成唯識論掌中樞要 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

1.1

Composed by Kuiji, monk and translator of Dacien Temple.

1.3

Now in explaining the text of the treatise, I briefly make five analytical divisions:

1. Clarifying the times and benefits:
a. Clarifying the times:
i. Recounting the past:
(1) Recounting the teachings
(2) Rebuking the errors
ii. Presenting the present:
(1) Presenting the texts
(2) Showing the teachings
b. Clarifying the benefits:
i. Recounting the texts:
(1) Recounting the distinctions
(2) Harmonizing the texts
ii. Assigning the teachings:
(1) Establishing the tenets
(2) Assigning the teachings
2. Differentiating the tenets and essential nature:
a. Differentiating the tenets:
i. Heterodox tenets:
(1) Tīrthikas
(2) Hīnayāna
ii. Co-religionist tenets:
(1) Extreme tenets
(2) Madhyamā-pratipad
b. Differentiating the essential nature:
i. Heterodox natures:
(1) Tīrthikas
(2) Hīnayāna
ii. Co-religionist natures:
(1) Extreme nature
(2) Middle nature
3. Assigning the names and vehicles:
a. Assigning the names:
i. Recounting the names:
(1) Recounting the old
(2) Recounting the new
ii. Assigning the names:
(1) Name assignment
(2) Intent assignment
b. Assigning the vehicles:
i. Recounting the vehicles:
(1) Recounting differences
(2) Harmonizing sameness
ii. Assigning the vehicles:
(1) Differentiating meaning
(2) Correct assignment
4. Subsuming the baskets and divisions:
a. Subsuming the baskets:
i. Recounting the baskets:
(1) Heterodox views
(2) Own tenet
ii. Subsuming the baskets:
(1) Meaning differentiation
(2) Correct assignment
b. Subsuming the divisions:
i. Recounting the divisions:
(1) Recounting marks
(2) Pure and mixed
ii. Subsuming the divisions:
(1) Meaning differentiation
(2) Subsuming divisions
5. Recounting the causes and commenting:
a. Recounting the causes:
i. Recounting the times
ii. Recounting the emergence
b. Correctly commenting:
i. Correct categorization
ii. Correctly commenting

1.5

Alternatively, in explaining the text of the treatise, it is initially differentiated through three divisions:

1.6

1. Clarifying the similarities and differences of the treatise:
a. Differences in doctrinal benefits:
i. Benefits of the turning [of the wheel]:
(1) Earlier heterodox views
(2) Later Mahāyāna
ii. Benefits of meaning:
(1) Earlier heterodox views
(2) Later Mahāyāna
b. Distinctions in temporal benefits:
i. Recounting the past:
(1) First, recounting the teachings
(2) Later, rebuking the errors
ii. Presenting the present:
(1) First, presenting the texts
(2) Later, showing the teachings
c. Respective brevity in expressing tenets:
i. Heterodox tenets:
(1) First, tīrthikas
(2) Later, Hīnayāna
ii. Co-religionist tenets:
(1) First, extreme tenets
(2) Later, middle tenets
d. Non-identity of essential nature:
i. Heterodox natures:
(1) First, tīrthikas
(2) Later, Hīnayāna
ii. Co-religionist natures:
(1) First, extreme nature
(2) Later, middle nature
2. The locus to which the teaching belongs:
a. Assigning names:
i. Recounting names:
(1) Earlier old names
(2) Later new names
ii. Assigning names:
(1) First, assigning to the great
(2) Later, assigning to the branch
b. Assigning baskets:
i. Recounting baskets:
(1) First, recounting differences
(2) Later, Mahāyāna
ii. Assigning baskets:
(1) First, meaning analysis
(2) Later, correct assignment
c. Assigning divisions:
i. Recounting divisions:
(1) Earlier recounting marks
(2) Later pure marks
ii. Assigning divisions:
(1) First, meaning differentiation
(2) Later, correct assignment
d. Assigning vehicles:
i. Recounting vehicles:
(1) First, recounting differences
(2) Later, harmonizing sameness
ii. Assigning vehicles:
(1) First, meaning differentiation
(2) Later, correct assignment
3. Recounting and explaining the causes:
a. Recounting causes and conditions:
i. Recounting primary causes
ii. Recounting secondary causes
b. Recounting years and authors:
i. Recounting years
ii. Recounting authors
c. Explaining divisions and sections:
i. Root divisions
ii. Branch divisions
d. Explaining the text of the treatise:
i. Explaining the root
ii. Explaining the branches

1.7

However, the initial five divisions and ten topics are still generally subsumed under three heads: 1. clarifying the similarities and differences of the treatise; 2. the locus to which the teaching belongs; 3. recounting and explaining the title and text. Clarifying the similarities and differences is further briefly divided into three: 1. to demonstrate the distinctiveness of our own school in contrast to other tenets; 2. to demonstrate the essential nature of our own doctrine in contrast to other teachings; 3. to broadly explain the times and capacities [of listeners] in responding to their predispositions. The locus to which the teaching belongs is also subdivided into three: 1. which division among the twelve divisions of teachings subsumes it; 2. which basket among the two or three baskets and so forth subsumes it; 3. which vehicle among the one or two vehicles and so forth subsumes it. Explaining the title and text is also subdivided into three: 1. recounting the date and author of the treatise; 2. explaining the treatise's title; 3. interpreting the root text of the treatise. Again, explaining this treatise is analyzed and interpreted through three divisions: 1. recounting the origins of the treatise; 2. explaining the title of the treatise; 3. determining and explaining the root text.

