成唯識論了義燈 1.80

1.80

出體之中。《法苑》敬禮，即以三業為體。西明以慚、愧為體。《要集》云：今取前解，三業為正。有云：依教十法為體，一、思；二、慚；三、敬；四、愛；五、信；六、無慢；七、捨；八、色蘊；九、識蘊；十、智。今謂不爾。若言十法敬愛不慢，百法是何？所餘非理，如《要集》辨，煩不具錄。《要集》云：言稽首者，顯勝身業。然由於德、有德等境，發勝解，俱決定，思已即起淨信。思此，起慚崇，重賢善。因斯能發清淨身、語，是故此中意通三業，慚為敬體。信等諸法，是敬之因。身、語二業，是敬之果，意通因果。《法苑》所說，三業及愧，以為敬體，理亦難成。三業體思，思即造作，敬相微隱故，《大婆沙》三十四云：敬慚為體，崇重賢善，是敬相故者。今詳此釋，理未必然，且自不定。先敘《法苑》，思為體性。有釋以慚自斷，取前三業為正，今復取慚為能敬體，從何為正？復不可說前後義別，同解稽首敬禮義故。　又若以慚為自正義者，理必不然。何者？若發勝解，俱決定，思已即起淨信，理且不然，思非信因。第六卷云：忍，謂信因樂欲為果。不言信俱思，為因起信。若遍行故，應說作意，不應說思。又云，由此起慚崇重賢善因，斯能發清淨身、語。是故此中，意通三業，慚為敬體者。此亦不爾。為取三業為歸敬體，為但取慚。若但取慚，何須說云，意通三業，慚為敬體？慚性非是三業體故。　若通三業，即不唯慚。何故復云信等諸法，是敬之因？身、語敬果，意通因果，即三業但是敬之因果，非自體故。若唯說慚為敬體者，理亦不然。此唯明敬可但是慚。既云敬禮，明是三業。三業致禮，由敬慚因，無處說慚，亦為業體。又不說慚，是發業故。又《攝大乘論》云：故我至誠，身、語、思頻修，無倒歸命禮。又瞿波論師云：三業禮者，欲顯大師有天眼故，以身業禮等。律中云在明處近，已身業禮等故。但是思不可說慚為因，可爾如以貪等，而為加行，方起三業。雖復論云，斷命名嗔等，終不說貪等以為業體。雖說於慚，敬德有德，論歸敬體，即是三業。此理決定，勿更別解。又《法苑》中，但說三業，無文說愧以為敬體。波錯看文，應更審讀。

Regarding identification of the intrinsic nature: In the Fayuan [yilinzhang], reverent homage takes the three actions as its intrinsic nature. Ximing takes shame (hrī) and embarrassment (apatrāpya) as its intrinsic nature. The Yaoji says: "We now take the former explanation—the three actions—as correct." Some say that based on the teaching, ten dharmas constitute its intrinsic nature: 1. volition (cetanā); 2. shame; 3. reverence; 4. affection; 5. faith; 6. non-arrogance; 7. equanimity; 8. the aggregate of form; 9. the aggregate of consciousness; 10. knowledge. Now I say this is not so. If one says that ten dharmas [include] reverence, affection, and non-arrogance, where are these among the hundred dharmas? The rest is unreasonable, as analyzed in the Yaoji, so I will not tire of recording it in full. The Yaoji says: "The word 'bowing the head' reveals superior bodily action. However, because one produces resolute resolve toward objects such as virtues and the virtuous, being resolute together [with it], once one has engaged in volition, pure faith arises immediately. Considering this, shame arises, esteeming and honoring the worthy and good. Due to this, one is able to produce pure bodily and vocal [actions]. Therefore, here volition encompasses all three actions, and shame is the intrinsic nature of reverence. Dharmas such as faith are the causes of reverence; bodily and vocal actions are the results of reverence; and volition encompasses both cause and result. What the Fayuan says—taking the three actions and embarrassment as the intrinsic nature of reverence—is also difficult to establish rationally. The intrinsic nature of the three actions is volition; volition is action, and the characteristic of reverence is subtle and hidden. Hence the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 34, says: 'Reverence takes shame as its intrinsic nature, because esteeming and honoring the worthy and good is the characteristic of reverence.'" Now examining this explanation, its reasoning is not necessarily so, and moreover it contradicts itself. First it quotes the Fayuan, taking volition as the intrinsic nature. Then in a certain explanation, [the author of the Yaoji] makes his own judgment taking the former [view of] the three actions as correct, yet here he again takes shame as the intrinsic nature of the homage-paying [reverence]. Which one is taken as correct? Nor can it be said that the earlier and later meanings differ, since both explain the meaning of bowing the head and paying reverent homage. Furthermore, if one takes shame as one's own correct position, the reasoning is certainly unacceptable. Why? If [one claims that] producing resolute resolve together with resolution, once one has engaged in volition, pure faith arises immediately, the reasoning is simply not so: volition is not the cause of faith. Fascicle six states: "Patience is said to be the cause of faith, and aspiration is its result." It does not state that volition conjoined with faith serves as the cause for faith to arise. If [it were so] because it is omnipresent, one should say attention (manaskāra), not volition. Moreover, it says: "Due to this, shame arises, esteeming and honoring the worthy and good; because of this, one can produce pure bodily and vocal [actions]. Therefore, here volition encompasses all three actions, and shame is the intrinsic nature of reverence." This also is not so. Does one take the three actions as the intrinsic nature of taking refuge and revering, or does one take only shame? If one takes only shame, why must one say, "Volition encompasses the three actions, and shame is the intrinsic nature of reverence"? For the nature of shame is not the intrinsic nature of the three actions. If it encompasses the three actions, then it is not solely shame. Why again say that dharmas such as faith are the causes of reverence, bodily and vocal actions are the results of reverence, and volition encompasses both cause and result? That would mean the three actions are merely the cause and result of reverence, not its intrinsic nature. If one says solely that shame is the intrinsic nature of reverence, the reasoning is also not so. This clarifies reverence; it may be that [reverence] is only shame, but since the text says "reverent homage," it clearly refers to the three actions. The three actions pay homage due to the cause of reverence and shame; nowhere is it said that shame also serves as the intrinsic nature of karma. Nor is it said that shame produces karma. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Therefore I with utmost sincerity, with body, speech, and thought repeatedly cultivate, unerringly taking refuge and paying homage." And Master Gopadatta says: "Paying homage with the three actions is intended to show that the Great Master possesses the divine eye, hence paying homage with bodily action," and so forth. In the Vinaya it says that being nearby in an illuminated place, one pays homage with bodily action, and so forth. Thus it is only volition; one cannot say shame is its cause. It may be that, just as greed and the like serve as preparatory cultivation to then produce the three actions, although the treatise says "cutting off life is called hatred," it ultimately never says greed and the like are the intrinsic nature of karma. Although it is said that regarding shame, one reveres virtues and the virtuous, when discussing the intrinsic nature of taking refuge and paying reverence, it is precisely the three actions. This principle is definitive; do not offer another explanation. Furthermore, in the Fayuan, it only speaks of the three actions, with no text saying embarrassment is the intrinsic nature of reverence. Poshen misread the text and should re-examine it more carefully.