成唯識論了義燈 2.167

2.167

《論》：無想定前求無想果，故所熏成種，招彼異熟識。本疏二解：自斷前正，雖無想異熟，假非實感。然為求彼果，修無想定，若有心時，是能感彼無想果者，修有心定，何假無心？以無心定前，微微心所熏成種，防心不起，方名無心定。即說假法，能防實心，後得果時，彼雖是假，然由厭心功能力故。想等不起，假說為感，於理何違。若俱實種，為能感者，應同第八，不名無心。又復此論，但云：故所熏成種，招彼異熟識。依之麁動想等不行，假立無想，不言成種，招彼無想，又復是假，如何種感？問：得果之時，微微心種即久已滅，但有相續無心種子，無二種種，如何可說有心感有心？答：雖無別種，即最後心與種俱時修，有能感彼，總異熟力，以未熟故，果不得起。後熟生果時，將現就種，望得果時，說有心感，故亦不違。西明云：准知此因加行時種微及微微，皆感總果有心異熟。正無心位，根本實種，招無心別果。無心定力遮心，不生其理決然，無勞致惑。此雖異釋，據時能感，不越本解，然復有過。何者自許彼天非所生果，假無別體？故不應說為實種感，若許實感，何故復言無心定力遮心不生？其理決然，徒設劬勞。《要集》云：有說二解，後說違五十六者。本疏自判後釋非正，何煩重述。然云：彼天總報第八，及彼生得心等，必為微微有心種感。若無現思，種不能獨取果。彼假異熟無想別報，即隨所依，一時說感，不可分拆有心、無心，二位種子別感二果者。既一時感，如何一有心、一無心，又俱時感，即應無心，與總異熟俱時而得，何故前後？若云：誰說前後，即違論說心、心所滅。既言心、心所滅，明知初起現行，亦不可云。《伽》五十六既云，起者謂能引發無想定思，能感彼異熟果，明是一時，不更別分總別二果。此亦不爾，若直執論說，亦應但現思不得通種子，彼云謂能引發無想定思，能引即現思，復不說種子。若云以義通種子者，亦以義取說感總報，依此總報六識不行，假立無想。故此論云：故所熏成種招彼異熟識，依之麁動想等不行，假立無想。論云：無想定前，至招彼異熟識，明所依，依之麁動至假立無想，明能依。問：無想異熟滅幾識立？答：滅一識立，以鼻、舌二識，但在欲界；眼、耳、身三識，但在初定；在第四定麁但第六，不可起於下地異熟，眼等三識，故唯第六。問：出彼異熟心緣何地？答：隨所生地以為所緣，以潤生愛，必與所生同一地故，不說異地愛潤異地生故。問：無想異熟，即依所厭以立，二定何故依能厭立？答：異熟是所求故，於所求立異熟，一定亦所求，即於二定之上立二定，故無過難。

