成唯識論了義燈 1.55

1.55

有釋：四字皆有決定。《要集》云：若無此釋，於理有闕。雖有諸釋，仍未盡理。謂立論者，欲成無常。對敵論等，即立量云：諸行無常。其敵論等，雖聞前三，而於所立，未生定解。說常字時，方生定解。故前三字，未有決定。乃至云：若依此釋，立因、喻後，方生決定。亦准此理，此意立宗。若未解時，未有決定，因、喻已後，方生決定。此義應思：且西明釋，於四字上，皆決定者，且聞諸字，知目於何，既未知諸，諸於何法？豈生決定？若言決定，知是諸聲，有決定心，說行字時，應有三決定。決定知行，復決定知諸言目行。若不定知，諸言目行不生解故，餘二准此。即合念六決定，不應但有四故，亦增減失。《要集》所說，亦不盡理，對敵立量，可如所說，或但說法，不立比量，可無決定。故《法苑》意通約說法，決定知彼諸言所目，生決定心，說有七心，或十二等故，即無過。不唯據悟所說義旨，以判多少。餘既重說，何不盡言？《要集》云：《法苑》云：諸惡者莫作，依《婆沙》作法。字、字身、多字身、名、名身、多名身等，聞一句時，即有五十一法。令謂聞經一句義中，生解之心，必無如是多法現前者。此不善得《法苑》之意，且據一句作法如是，如說五字，或有一字名，即名、名身有十五等。言五十一聚集顯現不決定言，聞一句時，有許聚集。如第五卷，五別境中，作法之類。《要集》云：由此理故，有字非名攝，一字字不成句。字為二依故，於此中有十八法。謂字有十五，字有五，字身四，多字身六，准作法知。此亦不爾，應言字及字身等有十五，下准知之。一句一名一所詮義，此亦不爾。依字成名，依名成句，諸處通說，豈可莫作不是名耶？不爾，苦、空等亦應非名攝。又下自判諸行、無常，二名為正，何故此處即但一名？又不應言一所詮義。如《瑜伽論》等云：所立有二：一、自性；二、差別。又名詮自性，句詮差別，自性、差別豈不二義？說一義耶？又云：若不依識相，准義作法，非唯五十合七十一法。字有十五，名有三十五，句有二十，及所詮義故。此意或有二名成句，三名成句，四名成句，五名成句故。三十五名，有二十句。此意一字成名，有五个名。二名成句有四，二二合。三名成句有三，三三合。四名成句有二，四四合。五名成句有一，五合說。即有十个句。二字成名，作句中名，既有四。二名成句有三。三名成句有二。四名成句有一。復有六句，三字成名作句中，二名成句有二，三名成句有一。四字成名作句中，有一句。總二十句。五字成名，名既唯一，一名無句，并一詮義。合七十一，此亦不爾，何者若論字有五，名有十五，一字所成名有五，二字所成名四，三字所成名三，四字所成名二，五字所成名一。若字身名身，即重合彼，非更有別名之。與字并句二十，合三十五所詮之義。足字字身十五，名名身三十五，句有二十，合一百五。若更句句身，并所依聲，即更有多故。今但言為七十一，有增減過。《法苑》本意，且約能詮，粗作法爾，復既細論，不盡故過。

