成唯識論掌中樞要 1.51

1.51

依後二諦辨唯識性者：《瑜伽》六十四云：「世俗有四：一、世間世俗；二、道理世俗；三、證得世俗；四、勝義世俗」。《唯識》第九云：「勝義諦有四：一、世間勝義；二、道理勝義；三、證得勝義；四、勝義勝義」。今者略為三類：一、總別相對；二、別、餘相對；三、總、餘相對。四重二諦如章中解。第一、總別相對應為四句：一、以俗總對真別有一句，過四俗之真，唯有後一故，謂安立、非安立唯識性。第二、以俗別對真總有四句，勝俗之真，四皆是故。一、以初俗對四真，遣悟性；二、以第二俗對三真，斷知性；三、以第三俗對二真，解修性；四、以第四俗對一真，覺證性。三、以俗總對真總唯有一句，謂真俗唯識性。四、以俗別對真別有四句，一一次第各各相望為四句：一、心境性；二、事理性；三、別總性；四、證旨性。初俗為境，初真為心；第二俗為事，第二真為理；第三俗為別，理四諦故；第三真為總，理二空故；第四俗為詮，依空門故；第四真為旨，廢詮論故。如是相對，合成十句。第二別、餘相對，有二類：初類有四句，謂：以初俗對真如名妄如；以第二俗對名事如；以第三俗對名理如；以第四俗對名觀如。後類有十句：謂：以初俗對四別真為四句，以第二俗對三別真為三句，以第三俗對二別真為二句，以第四俗對一別真為一句，如是合有十四句。第三總、餘相對中有三類：第一、以二俗對真有十句，以初二俗別對真中一有三句，不對初真即第二俗故，勝俗名真，彼齊等故。即以此二俗對二真有二句，亦除初真。以此二俗對三真有一句。如是合有六句。次以第二、第三俗對真中一有二句，對真中二有一句，無對三者亦齊均故。如是合有三句。次以第三、第四俗對真唯一句，餘真齊均及體劣，故不可為句。第二、以三俗對真有四句，謂：以初三俗對真一有二句；對真二有一句，除初俗故；以後三俗對真亦唯一句。第三、以四俗對真有一句，不對前三真故。如是合有十五句。各有別名，恐繁且止，智者思之。如是二諦合有三十九句唯識性，並三性中合有四十九句，無有以俗對真中間隔越為句，亦無以真對俗齊均及劣法為句，便非勝義故。若體空者遣之淨，有漏者斷之淨，無漏者獲悟淨，隨應具知。此等唯識皆能差別，為所歸之境差別於漏分二淨。

Regarding the distinguishing of the nature of consciousness-only based on the latter two truths: [The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra], fascicle sixty-four, states: "Conventional truth is of four kinds: 1. worldly convention; 2. rational convention; 3. attained convention; 4. ultimate convention." The [Cheng] weishi [lun], fascicle nine, states: "Ultimate truth is of four kinds: 1. worldly ultimate; 2. rational ultimate; 3. attained ultimate; 4. ultimate ultimate." Now, these are briefly categorized into three types: 1. reciprocal comparison of general and particular; 2. reciprocal comparison of particular and remaining; 3. reciprocal comparison of general and remaining. The fourfold two truths are as explained in the relevant chapter.

First, reciprocal comparison of general and particular should comprise four propositions:
1. Conventional general compared with ultimate particular yields one proposition: because only the last [ultimate truth] surpasses the four conventions, this is called the consciousness-only nature of the posited and non-posited.
2. Conventional particular compared with ultimate general yields four propositions, because the ultimate that surpasses the conventional encompasses all four: (1) the first convention compared with the four ultimates is the nature of dispelling and awakening; (2) the second convention compared with the [latter] three ultimates is the nature of severing and knowing; (3) the third convention compared with the [latter] two ultimates is the nature of understanding and cultivating; (4) the fourth convention compared with the [single lattermost] ultimate is the nature of awakening and realization.
3. Conventional general compared with ultimate general yields only one proposition, called the nature of consciousness-only as ultimate and conventional.
4. Conventional particular compared with ultimate particular yields four propositions, when contrasted one by one in sequential order: (1) the nature of mind and object; (2) the nature of phenomenon and principle; (3) the nature of particular and general; (4) the nature of realization and purport. The first convention is the object, and the first ultimate is the mind; the second convention is the phenomenon, and the second ultimate is the principle; the third convention is the particular, because of the principle of the four truths; the third ultimate is the general, because of the principle of the two emptynesses; the fourth convention is the expression, because it relies on the portal of emptiness; the fourth ultimate is the purport, because it sets aside discourse on expressions. Correlated in this way, they combine to make ten propositions.

Second, reciprocal comparison of particular and remaining has two categories. The first category has four propositions: the first convention compared with suchness is called 'deluded suchness'; the second convention compared with it is called 'phenomenal suchness'; the third convention compared with it is called 'principled suchness'; the fourth convention compared with it is called 'contemplative suchness'. The latter category has ten propositions: the first convention compared with the four particular ultimates makes four propositions; the second convention compared with the three particular ultimates makes three propositions; the third convention compared with the two particular ultimates makes two propositions; the fourth convention compared with the one particular ultimate makes one proposition. Thus combined, there are fourteen propositions.

Third, reciprocal comparison of general and remaining contains three categories. First, two conventions compared with the ultimates make ten propositions: the first two conventions individually compared with one of the ultimates make three propositions (not being paired with the first ultimate, which is identical with the second convention; what surpasses the conventional is called the ultimate, and those two are equal). These two conventions compared with two ultimates make two propositions (likewise excluding the first ultimate). These two conventions compared with three ultimates make one proposition. Thus, there are six propositions in total. Next, the second and third conventions compared with one of the ultimates make two propositions; compared with two of the ultimates, they make one proposition; there is no comparison with three, because they are likewise equal. Thus, there are three propositions in total. Next, the third and fourth conventions compared with the ultimate make only one proposition; the remaining ultimates are equal or of inferior status, and thus cannot form a proposition. Second, three conventions compared with the ultimates make four propositions: the first three conventions compared with one ultimate make two propositions; compared with two ultimates, they make one proposition (since the first convention is excluded); the latter three conventions compared with the ultimate also make only one proposition. Third, the four conventions compared with the ultimate make one proposition, because they are not compared with the former three ultimates. Thus combined, there are fifteen propositions. Each has its distinct name, but fearing verbosity, we set them aside for now; let the wise reflect upon them.

Thus, the two truths combine to yield thirty-nine propositions on the nature of consciousness-only, which, together with [the ten] within the three natures, make forty-nine propositions in all. There is no proposition formed by skipping intermediate steps between conventional and ultimate, nor is there any proposition comparing ultimate with conventional where they are equal or where the ultimate is inferior, for then it would not be the ultimate truth. What is empty in essence is purified by dispelling it; what is sāsrava is purified by severing it; what is anāsrava is purified by attaining and awakening to it—one should know this thoroughly as appropriate. These kinds of consciousness-only are all qualifier attributes, qualifying the realm of refuge in terms of the two purities with respect to the sāsrava portion.