成唯識論了義燈 2.67
成唯識論了義燈 2.67
- Language
- Classical Chinese
2.67
有說瑜伽之師即依士釋,師有瑜伽師即有財釋。此亦依主,而非有財,如前分別。後思《集》云:心、境相應,義且難了。若云心起必託境,心趣此境,境順彼心,故名相應者,境應皆通三性、定散心中。若言隨心所樂,其境必現,於彼自在,故名相應者。以假想惠分析聚色,雖作微解而不現微,如何得名瑜伽師也?若言心即不違境界諸法自性,故名相應者,於本聚色先無極微,作極微解,如何相應?壞法相故。《集》自解云:觀心所緣境界,不障觀心,令彼觀心種種行解,或青黃等極微等相,得自在轉,是故說名心境相應,非謂境相隨心現,故名為相應者。此亦不爾,空花雖無,亦不障心作空花解,如病損眼,非黃見黃,遍計我等境,皆不障心邪妄解生,豈得說名心境相應。故知言相應者,心稱境知,名為相應,相符順義。聚雖無微,以託聖教假想觀之,順入無我,無我理境及名教境,與心相應,此為善釋。當撿《瑜伽》釋、及《顯揚》二十明《瑜伽》抄。問:於麁色相,漸次除析,變極微時,何不別熏成種?答:以無本質故。若爾,名言熏習,及緣過境熏成種時,豈有質耶?答:如名言熏及緣過境,以現曾有彼境可生,即熏成種。空花非有,雖緣不能別熏成種,極微亦爾,元無彼質,故不別熏。問:空花無質可不熏種,極微託色何不種生?答:雖於色相,如執我等,故不成種,不爾彼執,觀微非執,何以為例?答:雖非執心,無質義等,故不為例。若准西明法師,即許成種,如前辨非。
Some say that "a master of yoga" (yogācārya) is a tatpuruṣa compound, while "a master who possesses yoga" is a bahuvrīhi compound. This is also a tatpuruṣa, not a bahuvrīhi, as distinguished earlier. Later, pondering the *Ji*, [it says]: "The meaning of 'harmony' (yoga) between mind and object is difficult to understand. If one says that whenever the mind arises it must rely on an object, the mind tending toward this object and the object conforming with that mind, hence termed 'concordant' (yoga), then objects should all extend to the three moral natures and to states of mind in concentration or distraction. If one says that according to what the mind delights in, its object necessarily appears, and being master over that is termed 'concordance', then when using conceptual wisdom to dissect agglomerated form, although one conceives an understanding of the subtle, the subtle does not [actually] appear; how then could one be termed a yogācārya? If one says that the mind simply does not contradict the intrinsic nature of all dharmas of the object, hence termed 'concordant', then regarding the original agglomerated form where there were previously no paramāṇus, in forming the understanding of paramāṇus, how could it be concordant? For it would destroy the characteristics of dharmas." The *Ji* itself explains: "The object cognized by the contemplating mind does not obstruct the contemplating mind, allowing that contemplating mind's various conceptual understandings—or signs of blue, yellow, etc., and paramāṇus—to operate with mastery. Therefore it is termed the harmony of mind and object; it does not mean that the object's form appears in accordance with the mind, hence being termed concordant." This too is incorrect. Although sky-flowers do not exist, they do not obstruct the mind from forming an understanding of sky-flowers; just as with diseased eyes, seeing yellow where it is not yellow, or objects of imaginary selfhood, none obstruct the arising of the mind's erroneous understandings. How could that be termed the harmony of mind and object? Therefore one knows that what is termed "harmony" means that the mind corresponds to the object in knowing it; this is termed harmony (yoga), in the sense of mutual agreement and conformity. Although an agglomeration has no paramāṇus, because one relies on the holy teaching to conceptually contemplate them, one conforms and enters into non-self; the objective realm of the principle of non-self and the objective realm of the teaching of names are in harmony with the mind—this is the good explanation. One should consult the *Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā* and the commentary on the *Xianyang* [fascicle] twenty explaining yoga. Question: When one gradually dissects coarse form and transforms it into paramāṇus, why does this not separately perfuse into seeds? Answer: Because there is no substantial referent (vastu). If so, when nominal perfuming and cognizing past objects perfume into seeds, how could there be a substantial referent? Answer: As with nominal perfuming and cognizing past objects, because previously in actuality that object existed and could be produced, it then perfumes into seeds. Sky-flowers do not exist; although cognized, they cannot separately perfume into seeds. Paramāṇus are also like this: originally having no such substantial referent, they do not separately perfume. Question: Sky-flowers, having no substantial referent, may well not perfume seeds, but paramāṇus rely on form; why do they not generate seeds? Answer: Although with respect to the form, it is like grasping at a self, etc., hence it does not form seeds. [Objection:] That is not so; that is grasping, whereas contemplating paramāṇus is not grasping; why use it as an analogy? Answer: Although it is not a mind of grasping, the meaning of lacking a substantial referent is the same, so it serves as an analogy. If according to Master Ximing, he admits the formation of seeds, but its error was distinguished earlier.
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