成唯識論了義燈 1.59

1.59

三歸在者，復分為四：一、歸藏；二、歸分；三、歸乘。並如《法苑》〈藏〉、〈分〉、〈乘〉章；四、歸名者，初辨後歸。辨有三：一、辨六釋，亦如《法苑》，總聊簡章，得名懸隔，辨然有解，六釋中，依士、依主，作四句辨云：有依士非依主，如取之蘊，以取是所，非心王故。有依主非依士，如蘊之取。此不應爾。若依士依主，二不相攝，應有七釋。有解：六釋勒為三例：一、同體非別，持業、帶數；二、別體非同相違、隣近；三、亦同亦別，依主、有財。思之，理有相濫。若所釋法通，即不障。據六釋體，即不必。然且如四斷，斷者是勤心所。四者是數，即不相應，云何同體？又如相違，五識身相應地意地，以二法別合一處，說據體各異，如五識身相應地自是地，不是用彼意相應之五識為地，亦非以五即意地等。既言五識身相應地，此豈別體？《要集》云：三藏相傳，約分為四：一、用自非他；二、用他非自；三、自他俱用；四、自他俱不用。持業唯初句，依主唯第三，有財唯第二，相違唯第四，隣近通二、三，帶數初及三。乃至帶數三句，如四正斷，即初句，四即正斷故，如四神足。即第三句，四屬欲等，非神足故。如說三藏法師，亦是第三句。若但言三藏是第二句，三即是藏，俱非人故。彼釋極廣，恐煩不具。然准此釋，有相雜亂，六釋簡濫，應可思之。

As for the third, subsumption under categories, it is further divided into four: first, subsumption under Piṭakas; second, subsumption under divisions; third, subsumption under Yānas—all as presented in the chapters on "Piṭakas", "Divisions", and "Yānas" in the Fayuan [yilin zhang]—and fourth, subsumption under designations. The fourth first distinguishes and then subsumes. Distinguishing has three parts. First, distinguishing the six compound analyses (ṣaṭ-samāsāḥ). This is also as in the Fayuan [yilin zhang], in the chapter on general sorting and differentiation, where the titles are treated as far apart. Distinguishing them, there is an explanation which, among the six compound analyses, differentiates tatpuruṣa into four permutations (catuṣkoṭi), saying: There is a dependent determinative (tatpuruṣa) that is not a possessive determinative (şaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa), such as the "aggregates of grasping" (upādāna-skandha), because grasping is a mental factor (caitta) and not the primary mind. There is a possessive determinative that is not a dependent determinative, such as the "grasping of the aggregates." This should not be so: if the dependent determinative and the possessive determinative were not mutually subsumed, there would have to be seven compound analyses. Another explanation holds that the six compound analyses can be summarized into three paradigms: (1) identical entity and not distinct: karmadhāraya and dvigu; (2) distinct entities and not identical: dvandva and avyayībhāva; (3) both identical and distinct: tatpuruṣa and bahuvrīhi. If one considers this, in principle there is mutual confusion. If the dharma being analyzed is general, it presents no obstacle; but strictly speaking with respect to the entities of the six compound analyses, it is not necessarily so. For example, regarding the "four right abandonments" (samyakprahāṇa): "abandonment" is the mental factor of diligence (vīrya), while "four" is a number, so they are not associated (asaṃprayukta); how could they be identical in entity? Furthermore, as in dvandva: regarding "the bhūmi associated with the collection of five consciousnesses" and "the mental bhūmi", because two distinct dharmas are combined in one place, speaking with respect to their entities each is different. For instance, "the bhūmi associated with the collection of five consciousnesses" is itself a bhūmi; it does not take those five consciousnesses associated with the mind as its bhūmi, nor does it make the five consciousnesses identical with the mental bhūmi, and so forth. Since it is called "the bhūmi associated with the collection of five consciousnesses," how could this not be distinct entities? The Yaoji says: According to the transmission of the Tripiṭaka Master, they are analyzed into four alternatives: (1) applying to oneself and not the other; (2) applying to the other and not oneself; (3) applying to both oneself and the other; (4) applying to neither oneself nor the other. Karmadhāraya is solely the first alternative; tatpuruṣa is solely the third; bahuvrīhi is solely the second; dvandva is solely the fourth; avyayībhāva extends to the second and third; dvigu to the first and third. Further, concerning the three alternatives for dvigu: for instance, the "four right abandonments" is the first alternative, because the four are precisely the right abandonments; the "four bases of psychic power" (ṛddhipāda) is the third alternative, because "four" pertains to aspiration (chanda) and so forth, not to psychic power itself. Likewise, to speak of "the Tripiṭaka Dharma Master" is also the third alternative; if one only said "Tripiṭaka" it would be the second alternative, because the three are precisely the piṭakas, neither being a person. His explanation is extremely extensive; fearing prolixity, I shall not present it fully. Yet following this explanation, there is mutual confusion; the sorting out of confusion in the six compound analyses ought to be reflected upon.