成唯識論掌中樞要 1.202

1.202

「因緣故變」等中，《疏》有四釋：一、因緣者，任運義；分別者，強思義。難陀師觸等五法亦能受熏，持諸種子，變皆有用。即違《成業》多種生芽。下第三卷自當廣釋非也。第二、因緣者，諸法實因緣；分別者，餘七識。非實種子故，唯取第八所變是因緣變者，此言因緣是何義？若論異熟，應通五數，何故不爾？若五識所變不是實法，云何名「得自相」？若言得處自相，非事自相，即青、黃等及定四大等，非五識得。甚大靈異火燒身時，應不覺痛等。又「本識得實非五識」者，即應五塵法處所攝，非五境攝。「許五識得自相」者，以總從別，五塵所收。既不許緣自相，如何以假從實，五塵所攝。如勝定果色本唯意變，設雖五識得，以末從本，名「勝定果」，法處所收。離本說末，以境對根，可五塵攝。青、黃等色五本不得，唯意所緣，應法處收。何因以實從假，五塵所收。第三、解云：「因緣」者異熟心，「因」謂名言種子，「緣」謂善、惡業緣，若隨此生，變必有用。本識觸等為例應爾。若不自在故非者，五識非一切時，是業果故，俱意亦然。如何變必有用？又獨頭之意是業果心，因緣變故，亦應有用。由此故知第四說善。「因緣」者法體實從真種子生。從真種子生者，所變有用。餘名分別：性境不隨心，獨影唯從見，帶質通情本，性種等隨應。性境全及，帶質一分，是因緣變。獨影及帶質一分，是分別變。然帶質境可通因緣、分別二門，從種及見二門攝故。若所緣心無心用者，見分為境，自證分緣，云何有用？答：自體義分，非相分故。

Regarding 'transformation by direct causes and conditions' and so forth, the Commentary has four interpretations: First, 'direct causes and conditions' means effortless; 'conceptual discrimination' means forceful deliberation. Master Nanda [held] that the five factors including touch can also receive perfuming, hold all seeds, and their transformations are all functional. This contradicts the Karmasiddhi regarding multiple seeds producing a sprout. Fascicle Three below will extensively explain this error. Second, 'direct causes and conditions' means the real causes and conditions of all dharmas; 'conceptual discrimination' refers to the remaining seven consciousnesses. Because they are not real seeds, only what is transformed by the eighth is transformation by direct causes and conditions. What is the meaning of the word 'causes and conditions' here? If speaking of vipāka, it should apply to the five mental factors; why is it not so? If what is transformed by the five consciousnesses is not real dharmas, how can it be called 'attaining svalakṣaṇa'? If one says it attains the svalakṣaṇa of the āyatana and not the svalakṣaṇa of the actual thing, then blue, yellow, and so forth, as well as the meditative four great elements, would not be apprehended by the five consciousnesses. When an extremely supernatural fire burns the body, one would not feel pain and the like. Furthermore, if 'the mūla-vijñāna attains the real, not the five consciousnesses', then the five dusts should be included in the dharmāyatana, not in the five objects. If 'the five consciousnesses are allowed to attain svalakṣaṇa', subsuming the specific under the general, they are included in the five dusts. Since they are not allowed to take svalakṣaṇa as ālambana, how could the provisional follow the real to be subsumed under the five dusts? Just as meditative form is originally transformed solely by the mind, even if apprehended by the five consciousnesses, subsuming the branch under the root, it is called 'meditative fruit' and included in the dharmāyatana. Setting aside the root to speak of the branch, matching the object to the faculty, it may be included in the five dusts. If blue, yellow, and other forms were originally not apprehended by the five, but were taken as ālambana solely by the mind, they should be included in the dharmāyatana. By what reason would the real follow the provisional to be subsumed under the five dusts? The third explanation says: 'direct causes and conditions' refers to the vipāka mind; 'cause' means nominal seeds, and 'condition' means the conditions of good and bad karma; if produced in accordance with these, what is transformed must be functional. By analogy, touch and the others in the mūla-vijñāna should be the same. If it is rejected because it lacks autonomy, the five consciousnesses are not karma-fruits at all times, and the concurrent mental consciousness is also like this; how then could their transformations necessarily be functional? Furthermore, the solitary mental consciousness is a karma-fruit mind; being a transformation by causes and conditions, it should also be functional. From this, we know that the fourth explanation is superior: 'causes and conditions' means that the essence of the dharma is genuinely produced from true seeds. For what is produced from true seeds, what is transformed is functional. The remainder is called discrimination: the nature-sphere does not follow the mind; the solitary shadow follows only the view; that which carries substance spans emotion and origin; their nature and seeds correspond accordingly. The entire nature-sphere and one part of that which carries substance are transformations by causes and conditions. The solitary shadow and one part of that which carries substance are transformations by conceptual discrimination. However, the sphere that carries substance can be admitted under both headings of causes and conditions and discrimination, because it is subsumed under the two categories of seeds and view. If an apprehended mind lacks mental functioning, and the darśana-bhāga is taken as an object by the svasaṃvitti-bhāga, how could it be functional? Answer: this is an analytical distinction within the essence itself, not a nimitta-bhāga.