成唯識論掌中樞要 1.112

1.112

難同、異性中：第一、有法自相相違過。彼云：「同、異性定異實別有；許異實故；如德、業。」今令同、異亦非同異，故成有法自相相違，云何亦名謂「許異實」等。因不但顯有異於實、德、業，亦顯實等性非實性等，如能成遮實。如是亦能成遮同、異性，俱決定故，故成有法自相相違，又不但有比量及決定相違，及有有法自相相違。故論言：亦不爾，亦言便為無用。比量相違過者，實、德、業三更無別性；六、十句中隨一攝故；如大有等。又或實性定異實無；許顯實故；如實。餘德、業性亦爾，亦成決定相違。

In challenging the universals and particulars (sāmānya-viśeṣa): First, the fallacy of contradiction with the proper nature of the subject. They say: 'Universals and particulars are definitely different from substance and exist separately; because they are accepted as being different from substance; like quality and action.' Now we make universals and particulars also not be universals and particulars; hence it constitutes a contradiction with the proper nature of the subject. Why is it also called 'accepted as being different from substance' and so forth? Because the reason not only shows that they are different from substance, quality, and action, but also shows that the nature of substance and so forth is not the nature of substance and so forth; just as it can establish the exclusion of substance, it can likewise establish the exclusion of universals and particulars. Since both are decisive, it constitutes a contradiction with the proper nature of the subject. Furthermore, there is not only a counter-inference and a decisive contradiction, but also a contradiction with the proper nature of the subject. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Nor is it so,' which would make the word 'nor' (also) useless. As for the fallacy of counter-inference: substance, quality, and action have no further distinct nature; because they are subsumed under any one of the six or ten categories; like the great existence (mahābhāva) and so on. Or again: the nature of substance is definitely absent as different from substance; because it is accepted as manifesting substance; like substance. The remaining natures of quality and action are likewise; this also constitutes a decisive contradiction.