1.8

Regarding recounting the origins of the treatise, the Yogācārabhūmi commentary states briefly: From beginningless time, all sentient beings have had ignorance and perverse attachments regarding the true nature of phenomena. They arouse defilements, produce karma, and transmigrate through the five destinies. The Tathāgata appeared in the world and expounded, according to what was appropriate, the wondrous truth of the middle way, leading sentient beings to understand thoroughly that all phenomena are neither empty nor existent, to leave behind doubts and attachments, to cultivate the middle-path practice, to extinguish hindrances according to their capacity, and each completing their cultivation, attain sambodhi and realize the bliss of tranquil cessation.

1.9

After the Buddha entered nirvāṇa, because of Mahādeva, sectarian schisms arose competitively, mostly clinging to views of existence. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna realized the Pramuditā-bhūmi. He collected the Mahāyāna teachings on signlessness and emptiness and composed the Madhyamaka-śāstra and other texts, exhaustively expressing the true essentials to eliminate those views of existence. Great treatise masters such as the Ārya Āryadeva composed the Śata-śāstra and other works to broadly propagate the great meaning. Due to this, sentient beings again clung to the view of emptiness.

1.10

Bodhisattva Asaṅga also ascended to the first ground, realized the Samādhi of Dharma Light, and attained great supernatural powers. He served the Great Compassionate Lord (Maitreya) and requested the expounding of this treatise. Its principles were utterly exhausted, its phenomena thoroughly detailed, its texts fully elucidated, its meanings completely declared, its doubts totally dispelled, its attachments thoroughly broken, its practices fully cultivated, and its fruits fully realized. It was primarily meant for bodhisattvas, so that they might attain skillfulness regarding the objects, practices, and results of all vehicles, diligently cultivate the great practice, realize great bodhi, and broadly expound without error for sentient beings at all times; secondarily, it was for the other vehicles, so that they might cultivate their own practices and attain their own fruits and realizations according to their own teachings. Therefore, the five divisions of the Central School flourished across the four realms, and the ten sections of the Yoga texts circulated through the five Indias. At that time, there was Bodhisattva Vasubandhu—in Chinese called 'Shishi' (World-Kin)—the uterine younger brother of Bodhisattva Asaṅga. His stage was within the Attainment of Clarity, his path bordered on the Pramuditā-bhūmi; he was comprehensively versed in the three vehicles and had traversed all the sects. Knowing that the lesser teachings were not ultimate, he eventually turned his inclination toward the Mahāyāna. Hearing recitations of the 'Chapter on the Ten Grounds' of the Avataṃsaka and the 'Chapter on the Compendium of the Great Vehicle' of the Abhidharma, he repented his past errors, wept over his former views, and took up a knife to cut off his tongue to show his deep remorse. His brother, dwelling three yojanas away, stretched forth a hand from afar, stopped him from cutting himself, and explained the benefits and harms: 'Although you slandered the Dharma with your tongue, how could cutting off your tongue eradicate the sin? You should swiftly praise and comment on the Mahāyāna to repent of your previous transgression.' The Bodhisattva respectfully obeyed his brother's counsel and thereupon took refuge in the wondrous truth. His brother then entrusted him with the Daśabhūmika-sūtra and enjoined him with the root text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, bidding him compose commentaries. Thus these two treatises were the Bodhisattva's first works upon converting to the Mahāyāna. Subsequently, as the texts contained profound tenets and his mind broadened to the ultimate meaning, he went further to compose a grand treatise to express the deep and ultimate reality. Gathering arcane essentials and grasping the refined and profound, he composed the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā-kārikā to expound the wondrous import of the Mahāyāna. Ten thousand phenomena are contained in a single character; a thousand instructions are complete in a single word. His path surpassed all scriptures; his renown outshone the multitude of sages. Once the concise verses were completed and the detailed commentary was just about to be presented, conditions were not yet aligned, and he passed away into the unseen realm.

1.11

Later, bodhisattvas such as Dharmapāla appreciated the verse text and each composed an exegetical commentary. Though they branched like peaks from Mount Kunlun or stems and boughs from jade trees, the only one who uniquely possessed dazzling brilliance and bore fragrant renown was surely Dharmapāla alone! Having fulfilled bodhisattva fruition, his rank in previous eons was accomplished among the present sages. He comforted beings and provided hidden support, manifesting favorably in response to their faculties. At twenty-nine years of age, knowing that his teaching activities had a designated limit, weary of impermanence through the practice of meditation, he vowed never to leave the Bodhi Tree. Finishing his three remaining years, in the intervals of meditation and worship, he composed and edited this commentary. Its style is transcendent and its purports far-reaching; its wisdom is vast and its renown lofty. Overthrowing dogmas is accomplished in a single word; untangling perplexities is exhausted in half a verse. Where texts differed like water and fire, he brought them into accord like glue and lacquer; where doctrines diverged like rivers and lakes, he parted them into the clear and the turbid. Level plains stretch gently, yet he erects layered peaks to touch the Milky Way; crags soar steeply, yet he levels lofty mounds into vast expanses. Delving downward into profound depths, he finds no bottom; gazing upward to the heights, he finds no bound. In sparse phrases with shallow literal sense, the streams flow ceaselessly; in mighty sentences of grand doctrines, the molding and shaping reach the ultimate limit. His achievement surpasses a thousand sages; his path accords with a hundred kings.

