心故，依他是有，觀為無故。無性云：尋思依名所表外事，唯意言性，思惟此義似外相轉，實唯在內故。不無依他，內文義也。此二唯有內法，假名有，文義外法故說唯假。此即觀一切有為、無為皆義中攝，此遍一切諸有法也。依此二法觀其自性，心外亦無，唯是假立如我、法等體；差別亦爾，如無常等義。無性云：證知四種虛妄顯現，依他起攝，了達四種遍計所執皆不可得。三十六〈真實義品〉云：此諸菩薩於彼名、事，或離相觀，或合相觀、成合相觀故，通達二種自性、差別二種假立，依離相觀別觀二種之自性故。既先加行起四尋思，四尋思已必有智果故，次辨智果。

The Commentary states: This refers to the names and referents of all dharmas: since in the preceding stage one took the cognitive objects of dharmas and referents as objects, among them 'resembling syllables' means that the referent of the syllable and name is solely mental speech, and based on this, the referent of the syllable and name is also solely mental speech. Asvabhāva's commentary on Fascicle 6 explains: 'Here, "name" refers to form, sensation, and so forth, and also subsumes the investigations of the causes of names, the fruits of names, and so forth. The cause of a name refers to phonemes, collections of phonemes, collections of multiple phonemes, sounds, and so forth. The fruit of a name refers to phrases, collections of names, collections of multiple names, collections of phrases, collections of multiple phrases, and so forth, which are all fruits of names.' Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā, Fascicle 11, states: 'This means seeking into how the intrinsic characteristics of the collection of names, collection of phrases, and collection of phonemes of all dharmas are all unsubstantial. Because a name excels in designating a dharma, it is simply called investigating names.' 'Referent' means what is expressed by the collections of names and so forth, arriving at the aggregates, sense fields, elements, and so forth. Whether essence or meaning, it is collectively termed 'referent'; because 'referent' is broader, individual essence is not stated separately. One seeks into how this expresser and expressed are definitely not conjoined. Here, one contemplates solely that what is grasped by erroneous sentiment—the expresser and the expressed—is merely the nature of mental speech. Within mental speech, the syllables and referents of the other-dependent nature are not said to be non-existent; thus, based on the grasped expresser and expressed, one now contemplates that they are merely the nature of mental speech. The Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā and other texts state: this is in the stages of heat and summits, for these stages contemplate solely the non-existence of the grasped, contemplating the non-existence of the parikalpita, not the paratantra. If it were not so, it would become an inverted mind, because the paratantra exists, yet one would contemplate it as non-existent. Asvabhāva says: 'Investigation relies on external things expressed by names as being merely the nature of mental speech, reflecting that these referents appear to evolve as external characteristics, whereas in reality they are solely internal.' Therefore, it does not lack other-dependent, internal syllables and referents. These two have only internal dharmas, nominally existent, while syllables and referents as external dharmas are said to be merely nominal. This contemplates that all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are subsumed under 'referent'; this pervades all existent dharmas. Relying on these two dharmas, one contemplates their intrinsic nature as also non-existent outside the mind, being merely nominally designated, like the entities of self, dharma, and so forth; the differences are also likewise, like the meanings of impermanence and so forth. Asvabhāva says: 'One realizes that the four kinds of false manifestations are subsumed under the other-dependent nature, and thoroughly penetrates that all four kinds of parikalpita are ungraspable.' Fascicle 36, the 'Chapter on the Meaning of Reality', states: 'These bodhisattvas, with regard to those names and things, contemplate them either separately or jointly; having completed the joint contemplation, they penetrate the two kinds of intrinsic nature and the two kinds of nominal designation of differences, because based on the separate contemplation they contemplate the intrinsic nature of the two separately.' Having previously generated the four investigations through preparatory practice, after the four investigations there must be the fruit of wisdom; therefore, the fruit of wisdom is explained next.