成唯識論述記 9.89

9.89

述曰：所執雖是遍計心境，而非所緣緣，故非所遍計。所遍計者，據有法故，境義同通無法名境，所緣緣局無法即非，故唯依他是所遍計。七十四說：「由何故遍計？由依他起。」即是此也。何故七十四又說：遍計所執非凡、聖智境，以無相故，言「俱非境」。似相分者，非無法故。無法非所緣緣，所緣緣者，必是有法。彼性可言「所緣之境」，故彼言「境」而「非是緣」，以無體故，非不對心說為非境，是故此性說為應知。若非對心，云何令知？又說「遍計唯凡境故」，此即廣前第二句頌訖。佛知無不？若知，如何成所緣？若不知，如何言遍智？此義應思，如第七卷《唯識》中解。

The Commentary states: Although what is grasped is the cognitive sphere of the parikalpita citta, it is not an objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya); therefore, it is not that which is conceptualized. That which is conceptualized is based on existing dharmas; the meaning of 'cognitive sphere' is broader and non-existent dharmas are also called cognitive spheres, while 'objective condition' is narrower and non-existent dharmas are not such. Therefore, only the paratantra is that which is conceptualized. Fascicle 74 says: 'Due to what is there conceptualization? Due to the paratantra-svabhāva.' This is precisely it. Why does Fascicle 74 also state: the parikalpita-svabhāva is not an object of ordinary or noble jñāna, because it lacks marks, saying 'it is the cognitive sphere of neither'? That which resembles a nimittabhāga is not a non-existent dharma. A non-existent dharma is not an objective condition; an objective condition must be an existing dharma. That nature may be called an 'object of cognition', which is why it is called a 'cognitive sphere' and 'not a condition'; because it lacks an entity, it is not that it is not spoken of as a non-object in contrast to the citta. Therefore this nature is said to be that which should be known. If it were not in contrast to the citta, how could one cause it to be known? Furthermore, it says: 'Because parikalpita is exclusively an object of the ordinary.' This concludes broadly explaining the second line of the verse above. Does a Buddha know non-existence or not? If He knows it, how does it constitute an object? If He does not know it, how can He be called all-knowing? This meaning should be contemplated, as explained in Fascicle 7 of the Vijñapti[-mātratā].