成唯識論了義燈 1.106

1.106

問：佛無相、見，誰能說耶？答：准此，應同無性等釋，聞者識上聚集顯現，佛實不說。然安惠釋：假我、假法，世間愚夫，於自證分上，妄生相、見。相、見本無，不了此空，執有我法。我法別無。或執相、見別二，以為若我、若法，故名別無。相、見總無，為別我法，作所依止。以此我法，依相、見故，名別無依總無，而假立為世間我法。以無依無假，立聖教所說我法，雖迷、悟異，俱依於無。又此安惠以外似內，以無似有，相、見體無，似內心執有，故法准同。聖教我法，以有似無。若護法釋，具如疏辨。然疏判云：此上二解。第一解云：我、法二假乃屬於說。唯假言說，以為我法，彼體都非者。此意釋云：世間我、法說所執相，以為我、法，我、法本無，唯只言說。聖教雖說，所緣見、相蘊等諸法，以為我法。蘊等實非若我、若法，但唯有言。故云乃屬於說。第二解云：以所說為若我、若法者。此意解云：所執外我法無。世說我法者，隨自情執我法之解，說為我法，無彼所執我法可說。以我法無依內情故，以無依有假故，但說情。聖教所設，依識等，上有我法義，義依於體，即義是別。識體是總，以別依總。故說別義，以為我法，名義依體。此既說義以為我法，故不在言。有彼體義為所說故。又護法釋：以內似外，以有似無，向外似故。相、見是有，似外我法，我法是無。此意聖教所說相、見，而體雖有，愚夫所執實。相、見無以執實，有能緣所緣為見、相故。今護法意，相、見緣生，假名相、見分。從彼愚夫所執二分故，云以有似無。

Question: If the Buddha lacks the objective and seeing aspects, who can teach? Answer: According to this, it should agree with the explanation of Asvabhāva and others: it is aggregated and manifested upon the consciousness of the hearer, but the Buddha does not actually speak. However, Sthiramati explains: as for conventional self and conventional phenomena, worldly fools falsely give rise to the objective and seeing aspects upon the self-verifying aspect. The objective and seeing aspects are fundamentally non-existent; failing to understand this emptiness, they grasp at the existence of self and phenomena. There are no separate self and phenomena. Or else, grasping at the distinct two—the objective and seeing aspects—they consider them to be either a self or phenomena, which is why they are called 'separately non-existent'. The objective and seeing aspects are totally non-existent, serving as the basis for the separate self and phenomena. Because these self and phenomena depend upon the objective and seeing aspects, it is called the 'separately non-existent depending on the totally non-existent', which is conventionally established as worldly self and phenomena. Through the 'non-existent depending on the non-existent', the self and phenomena spoken of in the holy teachings are conventionally established. Although delusion and awakening differ, both depend on the non-existent. Furthermore, this Sthiramati [holds that] the external resembles the internal, and the non-existent resembles the existent; the objective and seeing aspects have no substantial entity, yet resemble the internal mind grasping them as existent, and phenomena follow the same principle. The self and phenomena of the holy teachings [rely on] the existent resembling the non-existent. As for Dharmapāla's explanation, it is fully distinguished as in the Commentary. However, the Commentary determines: regarding the two explanations above, the first explanation says: 'The two designations of self and phenomena belong strictly to verbal expression. They are merely conventional designations taken as self and phenomena, whose substantial entities are completely non-existent.' The meaning of this explanation is: worldly self and phenomena speak of the grasped form as self and phenomena; self and phenomena are fundamentally non-existent, being only speech. Although the holy teachings speak of them, the perceived seeing, objective, skandha, and other phenomena are taken as self and phenomena. The skandhas and so forth are truly neither a self nor phenomena; they are only speech. Hence it says 'they belong strictly to verbal expression.' The second explanation says: 'Taking that which is expressed to be either self or phenomena.' The meaning of this explanation is: the grasped external self and phenomena are non-existent. When the world speaks of self and phenomena, it speaks of them as self and phenomena in accordance with its own sentimentally grasped understanding of self and phenomena; there are no such grasped self and phenomena that can be spoken of. Because the self and phenomena are non-existent and depend on internal sentiment, through the 'non-existent depending on the existent', it is conventional, and merely expresses sentiment. What the holy teachings establish depends on consciousness and the rest, upon which the meaning of self and phenomena resides. The meaning depends upon the substantial entity; that is, the meaning is distinct, while the substantial entity of consciousness is general, with the distinct depending on the general. Therefore, speaking of the distinct meaning as self and phenomena is called 'the meaning depending upon the substantial entity'. Since this already speaks of the meaning as self and phenomena, it does not consist in speech alone, because that substantial entity and meaning exist as what is expressed. Furthermore, Dharmapāla explains: the internal resembles the external, and the existent resembles the non-existent, because they resemble outward. The objective and seeing aspects are existent, resembling the external self and phenomena, whereas self and phenomena are non-existent. The meaning of this is: although the substantial entity of the objective and seeing aspects spoken of in the holy teachings is existent, the real objective and seeing aspects grasped by fools are non-existent, because grasping at a real grasping subject and grasped object constitutes seeing and objective aspects. Now, according to Dharmapāla's intention, the objective and seeing aspects are dependently arisen, and are conventionally called the objective and seeing divisions. In accordance with those two divisions grasped by fools, it is said that 'the existent resembles the non-existent.'