1.12

At that time, there was a layman named Xuanjian, who recognized when the phoenix and fowl fold their wings and understood when the qilin and dragon conceal their traces. He continually exhausted his resources to provide offerings, steadfast in deep sincerity and resolution, depleting his wealth year after year. The Bodhisattva instructed and guided him in many ways, and, presenting him with this commentary in return, tested him saying: “After I pass into extinction, whenever anyone comes to read this, take one ounce of gold; if you happen to encounter someone of divine brilliance, you may transmit and circulate it.” The final term having approached, his profound guidance suddenly came to an end. The Bodhisattva's renown shook this continent [of Jambudvīpa], and the fame of his treatise and commentary surpassed that other land. Among sentient beings, who did not cherish reverence? Hearing it at dawn and dying at dusk, how could they begrudge gold and jade? People rushed to the sage as to a market; offerings piled up like mountains. The five regions of India craned their necks in longing, but it had not yet circulated freely.

1.13

The Great Master [Xuanzang] had heavenly-endowed intelligence and insight, relying on travels and study to broaden his knowledge; there was no sacred trace he did not venerate, no holy teaching he did not unfold and chant. Hearing of this wondrous doctrine, he earnestly and reverently sought it out. Remembering the late sage's bequeathed words, the layman knew it surely belonged to this present worthy, and thereupon offered this draft manuscript, along with the Pañcaskandhaka and its commentary. The Great Master treasured it as though beholding the sacred countenance; whenever he held it in his palm, it was no different from true speech. Since the jade documents drifted westward and the white horse galloped eastward, although subtle teachings had been widely expounded, he treasured this as an esoteric secret. When resting in a separate lodge, sheltered from the scorching heat, he refreshed his ears and eyes with profound contemplation, cleansing his mind to unravel its marvels, and then remarked: “Only now is my mind truly gratified!” As Xuan-ni [Confucius] said: “I have a precious jade stored in a case; who is the good merchant? I shall sell it!”

1.14

My fortune from early life was solitary and ill-fated; at the age of nine I suffered the loss of my parents. From then on my aspirations rested upon the mist and clouds, and moreover I ever longed for the monastic robes, cutting off worldly tastes and affections in my youth. By the age of seventeen, I was finally admitted to the forest of black robes. Specially receiving the brilliant imperial edict, I was able to serve as his attendant. Since participating among the three thousand, I rejoiced in modeling myself on the seventy; having surely fulfilled this good aspiration, I later received teachings directly from his platform. Not discarded for my coarse timber, I was thereupon permitted to join the ranks of the translation staff. Setting to work, I took up the brush and received this treatise. At the inception of the work, the ten commentaries were to be translated separately; Fang, Shang, Guang, and Kuiji, the four of us, jointly received, polished, took down, checked the text, and compiled the meanings. Since it was an exemplary model, each had his assigned duties. After several mornings, I requested to withdraw. The Great Master pressed for the reason, and I earnestly requested, saying: “Since in the evening one dreamed of the golden countenance and in the morning rushed to the White Horse, outstanding talents have emerged intermittently, and divine intellects have followed shoulder to shoulder. Hearing the five divisions, minds yearned; grasping the eight sections, hopes were cast afar. Although the dregs of the Dharma-gates were obtained, the purity of the profound source was lost. Now the works brought to the East allow us to witness the profound tenets directly. Fortunately, you uniquely stand out in all regions and surpass a thousand ages in brilliance; if you do not establish achievement by synthesizing and blending them, it might be called missing the opportunity. Furthermore, the compositions of the various sages each enjoy fame across the five regions of India; though the texts are preserved in their entirety upon palm leaves, the doctrines are not complete in a single volume. Minds and views differ, so students have nothing to rely upon. What is more, as the times degenerate and people become frivolous, life is short and wisdom erratic; if one examines the fragmented parts, one may hardly master them, and when grasping the original purports, they are difficult to propagate. I pray that you interweave the diverse sayings into a single volume, settling the true and false to establish a grand standard.” After some time he finally assented, and thus this treatise was circulated. Reasonably dismissing the three worthies, the Great Master entrusted it solely to this mediocre and clumsy self.

1.15

This treatise gathers the secrets of the diverse sūtras and embraces the purports of the various sages. What obstruction does it not dissolve? What profundity does it not illuminate? Looking up to it, it is boundless; gazing down into it, it is unfathomable. From afar, it seems devoid of wisdom; drawing near, it possesses true knowledge. It organizes the five sciences and unfolds the eight treasuries; whenever profound passes were guarded, the mysterious path was blocked. Yet just as mountain-like piles of fine down melt when exposed to blazing heat, or frost and ice accumulated in ravines dissolve when poured over with glowing warmth, it is truly the silver radiance of the great night and the golden mirror of dawn and dusk. Although it originally came from the five regions of India, there was no such blended commentary there. To merely assemble the separate works of the ten masters was difficult enough; how much more so to select these profound texts—it was truly unprecedented. This, then, is the cause and origin of this treatise.