The treatise says: "Prior to the thoughtless absorption, seeking the fruit of thoughtlessness, that which is perfumed becomes seeds which bring about that heterometabolic consciousness." The primary commentary has two explanations: It itself decides that the former is correct: although the thoughtless heterometabolism is designated and not genuinely brought about [by a single real entity], nevertheless, because one cultivates the thoughtless absorption to seek that fruit, if [cultivating] when having mind were what could bring about that fruit of thoughtlessness, one would cultivate a mindful absorption—why would one need the thoughtless? Because prior to the thoughtless absorption, the seeds perfumed and produced by the extremely subtle mind prevent the mind from arising, it is only then called the thoughtless absorption. That is to say, a designated phenomenon is able to prevent the real mind; when the fruit is subsequently attained, although it is designated, nevertheless by the power of the efficacy of the mind that is disgusted, ideation and the like do not arise, and it is metaphorically spoken of as bringing [it] about; what contradiction is there with principle? If both were real seeds acting as the bringer-about, it should be the same as the eighth [consciousness] and not be called thoughtless. Furthermore, this treatise only says: "Therefore that which is perfumed becomes seeds that bring about that heterometabolic consciousness; based upon this, coarse and active ideation and the like do not operate, and one conventionally establishes 'thoughtlessness'." It does not say that it becomes seeds that bring about that thoughtlessness, and furthermore, being designated, how could seeds bring it about? Question: At the time of attaining the fruit, the seeds of the extremely subtle mind have already long ceased; there are only the continuous thoughtless seeds, without two kinds of seeds—how can one say that mindful brings about mindful? Answer: Although there is no separate seed, precisely at the time when the final mind and the seed are cultivated together, there is the power capable of bringing about that general heterometabolism; because it has not yet matured, the fruit cannot arise. Later, when it matures and gives birth to the fruit, taking the manifest to accompany the seed, in view of the time the fruit is attained, it is said that the mindful brings it about; hence there is also no contradiction. Ximing says: "It is known by inference that at the time of this causal preparatory stage, the subtle and extremely subtle seeds both bring about the general fruit of mindful heterometabolism. At the exact stage of thoughtlessness, the fundamental real seeds bring about the specific fruit of thoughtlessness. The power of the thoughtless absorption obstructs the mind so that it does not arise—its principle is definite, so do not labor to give rise to doubt." Although this is a different interpretation, in terms of the bringer-about at that time, it does not exceed the original explanation, yet it still has an error. What is it? He himself concedes that that heaven is not a produced fruit, and that as a designation it has no distinct substantial entity; therefore one should not say that it is brought about by real seeds. If one conceded that it is really brought about, why would one further say that the power of the thoughtless absorption obstructs the mind from arising? Its principle being definite, such labor is exerted in vain. The Yaoji says: "Some state two explanations, and say that the latter explanation contradicts [Yogācārabhūmi] chapter 56." The primary commentary itself judges that the latter explanation is not correct, so why bother repeating it? However, it says: "The general retribution of the eighth [consciousness] of that heaven, as well as its innate mind and so forth, must be brought about by the mindful seeds of the extremely subtle [state]. If there is no manifest volition, the seeds cannot seize the fruit on their own. That designated heterometabolism of the specific retribution of thoughtlessness is, following that which it is based on, spoken of as brought about simultaneously; one cannot separate the seeds of the two stages, mindful and thoughtless, as distinctively bringing about the two fruits." Since they are brought about simultaneously, how could one be mindful and one thoughtless? Furthermore, if brought about at the same time, then the thoughtless should be attained simultaneously with the general heterometabolism; why should they be sequential? If one says: "Who says they are sequential?", this would contradict the treatise's statement that mind and mental factors cease. Since it says mind and mental factors cease, one clearly knows it is the initial arising of the manifest activity, nor can one say [otherwise]. Since chapter 56 of the [Yogācārabhūmi-]śāstra says that arising refers to the volition capable of initiating the thoughtless absorption, which is capable of bringing about that heterometabolic fruit, it clearly indicates that it is at one time, and one does not further distinguish between the two fruits of general and specific. This is also not so. If one clings strictly to the statement of the treatise, it should also only be manifest volition and not extend to seeds, for it says "refers to the volition capable of initiating the thoughtless absorption"—what can initiate is the manifest volition, and it does not speak of seeds. If one says that in terms of meaning it extends to seeds, then in terms of meaning it is also taken to be spoken of as bringing about the general retribution; based on this general retribution, the six consciousnesses do not operate, and one conventionally establishes "thoughtlessness". Therefore this treatise says: "Therefore that which is perfumed becomes seeds which bring about that heterometabolic consciousness; based upon this, coarse and active ideation and the like do not operate, and one conventionally establishes 'thoughtlessness'." The treatise saying: "Prior to the thoughtless absorption... to... bring about that heterometabolic consciousness" clarifies the support; "based upon this, coarse and active... to... conventionally establishes 'thoughtlessness'" clarifies that which is supported. Question: How many consciousnesses are ceased to establish the thoughtless heterometabolism? Answer: It is established by the cessation of one consciousness. Because the two consciousnesses of nose and tongue are only in the desire realm, and the three consciousnesses of eye, ear, and body are only in the first dhyāna; in the fourth dhyāna, coarse [activity] is only the sixth, and it is impossible to give rise to the heterometabolic eye and other three consciousnesses of lower stages; therefore it is solely the sixth. Question: What stage does the mind emerging from that heterometabolism take as its object? Answer: It takes whatever stage it is born into as its object. Because the craving that moistens rebirth must belong to the same stage as the birth produced, for it is never said that craving of a different stage moistens birth in another stage. Question: The thoughtless heterometabolism is established based upon that which is disgusted; why are the two absorptions established based upon that which can disgust? Answer: Heterometabolism is that which is sought, so the heterometabolism is established upon that which is sought; the single absorption is also that which is sought, so upon the two absorptions one establishes the two absorptions; therefore there is no fault or difficulty.