成唯識論掌中樞要 1.186

1.186

破分別論者中有三：初敘宗；次別破；後自釋。別破中有二：初空理非因難，後起心非淨難。起心非淨難中有八：一、相轉體常難；二、二性應同難；三、惡與善俱難；四、不俱非善難；五、例惡非因難；六、治障性同難；七、凡夫起聖難；八、現種應同難。大眾部等無種子；破分別論者而言成種者，別破大乘異師；又經部別有種子；薩婆多因義種子義，未來有無漏因故；大眾類此亦然。凡夫身中有可當生無漏之因義名為種子，不同經部等。又不相應隨眠亦名種子等。

In refuting the Vibhajyavādin, there are three parts: first, stating their thesis; next, refuting it separately; finally, offering one's own explanation. In refuting it separately, there are two parts: first, the difficulty that the principle of emptiness is not a cause; second, the difficulty that an arising mind is not pure. In the difficulty that an arising mind is not pure, there are eight: 1. the difficulty that characteristics change while the essence is permanent; 2. the difficulty that the two natures should be identical; 3. the difficulty of evil co-occurring with wholesomeness; 4. the difficulty that non-co-occurrence would entail not being wholesome; 5. the difficulty that by analogy evil would not be a cause; 6. the difficulty that antidote and obstruction would have the same nature; 7. the difficulty of an ordinary being giving rise to the noble; 8. the difficulty that actual states and seeds should be identical. The Mahāsāṃghika and others maintain that there are no seeds; that this refutation of the Vibhajyavādin speaks of establishing seeds is a separate refutation of an unorthodox Mahāyāna master. Furthermore, the Sautrāntika maintain distinct seeds; the Sarvāstivāda hold seeds in the sense of cause, because in the future there is an anāsrava cause; the Mahāsāṃghika are similar in this regard: that in the body of an ordinary being there is a causal principle capable of giving rise to the anāsrava in the future is called 'seed', which differs from the Sautrāntika and others. Furthermore, non-associated latent propensities (anuśaya) are also called seeds, and so forth.