1.16

Explaining the title: In Sanskrit, it is vijñapti (ding-er fan: consciousness); mātratā (only); siddhi (establishment); śāstra (treatise). It should literally be called “Consciousness-Only Establishment Treatise”; according with the Chinese language here, it is Cheng weishi lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only). In Sanskrit, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi is spoken in the feminine gender; or else Vijñaptimātratāviśodhaka (viśodhaka meaning purification).

1.17

[With] śāstra, it should be called “Consciousness-Only Purification Treatise”; now it is called “Purification of Consciousness-Only Treatise”. At the end of the tenth fascicle of this treatise, it is explained: “This treatise establishes consciousness-only through its three parts; therefore, this treatise is named ‘Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only’.” Thus the original name is “Consciousness-Only”, and the exegetical commentary is named “Establishment”. However, according to Vasubandhu's original Triṃśikā text, beneath the title there is a special note stating: “This treatise is also named ‘Establishment of Consciousness-Only’,” because the teaching of the Triṃśikā establishes consciousness-only. As in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, the Buddha announced its name, saying: “The Sūtra on the Spoken Vimalakīrti Inconceivable Liberation Dharma-Gate”. Yet the sūtra title is “Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra”, and beneath the title a special note says “Also named ‘Inconceivable Liberation’”; here too, it is separately named “Establishment” in the same way. Furthermore, as the final verse of the Viṃśatikā composed by Vasubandhu says: “I have, according to my own capacity, / Briefly established the meaning of consciousness-only,” it is also named “Establishment of Consciousness-Only”. However, the commentaries composed by Dharmapāla often have titles different from their root treatises: the commentary on the Viṃśatikā is named Vijñaptimātratā-mārga-śāstra, while this treatise has “Establishment” as the designation of the commentary. Therefore, the end of the treatise states: “This root treatise is named ‘Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only’,” and also states: “This treatise establishes consciousness-only through its three parts.” Thus we know that “Consciousness-Only” is the name of the root treatise.

1.18

Now the commentary is named “Establishment”: “Establishment” is not the root designation; it merely takes the root treatise's primary name and does not take the specially noted name. In some cases, there is “only the root” without the name of the commentary, as in the Madhyāntavibhāga; in some cases, there is “only the commentary” and not the root name, as in the Vijñaptimātratā-mārga-śāstra; in some cases, both “root” and “commentary” names are present, as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā. Now, the name “only the commentary” may also be a general designation. In “Establishment of Consciousness-Only” (the establishment of consciousness-only), among the subanta declensions, it is the sixth, the genitive (possessive) case. That is, within the eight case inflections, when treatises on grammar analyze these nominal endings, the su ending is placed at the end; manta means “ending”, and thus it is an ending where su stands at the end. There are ten tenses/moods and eighteen person-endings in tiṅanta; when analyzing these verbal terminations, the ti ending is placed at the end; anta means “ending”, and thus it is an ending where ti stands at the end. To distinguish it from these endings, it is called subanta. Among the ṣaṭsamāsa compounds, it is a tatpuruṣa compound (dependent determinative compound); ṣaṭ means six, and samāsa means compound; thus among the six compounds, it first separates and then combines. Following the discussion: since a single syllable has no denotation, how can the syllable sha mean six? Relying on the Sanskrit text, there are three syllables, ṣa-ṭ-ta; combining them forms the word ṣaṭ; therefore it is not that a single syllable has denotation.

1.19

“Establishment” is the designation of that which establishes, taking establishment as its function. “Consciousness-only” is the name of that which is established, taking distinction and discernment as its meaning. Settling teachings and establishing reasoning is named “establishment”. “Consciousness” means that which discerns, because it expresses the five phenomena. “Only” has three meanings; “consciousness” expresses the five realities. “Only” excludes the two types of emptiness; “only” means setting aside and maintaining: having mind and making external objects empty is the meaning of “only”. Setting aside external objects and maintaining the mind—therefore it is said that setting aside and maintaining is the meaning of “only”. It also has the meaning of determination, and of manifesting the supreme. “Discernment” means cognitive discernment; expressing and determining functioning is the meaning of “consciousness”. Discernment with respect to objects is the function of consciousness. Regarding “only” here: Sthiramati holds one-part [consciousness as] only; Nanda holds two-part only; Dignāga holds three-part only, within which there are the two theories of real and nominal; Dharmapāla holds four-part only. Treatises mostly rely on three parts; teachings and reasoning have four parts.

