成唯識論了義燈 3.41

3.41

六、八等無為，假實分別，識變皆假，依如立者。本及西明說，六中五假，真如是實，八中三實，即三種如，餘皆是假。今為二解：一、云皆假，故此《論》云：此五皆依真如假立，真如亦是假施設名。又前標中云：二依法性假設，又下結諸言無簡。云：故諸無為，非定實有。二、云真如無為，一、三是實，《論》但說云真如，亦假施設名，非體假設，云非定實有者，總結非他，離色、心外，非定實有。不言不離色、心者，非定實有，未見文斷，任意取捨，增減不同者，依《大般若》立一，真如無為，約廢詮談旨故。依《瑜伽》五十三立二，謂：虛空及非擇，約世共知故。又世於空，但識其義，而不識體。但言空常住，不知是無為，於非擇滅，識體而不識義。謂知此法緣闕不生，法體滅無，而不知是無為，云不識義。若准此論，亦得云二：一、依識變；二、非識變，假實異故。依識變者，似非真故。或有立三，謂隨小乘，又為世出世故，虛空非擇世間，未離縛故，擇滅出世。或有立四，《掌珍》、《五蘊論》，為對他宗及於自義辨假實故，虛空、擇、非擇是共他立，真如無為是自義，前三是假，後一實故。此《論》立六，依於擇滅，分出二種，由依智、定二障別故，不動滅、想受滅，斷定障故，於定難知。又分二種，或由定、不定，不動、想、受，永斷擇滅，暫伏非擇，能所依異，故立真如。或假實別，對法立八，於真如中，約詮分三，謂善、不善，及無記法。此《論》約旨，故但立一。若據約詮，乃至眾多假立無失，種類不同，有三種無為：一、依如立，實是無為；二、依識立，相似無為，少分似彼，體實有為；三、別義立，謂諸無漏，非煩惱作，故名無為，從因緣起，故有為攝。初非染淨因緣，為次或二為，或非染為，以三性心俱得變故。後非染為，然若剋體，即是有為，從因生故。略問答者。何故斷煩惱障所顯真如，名為擇滅，斷所知障，不名擇滅，但名為滅？答：由不定故。下第十云：不動等二暫伏滅者，非擇滅攝，究竟滅者，擇滅所攝。與《顯揚》同。問：煩惱亦爾，何名擇、非擇？答：煩惱易而共許，與擇等名。所知難而非共，故但名滅。或互影顯，或隨應立名，不可齊責。問：擇、非擇滅，隨擇、非擇不生處得。不動、想、受，何故不然？答：據究竟斷，故作是說。不障分無，亦立彼二。據顯如齊解，或約二定所顯真如，餘地未得彼二定故，約得智、定不齊解，隨斷何煩惱必得智故。若苦樂受，及想受未滅，未得彼定故。問：煩惱不障定，唯約所知分，煩惱亦障定，應通二障說。答：實俱障定。但據勝論。以異熟受領下劣定。障於勝定勝餘染法故。偏據所知。不約煩惱說。問：識變無為，及緣無為所起相分，何法攝耶？答：攝相從見，即四蘊收，見、相別說，法同分攝，或准論文。無為有二：一依識變，雖實有為亦無為攝，以相從質，以假隨實故。更多問答，如餘廣辨。

