成唯識論了義燈 2.117

2.117

無為得者，無為有三，如本疏判。然通漏、無漏，若六行道得唯有漏；見道得唯無漏；修道通二，許於修道亦有漏斷故；無學無漏，斷非想惑唯無漏道，得果捨向故，捨前漏起無漏得，所得無為一向無漏。非擇滅得，唯是異熟無記性攝，以為、無為二有體法。若起得得屬行者，以有體故，隨其所應，得屬所得，及能得道。今此非擇，闕緣不生，法既不生，故不可屬所不生法，非有情故。但屬所依眾同分也，若其非得，唯屬所依眾同分立。定唯異熟，無記性也，然若得擇滅法，猶可重生也，如退果者，若得非擇，畢竟不生，以闕緣故。若依大乘，有為法得，亦同薩婆多定屬所得，諸性界地，若色若心，及漏、無漏種子現行，隨其所應，皆隨所得判屬彼法，以依此等諸法之上假建立故。

Regarding the possession of the unconditioned: there are three unconditioned [phenomena], as determined in the root commentary. However, they encompass both the tainted (sāsrava) and the untainted (anāsrava). If [acquired through] the path of the six mental practices, the possession is exclusively tainted. The possession of the darśanamārga is exclusively untainted. The bhāvanāmārga encompasses both, since it is accepted that on the bhāvanāmārga there is also tainted severing. In the untainted [stage] of the aśaikṣa, severing the defilements of the stage of neither-conceptualization-nor-non-conceptualization (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) is exclusively through the untainted path; because one acquires the fruit and abandons the [preceding] path of progression (pratipannaka), one abandons the former tainted [possession] and gives rise to untainted possession, while the unconditioned that is acquired is exclusively untainted. The possession of apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is subsumed exclusively under the indeterminate nature that is fruition (vipāka), because conditioned and unconditioned are both existent real phenomena. If possession arises, it belongs to the practitioner; because it is an existent entity, it belongs, as appropriate, to what is acquired and to the path that acquires it. Now, as for this apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha: it does not arise due to deficiency of conditions. Since the phenomenon does not arise, it cannot belong to the phenomenon that does not arise, for it is not a sentient being. It belongs merely to its basis, the homogeneous group (nikāyasabhāga). If it is non-possession (aprāpti), it is established as belonging solely to its basis, the homogeneous group. It is definitively of the indeterminate nature that is fruition alone. However, if one acquires a phenomenon of pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, it can still arise again, as in the case of one who falls from a fruit. But if one acquires apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, it will definitively never arise, because of the deficiency of conditions. If according to the Mahāyāna, the possession of conditioned phenomena, like that in the Sarvāstivāda, also definitively belongs to what is acquired: the various natures, realms, and stages—whether matter or mind, and whether seeds or actual manifestations that are tainted or untainted—are all, as appropriate, judged as belonging to those phenomena in accordance with what is acquired, because it is merely nominally established upon these phenomena.