1.20

Explaining the name “Consciousness-Only”. As explained in the chapter: together there are ten meanings explaining “Establishment of Consciousness-Only”: First, the sūtras say “Consciousness-Only”, and the treatise's explanation is named “Establishment”. Second, the root treatise is named “Consciousness-Only”, and the exegetical treatise is named “Establishment”. Third, both the sūtras and the root treatise are called “Consciousness-Only”, and the present commentary is named “Establishment”. Fourth, the thesis (pakṣa) is called “Consciousness-Only”; the reason (hetu) and example (dṛṣṭānta) are called “Establishment”. The root treatise briefly presents that which is to be established, called the thesis; the present commentary broadly establishes it, hence it is called the reason and example, fully stating the justifications and adducing similar and dissimilar instances to establish that which is set up. The Viṃśatikā says: “Establishing that the three realms of the Mahāyāna are consciousness-only.” Dignāga’s commentary says: “Establishing the thesis by reason and example is called establishment.” In the present context, being named “Establishment” has the same meaning. Fifth, the substantial entity is named “Consciousness-Only”, and the exegetical commentary is named “Establishment”. The root treatise briefly indicates its entity without discerning distinctions; the present work broadly clarifies the meanings, fully revealing distinctions, and is therefore named “Establishment”. Sixth, the concise is named “Consciousness-Only”, yet to unfold the profound meaning; the extensive is called able to “Establish”, fully stating the actual purport. These latter two explanations are based on the Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra; in interpreting scriptural teachings, the entity comes first and the meaning after, the concise comes first and the extensive after. Seventh, establishing teaching through teaching. Eighth, establishing reasoning through teaching. Ninth, establishing teaching through reasoning. Tenth, establishing reasoning through reasoning.

1.21

Question: Based on what may these latter four explanations be understood?

1.22

Answer: The final verse of the treatise states: 'Having relied on sacred teaching and correct reason.' It also says: 'The three parts of this treatise establish vijñapti-mātra.' Hence we know that what establishes [them] encompasses both teaching and reason. The opening verse of the treatise states: 'I now explain what he has spoken.' 'What he has spoken' is either the teaching established in the root treatise, or the principle that was spoken; both senses are admissible. The treatise also states at the end: 'Because it elucidates the principle of vijñapti-mātra with the Thirty Verses, it is exceedingly lucid and pure.' The verse says: 'Distinguishing the meanings of the nature and characteristics of vijñapti-mātra.' 'Meaning' is principle. Hence we know that what is established likewise encompasses both teaching and principle. As for 'treatise' (śāstra), the Kośa says: 'Because it instructs disciples, it is called a treatise.' The Commentary on the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] says: 'Because it resolves the natures and characteristics of all dharmas through questions and answers, it is called a treatise.' The former explanation is based on compassion, because it benefits sentient beings; the latter explanation is based on wisdom, because it discriminates all dharmas. 'Cheng weishi' is then the treatise that discusses 'establishing vijñapti-mātra'; one should understand this by analogy with these meanings. Why is this treatise named 'Establishing Vijñapti-mātra' and not named establishing anything else?

1.23

Because it also establishes other meanings, desiring to cause one to realize the principle and wisdom of vijñapti-mātra, it is established, just like the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra; this encompasses teaching and principle, and takes its name from the preponderance of 'vijñapti-mātra.' Or again, because it now unerringly establishes the wondrous principle of vijñapti-mātra, just like the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, it also encompasses teaching and principle, taking its name from what it explains. Or, because it refutes the grasping at real objects existing outside the mind and the inability to faithfully study the wondrous principle of vijñapti-mātra, it is established, just like the Prajñaptisiddhi-śāstra; it also encompasses teaching and principle, where 'establishing' (siddhi) means founding the thesis. Or again, this treatise is established based on the profound principle and wisdom of vijñapti-mātra, just as water- and land-born flowers, the Abhidharma treatises, and so forth arise based on their supports. Or, fearing that the wondrous principle of vijñapti-mātra might be scattered and lost, it is now established because it compendiously gathers widespread and dispersed meanings, just like the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Furthermore, among all dharmas, the mind is the supreme, as the Avataṃsaka says: 'The mind is like a skilled painter, painting the various five aggregates; within all worldly realms, there is no dharma that it does not create'—for such reasons it is established.

1.24

Question: In accord with the main body below, it may be divided into two: first, the cause; second, the fruit. Or it may be divided into three, as explained in the commentary. Or it may be divided into four: first, one verse and a half providing an overarching summary; second, fourteen verses and a half extensively setting forth the transforming [consciousness]; third, nine verses concluding and resolving external objections; fourth, five verses on acquiring benefits based on cultivation. Or it may be divided into five: within the previous third section, one verse is opened up as the section reiterating the meaning of transformation.

1.25

Since such explanations establish the meanings as appropriate, why is it solely named the 'Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only'?

1.26

Answer: It takes its name from what is clarified at the beginning, because those [phenomena] depend on what is transformed by consciousness, as in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Again, it takes its name from the first two sections, because the middle section also contains the word 'vijñapti-mātra', namely, the transformation of these consciousnesses, and so forth. Or it takes its name from what is clarified at the beginning, middle, and end, because the third section says: 'Until one has not yet aroused the consciousness that seeks to abide in the nature of vijñapti-mātra,' and so forth. Or it is because the later two sections intend to explain the brief initial indication. Or, although what is clarified extends to all dharmas, there is none that is not vijñapti-mātra; therefore it is not named after anything else. Furthermore, it is because its fundamental purpose is to establish the meaning of vijñapti-mātra. Such is the main import of establishing the name 'Cheng weishi' above.