Regarding the distinction between nominal and real among the six, eight, etc., unconditioned [phenomena]: those transformed by consciousness are all nominal, while those established based on tathatā—the original [commentary] and Ximing state that among the six, five are nominal and tathatā is real; among the eight, three are real (namely the three kinds of tathatā), and the rest are all nominal. Now, two explanations are given: First, it is said that all are nominal. Therefore this Treatise states: "These five are all nominally established based on tathatā; tathatā is also a nominal designation." Furthermore, the earlier proposition stated: "Two are designated based on the nature of phenomena (dharmatā)." Moreover, the concluding passage below, without qualification, states: "Therefore, all unconditioned [phenomena] are not definitely real existents." Second, it is said that the unconditioned of tathatā, whether one or three, is real. The Treatise merely states that tathatā is also a nominal designation, not that its substance is designated. When it says "they are not definitely real existents," this is a general conclusion refuting the other [schools], meaning that apart from form and mind, they are not definitely real existents; it does not say that those not separate from form and mind are not definitely real existents. As no decisive passage has been seen, one may accept or reject this at will. As for the variations in addition and reduction: based on the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, one is established—the unconditioned of tathatā—speaking from the standpoint of setting aside designations to discuss the essential purport. Based on Yogācārabhūmi fascicle fifty-three, two are established: space and non-deliberative cessation, based on common worldly knowledge. Furthermore, in the world, regarding space, they only recognize its meaning and do not recognize its substance; they merely say space is permanent, not knowing it is unconditioned; regarding non-deliberative cessation, they recognize the substance but do not recognize the meaning: that is, they know that when conditions are lacking this phenomenon does not arise and the substance of the phenomenon is extinguished and non-existent, yet they do not know it is unconditioned; hence it is said they do not recognize the meaning. If in accordance with this treatise, one may also speak of two: first, based on transformation by consciousness; second, not based on transformation by consciousness, because nominal and real differ. What is based on transformation by consciousness is like [an image] and not real. Or some establish three, in accordance with the Hīnayāna, and also because of the worldly and supramundane: space and non-deliberative cessation are worldly because bondage has not been abandoned, whereas cessation through deliberation is supramundane. Or some establish four: the Karatalaratna and the Pañcaskandhaka Śāstra, in order to distinguish the nominal and the real against other schools and within their own tenets, establish space, deliberative cessation, and non-deliberative cessation in common with others, while unconditioned tathatā is their own tenet; the former three are nominal, while the latter one is real. This Treatise establishes six: based on cessation through deliberation, two kinds are distinguished, because of the distinction between the two hindrances of cognition and concentration. The cessation of immobility and the cessation of ideation and feeling are due to severing the hindrance to concentration, and in concentration they are difficult to discern; thus two kinds are further distinguished. Or due to fixed and non-fixed: immobility, ideation, and feeling are permanently severed as cessation through deliberation, but temporarily suppressed as non-deliberative cessation. Because the basis and what is based differ, tathatā is established. Or distinguishing nominal and real, the Abhidharma establishes eight: within tathatā, distinguishing three according to designation, namely wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral phenomena. This Treatise is based on the essential purport, hence it only establishes one. If based on designation, up to many may be nominally established without fault. In terms of different categories, there are three kinds of unconditioned: 1. established based on tathatā, which is genuinely unconditioned; 2. established based on consciousness, which is a resembling unconditioned, partially resembling that, but whose substance is genuinely conditioned; 3. established by an alternative meaning, namely, all undefiled phenomena, not being made by afflictions, are called unconditioned, but arising from cause-conditions, they are subsumed under the conditioned. The first is not made by defiled or pure causes and conditions; the next is made by both, or not made by defilement, because minds of the three natures can all transform it; the last is not made by defilement, yet strictly speaking in terms of substance it is conditioned, because it is produced from causes. Brief questions and answers: Why is tathatā revealed by severing the affliction hindrance called cessation through deliberation, while severing the cognitive hindrance is not called cessation through deliberation, but merely called cessation? Answer: Because it is not fixed. Fascicle ten below says: the two, such as immobility, when temporarily suppressed, are subsumed under non-deliberative cessation; when completely severed, they are subsumed under cessation through deliberation. This agrees with the Prakaraṇāryavācā. Question: Afflictions are also like this; why are they called deliberative and non-deliberative? Answer: Afflictions are easy [to understand] and universally accepted, so they are given names such as deliberative; the cognitive [hindrance] is difficult and not universally [accepted], so it is merely called cessation. Or they reciprocally imply each other, or names are established as appropriate; one cannot demand uniform consistency. Question: Cessation through deliberation and non-deliberative cessation are obtained wherever deliberation or non-deliberation do not arise. Why is this not so for immobility, ideation, and feeling? Answer: This is said based on complete severing. It does not obstruct establishing those two on partial non-existence as well. This is an explanation based on revealing tathatā uniformly. Or it is based on the tathatā revealed by the two concentrations, because other grounds have not yet attained those two concentrations; this is an explanation based on the non-uniform attainment of wisdom and concentration, because whichever affliction one severs, one necessarily attains wisdom. If painful and pleasurable feelings, as well as ideation and feeling, have not yet ceased, one has not yet attained those concentrations. Question: If afflictions do not obstruct concentration and this is spoken of solely with respect to the cognitive [hindrance], then since afflictions also obstruct concentration, it should be explained in terms of both hindrances. Answer: In reality both obstruct concentration. But this is discussed based on preeminence. Because ripening feeling experiences inferior concentration, it obstructs superior concentration more prominently than other defiled phenomena; therefore it is treated exclusively under the cognitive [hindrance] and not discussed under afflictions. Question: Under what phenomenon are the unconditioned transformed by consciousness and the form-aspect (nimittabhāga) arisen from cognizing the unconditioned subsumed? Answer: Subsuming the aspect under the seeing part, it is included in the four aggregates; speaking separately of seeing and form, it is subsumed under phenomena of the same class (sabhāgadharma). Or following the treatise's text: the unconditioned is twofold: first, that based on consciousness-transformation—although strictly conditioned, it is also subsumed under the unconditioned, because the image follows the underlying object, and the nominal conforms to the real. For further questions and answers, see the extensive discussions elsewhere.