An explanation states: All four phonemes have determination. The Yaoji states: 'Without this explanation, it would be deficient in reason. Although there are various explanations, they still do not fully capture the principle. That is, a proponent wishing to prove impermanence, facing an opponent or the like, sets up the thesis-statement: "All conditioned phenomena are impermanent." Although the opponent hears the first three, they do not give rise to definitive understanding regarding what is being posited; only when the phoneme "eternal" is spoken do they give rise to definitive understanding. Therefore, the first three phonemes do not yet have determination.' And it goes on to say: 'If one follows this explanation, determination is only generated after establishing the reason and example. This principle also applies here: this refers to establishing the thesis. When one has not yet understood, there is no determination; only after the reason and example is determination generated.' This point should be considered: As for the explanation by Ximing that all four phonemes have determination: when hearing the phoneme 'zhu' (all), what does one know it refers to? Since one does not yet know what 'all' is qualifying, how could determination arise? If one says there is a determinative mind knowing definitively that it is the sound 'all', then when the phoneme 'xing' is spoken, there should be three determinations: determinately knowing 'conditioned phenomena', and further determinately knowing that the word 'all' refers to 'conditioned phenomena'. If one does not know definitively that the word 'all' refers to 'conditioned phenomena', understanding would not arise; the remaining two are analogous to this. This would add up to twenty-six determinations, and should not merely be four; thus it also incurs the fault of addition or omission. What is stated in the Yaoji also does not fully capture the principle: when setting up a thesis-statement against an opponent, it may be as stated; but when merely preaching the Dharma without setting up an inference, there may be no such determination. Therefore, the intention of the Fayuan broadly covers preaching the Dharma: determinately knowing what that word 'all' refers to, one generates a determinative mind, and states that there are seven minds, or twelve, and so on; thus there is no fault. It does not solely rely on awakening to the intended meaning of what is stated to determine the number. Since the rest has been reiterated, why not state it fully? The Yaoji says: 'The Fayuan states: "Do not commit any evil," following the formulation in the Mahāvibhāṣā. With phoneme, phoneme-collection (akṣara-kāya), multi-phoneme-collection, name, name-collection (nāma-kāya), multi-name-collection, and so forth, upon hearing one sentence there are fifty-one phenomena. If we suppose that in the mind that gives rise to understanding upon hearing one sentence's meaning of a sūtra, there must definitely not be so many phenomena appearing before it.' This does not properly grasp the intention of the Fayuan. It merely made a formulation like this on the basis of a single sentence: as in speaking five phonemes, or having one-phoneme names, then names and name-collections would number fifteen, and so on. In saying that fifty-one assemble and manifest, it does not state definitively that hearing one sentence has that many assembling. This is like the class of formulations among the five particular mental factors in the fifth fascicle. The Yaoji says: 'By this principle, there are phonemes not subsumed under names, and a single phoneme cannot form a sentence. Because phonemes are the basis of both, within this there are eighteen phenomena: that is, fifteen phonemes—five phonemes, four phoneme-collections, and six multi-phoneme-collections, as known by the formulation.' This too is not so; one should say that phonemes, phoneme-collections, and so forth number fifteen, as is to be understood below by analogy. 'One sentence, one name, and one expressed meaning'—this too is not so. Based on phonemes, names are formed; based on names, sentences are formed—this is universally stated in all sources. Could 'do not do' not be a name? Otherwise, 'suffering', 'emptiness', and so forth should also not be subsumed under names. Furthermore, below it personally decides that 'all conditioned phenomena' and 'impermanent' are two names correctly; why then does it have only one name here? Nor should it say 'one expressed meaning'. As the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other texts say: what is established is twofold: first, individual essence (svabhāva); second, distinction (viśeṣa). Furthermore, names express individual essence, and sentences express distinction; how could individual essence and distinction not be two meanings? How could one speak of one meaning? It also says: 'If one does not rely on the marks of consciousness but makes the formulation according to meaning, there are not merely fifty, but seventy-one phenomena in all: phonemes have fifteen, names have thirty-five, sentences have twenty, and the expressed meaning.' The idea is that there are sentences formed of two names, sentences formed of three names, sentences formed of four names, and sentences formed of five names; therefore, thirty-five names yield twenty sentences. The idea is: with one phoneme forming a name, there are five names. Sentences formed of two names have four, combined two by two. Sentences formed of three names have three, combined three by three. Sentences formed of four names have two, combined four by four. Sentences formed of five names have one, spoken as a combination of five. Thus there are ten sentences. With two phonemes forming a name, as names in a sentence, since there are four: sentences formed of two names have three; sentences formed of three names have two; sentences formed of four names have one; thus there are another six sentences. With three phonemes forming a name used in a sentence, sentences formed of two names have two, and sentences formed of three names have one. With four phonemes forming a name used in a sentence, there is one sentence. In total, twenty sentences. With five phonemes forming a name, since the name is only one, one name does not make a sentence, plus one expressed meaning, making seventy-one in all. This too is not so. Why? If discussing phonemes, there are five; names have fifteen: names formed of one phoneme have five, names formed of two phonemes have four, names formed of three phonemes have three, names formed of four phonemes have two, and names formed of five phonemes have one. As for phoneme-collections and name-collections, they merely recombine those, and do not name further distinct ones. These, together with phonemes and the twenty sentences, combine to thirty-five expressed meanings. Adding the fifteen of phonemes and phoneme-collections, the thirty-five of names and name-collections, and the twenty sentences, makes a total of one hundred and five. If one further adds sentences and sentence-collections (pada-kāya), together with the sound on which they rely, there would be even more. Therefore, merely stating it as seventy-one has the fault of addition or omission. The original intention of the Fayuan was merely to make a rough formulation based on the expressive elements; to discuss it in fine detail is incomplete and thus at fault.