1.27

In explaining the title, there are five kinds of vijñapti-mātra as the observed, and the three kinds of wisdom as the observer; furthermore, there are five kinds of vijñapti-mātra: object, teaching, principle, practice, and fruit, as explained in the chapter. Among the vijñapti-mātra of the object, the various sutras present various different explanations according to the capacities [of beings]: either relying on what is grasped, or with respect to defilement, or following what is grasped and the conditioned, or solely following the conditioned, or following pointed facts, or following all dharmas of emptiness and existence to elucidate vijñapti-mātra, each having explicit texts, with the meaning as stated in the chapter. Among these five kinds of vijñapti-mātra—object, teaching, principle, practice, and fruit—there is an interpretation of this treatise that it elucidates only the vijñapti-mātra of the object, abandoning the grasp of external objects because all objects are not separate from the mind, as the text fully shows; there is an interpretation that it speaks only of the vijñapti-mātra of teaching, because the root teaching of the Cheng weishi lun explains what he had spoken; there is an interpretation that it takes only the vijñapti-mātra of principle, establishing the principle spoken in the root teaching because it distinguishes the meaning of the nature and characteristics of vijñapti-mātra; there is an interpretation that it takes only the vijñapti-mātra of practice, because it clarifies the cultivation of the practice of vijñapti-mātra across the five stages; there is an interpretation that it takes only the vijñapti-mātra of the fruit, because it seeks the great fruit, and the body of peace and bliss, the body of liberation, and the Great Muni are called the dharma-kāya. Now, relying on the correct doctrine, all five kinds are included. Although according to the third section it says: 'Having relied on sacred teaching and correct reason, distinguishing the meaning of the nature and characteristics of vijñapti-mātra,' and says: 'I now explain what he has spoken,' which mention only teaching and principle, yet relying on teaching and principle it establishes those natures and characteristics, and since nature and characteristics subsume everything without remainder, taking all of them based on principle is supreme.

1.28

Question: Why do the four reliances admonish relying on wisdom (jñāna) and not relying on consciousness (vijñāna), whereas this treatise is named 'vijñapti-mātra' (consciousness-only) and not named 'jñāna-mātra' (wisdom-only)? Questions concerning the other three reliances are also like this.

1.29

It is as explained under the explanation of the name in the Weishi zhang. Furthermore, the method of explaining treatise titles is as stated in the Zonglun shuji. Regarding the capacities of those who are addressed, there are three parts: first, stating differences; next, harmonizing them; and finally, addressing the capacities. First, stating differences: The Lotus Sutra says: 'In the Buddha lands of the ten directions, there is only the Dharma of the One Vehicle; there are not two, nor are there three, except where the Buddha speaks expediently.' Matching the capacities by means of the teaching, there is only one capacity. The Nirvāṇa [Sutra] also says: 'The lion's roar is a definitive statement: all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. Sentient beings are likewise so; all possess a mind. All who have a mind will without exception attain anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi. Therefore all sentient beings possess only the Buddha-nature.' According to Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya: 'Because there is a distinction between the higher vehicle and the lower vehicle, bodhisattvas and śrāvakas each have their three pitakas, without discussing pratyekabuddhas, the indeterminate, or the natureless as being distinct.' The extensive teachings are thus divided into two; pratyekabuddhas and the natureless have no separate pitakas. Among the ten powers and so forth, the power of knowing the higher and lower faculties is likewise only two. According to the texts of the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Bodhisattvabhūmidhara-śāstra, they are established as two: first, having the nature; second, lacking the nature. The beginningless, naturally distinct six sense bases are 'having the nature'; being accomplished solely by the wholesome roots of humans and gods is 'lacking the nature.' According to the Lotus Sutra, it can also be said that there are three: those who seek the three vehicles are bestowed the three vehicles. Therefore that treatise says: 'Because the four types of śrāvakas do not include those of excessive pride who tend toward quiescence as receiving predictions,' because there is a fruit-vehicle, only three are spoken of. Relying on the Nirvāṇa Sutra there are also three: just as sick persons are of three types: first, whether meeting or not meeting a skilled physician, they will definitely recover—the bodhisattvas; second, meeting one they recover, not meeting one they do not recover—the two vehicles; third, whether meeting or not meeting, they cannot recover—persons lacking the nature. According to the sixteenth assembly in fascicle 593 of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra: 'When it was preached beside the White Heron Lake, the Bodhisattva Suvikrāntavikrāmin requested: "We only pray that the World-Honoured One, pitying us, will fully preach the realm and wisdom of the Tathāgata. If there are sentient beings whose nature is determinate in the śrāvaka vehicle, having heard this Dharma, they can swiftly realize their own anāsrava stage; if their nature is determinate in the pratyekabuddha vehicle, having heard this Dharma, they swiftly rely on their own vehicle to attain release; if their nature is determinate in the unexcelled vehicle, having heard this Dharma, they swiftly realize unexcelled, perfect awakening; if there are sentient beings who, though not yet having entered the stage of correctness and freedom from rebirth, are indeterminate in the three vehicles, having heard this Dharma, all will arouse the thought of unexcelled, perfect awakening. We only pray that the Tathāgata will answer what has been asked."' This sutra speaks only of persons with gotra who enter the noble path; hence it lacks the fifth type: persons lacking gotra, the icchantikas of great compassion. Furthermore, persons who have severed their wholesome roots cannot enter nobility; these are also not spoken of here. Again, the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra says: 'Sentient beings who are separated from spiritual mentors, who have heard nothing and lack the Dharma, are brought to accomplishment through the wholesome roots of humans and gods; to those who seek to be śrāvakas, the śrāvaka vehicle is given; to those who seek to be pratyekabuddhas, the pratyekabuddha vehicle is given; to those who seek the Great Vehicle, the Great Vehicle is given. This is called embracing the true Dharma and being capable of bearing the four great burdens.' Here, subsuming the general under the particular, those having gotra are three, and those lacking gotra are one.

1.30

Furthermore, according to the end of the second fascicle of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, and the first fascicle of the four-fascicle version, the general outline is also identical. The Buddha told Mahāmati: 'There are five gotras that realize the Dharma: first, the śrāvaka-yāna gotra; second, the pratyekabuddha-yāna gotra; third, the tathāgata-yāna gotra; fourth, the indeterminate-yāna gotra; fifth, the natureless, which refers to the icchantika. These are of two kinds: first, those who incinerate all wholesome roots and thus slander the Bodhisattva Piṭaka; second, those who take pity on all sentient beings and make vows exhausting all realms of sentient beings—these are bodhisattvas. [They vow:] "If sentient beings do not enter nirvāṇa, I will not enter either."' Mahāmati addressed the Buddha: 'Which of these two never enters nirvāṇa?' The Buddha said: 'The bodhisattva never enters nirvāṇa, not the one who incinerates all wholesome roots; because [the bodhisattva] knows that all dharmas are originally nirvāṇa, and does not abandon any sentient beings.' Fascicle one, 'Chapter on Gotra', of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra speaks of five kinds of gotra; the three vehicles, the determinate, and the indeterminate—these four are identical to the Yogācāra[-bhūmi]. In the fifth gotra, two kinds are explained: first, temporary; second, ultimate. The temporary has four [characteristics]; the verse says: 'Exclusively pursuing evil conduct, / Completely severing all pure dharmas, / Lacking any share of liberation, / Wholesomeness is slight and also lacks a cause.' Those who are ultimately without it are so because they lack the cause. Here, 'temporary' (時邊) should be said as 'transient' (暫時); the Sanskrit is naikāla-aparinirvāṇa-dharman. 'Nai' means temporary; 'kāla' means time; 'a' means non-; 'pari' means complete; 'nirvāṇa' means quiescence; 'dharma' means nature. Thus it is 'the nature of temporarily lacking complete quiescence.' If it were 'temporal boundary' (時邊) and so forth, it should be kālānta-aparinirvāṇa; 'anta' means boundary. The remaining meanings are the same as before. The five gotras taught in the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] are as in the commentary.

1.31

Next, to reconcile them: The remaining texts are as above and will be harmonised below. The two kinds of icchantika spoken of in the Laṅkāvatāra are: first, those who have severed roots of wholesomeness and are possessed of wrong views; second, bodhisattvas possessed of great compassion. The first have a time when they will enter nirvāṇa, whereas the second certainly do not; because the realm of sentient beings has no point of exhaustion, and because sentient beings devoid of gotra do not attain buddhahood, the bodhisattva of great compassion has no period of attaining buddhahood. However, the fifth gotra comprises three types in all: the first is called icchantika, the second is called acchantika, and the third is called atyantika. 'Icchantika' carries the meaning of 'desire', because of delighting in saṃsāra; 'acchantika' carries the meaning of 'non-desire', because of not delighting in nirvāṇa. These two apply to persons who have not severed roots of wholesomeness, because they are obscured by lack of faith and ignorance; they also apply to bodhisattvas of great compassion, because they are perfumed by great wisdom and great compassion. 'Atyantika' is called 'ultimate' (or 'absolute'), because they are absolutely devoid of the nature of nirvāṇa. These persons devoid of gotra also receive the first two names; the first two will eventually attain buddhahood after a long time, but the latter certainly will not. The Laṅkāvatāra mentions only those endowed with the first two, calling them 'icchantikas possessing the nature'; the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra speaks generally of two kinds of icchantika, those possessing the nature and those devoid of it; in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Laṅkāvatāra, for those who have severed wholesomeness, the result will certainly be attained, while in the present cause it is not attained because roots of wholesomeness have been severed; in the Laṅkāvatāra, the compassionate [icchantika] certainly achieves the present cause, but will definitely not achieve the fruit, because the realm of sentient beings has no time of exhaustion. Those without lineage achieve neither the present nor the future, absolutely failing in both. Combining the sūtras and śāstras, there are three icchantikas: first, those who have severed roots of wholesomeness; second, those of great compassion; third, those devoid of gotra. When manifest activity arises, the nature has both cause and fruit; through these three persons and the preceding four gotras, a fourfold analysis is made: 1. Cause is achieved, but fruit is not achieved—namely, the compassionate icchantika; 2. Fruit is achieved, but cause is not achieved—namely, the icchantika who possesses the nature but has severed wholesomeness; 3. Neither cause nor fruit is achieved—namely, the icchantika devoid of gotra and those determinate in the two vehicles; 4. Both cause and fruit are achieved—namely, those whose great wisdom is predominant, who have not severed roots of wholesomeness, and who attain buddhahood.

1.32

In sum: The Nirvāṇa-sūtra, relying on the nature as principle and a small portion of the nature as practice that applies to all, states that there is only one. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, relying on the sharp and dull faculties of those possessing the nature to elucidate it, merely divides it into superior and inferior. The Śīla-bhadra-sūtra (Shanjie jing), relying on the distinction between the classes of existence and non-existence, speaks of two natures: existent and non-existent. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa-sūtra divides those who possess the nature into two based on sharp and dull faculties, and counts those devoid of gotra as one; hence the sick are divided into three. The Lotus Sūtra converts the indeterminate; without making separate distinctions, it speaks of three in their general characteristics. The Prajñāpāramitā speaks of inquiring about entering the path; it speaks of those possessing the nature, not of those devoid of gotra. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra uses the metaphor of bearing four classes of burdens, concealing the indeterminate gotra; subsuming the universal under the particular, it does not exceed three classes. The Laṅkāvatāra relies on those possessing the nature to distinguish between future attainment and non-attainment; although it speaks of five, it does not speak of those devoid of gotra. In the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra, it fully and separately distinguishes that neither cause nor fruit nature manifests, and the fifth is separate from both, not speaking of great compassion. The Yogācārabhūmi discusses generally whether the natures of classes of sentient beings exist or not; although it sets forth five types, within the fifth it speaks neither of great compassion nor of those who have severed wholesomeness; that the Mahāyāna possesses the gotra is universally accepted by all, but the determinate two vehicles and those devoid of gotra are not understood by people. As it is said in the 'Viniścaya' section of chapter 67 of the Yogācārabhūmi: 'Question: Why does the Laṅkāvatāra not speak of those devoid of gotra, and why does the Yogācārabhūmi not speak of the compassionate icchantika?' 'Answer: Because the capacities addressed by the teaching and the assemblies of the time were different. The Laṅkāvatāra was intended to show that the bodhisattva of great compassion is the fifth gotra; since all five types of gotra speak of existence, it accordingly concealed those devoid of gotra among the five and did not discuss them.' The Yogācārabhūmi is based on principle regarding the distinctions among the five classes of gotra; even if one has severed roots of wholesomeness, one is subsumed under the previous natures, for although it is absent in terms of function, the essence of the seed exists. Great compassion and severing wholesomeness belong to the first or the fourth [gotra]; only those devoid of gotra are stated to be in the fifth, which is why it does not speak of the bodhisattva of great compassion.

1.33

The sixty-seventh chapter of the 'Viniścaya' presents five objections concerning sentient beings devoid of gotra: 1. the objection that stating non-existence raises doubt; 2. the objection concerning sentient beings without faculties; 3. the objection concerning the mutual transformation of all realms; 4. the objection that they should possess all realms; 5. the objection that non-existence should transform into existence. There are six replies: 1. the reply showing contradiction with both scripture and reason; 2. the reply showing that a hypothetical case cannot serve as an analogy; 3. the reply showing that an improper analogy goes against reason; 4. the reply showing that an equal analogy lacks distinction; 5. the reply showing that turning against the Dharma is inconsistent; 6. the reply showing that even granting transformation, it cannot be accomplished.

1.34

Namely, there is an objection that says: 'How can there be a nature that is absolutely devoid of the dharma of parinirvāṇa?'

1.35

One should cross-examine them, saying: 'Do the various classes of sentient beings have diverse realms, immeasurable realms, inferior realms, and superior realms, or do they not? If you say they exist, then claiming that there is no dharma absolutely devoid of nirvāṇa is unreasonable.' This also contradicts reason. As the Cheng weishi lun says: 'The nature is innate; without this, it cannot be so.' 'If you say they do not exist, the sūtra says: "The classes of sentient beings have diverse realms... up to superior realms," which would be unreasonable. This also contradicts the sūtras. Those devoid of gotra are subsumed under the inferior realm.'

1.36

Again, there is an objection that says: 'Although sentient beings have diverse realms, up to superior realms, it is said that there are no sentient beings without faculties. Why is the absence of the dharma of nirvāṇa not like this? Or else one should allow that there are sentient beings without faculties.' One should cross-examine them, saying: 'Are things without faculties sentient beings, or are they non-sentient beings? If they are sentient beings, then external things without faculties should be sentient beings. Setting up a hypothesis as an objection is not accepted by the other. If they are non-sentient beings, then saying "Why not allow that there are sentient beings without faculties?" is unreasonable. The nature is not devoid of faculties; how can it be used as a parallel objection?'

1.37

Again, there is an objection that says: 'Just as after becoming a kṣatriya, one later becomes a brāhmaṇa, vaiśya, or śūdra, and just as after becoming a naraka-being, one later even becomes a deva, why, likewise, after being one devoid of the dharma of nirvāṇa, can one not at some later time become one possessing the dharma of parinirvāṇa?' One should cross-examine them, saying: 'In the mutual transformation of various classes, do they possess all realms, or do they possess only one? If they possess all, the analogy is dissimilar, for that [person devoid of gotra] lacks all [realms]; hence it is an improper analogy. If they possess only one, then having formerly been a kṣatriya and the like and then transforming into another class is unreasonable, because it goes against right principle.'

1.38

Again, there is an objection that says: 'Just as a kṣatriya and the like possess all realms, why should one who is devoid of the dharma of parinirvāṇa not possess the realm of the dharma of parinirvāṇa?' One should cross-examine them, saying: 'Are having a realm and lacking a realm mutually contradictory, or are they not? If they are mutually contradictory, then saying "Why does one who lacks the dharma not have the dharma of parinirvāṇa?" is unreasonable, because they are mutually contradictory. If they are not contradictory, then this sentient being both lacks and possesses the dharma of parinirvāṇa. This is contrary to right principle, because there is no separate substantial entity.'

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