成唯識論了義燈 3.54

3.54

問：賴耶三相，為是體相？為是義相？答：本疏釋云：自相是體，餘二是義相。西明二解：一、云自相是體相，餘二是相狀相；二、云三俱體相，故下結云體相。又無性云：略有三者，分折此識自相、應相。今詳此釋，雖無文判，然本疏為正。何者？若說識中諸法種子以為因相、體相有二，果離自相，更無別體。但望酬因，義分果相。況此論文，說能持種，以為因相，故下論云：持種不共，故偏說之。離自相體，豈有別體為能持種？說為三相，不同二障，二障用殊，障性伏斷，各各差別。經論誠說二障體別，無文說此三相別體。設有文說，猶有前過。若云相狀體相，合說有三，自相有體，此即極成。因果狀相，為有別體？為無別體？若有別體，過即同前。若無別體，即是義相，名為相狀。此即前因，何勞別說？又自答云：於一體上，義說三體，故於自相，義說極成。

Question: Are the three characteristics of the ālaya substantial characteristics (dravyalakṣaṇa) or conceptual characteristics (arthalakṣaṇa)? Answer: The original commentary explains: The self-characteristic is the substance, and the other two are conceptual characteristics. Ximing gives two explanations: first, the self-characteristic is the substantial characteristic, and the other two are modal characteristics; second, all three are substantial characteristics, which is why it concludes below by saying "substantial characteristics." Furthermore, Asvabhāva states: "There being briefly three means analyzing this consciousness's self-characteristic and corresponding characteristic." Now examining these explanations, although there is no explicit textual decision, the original commentary is correct. Why? If one says that all dharmic seeds within the consciousness are the cause-characteristic, there would be two substantial characteristics; the fruition, apart from the self-characteristic, has no separate substance, but only in relation to rewarding the cause is the fruition-characteristic conceptually distinguished. How much more so when this treatise text states that being able to hold seeds is the cause-characteristic! Hence the treatise below states: "Holding seeds is uncommon; therefore it is spoken of specifically." Apart from the substance of the self-characteristic, how could there be a separate substance that is able to hold seeds? They are spoken of as three characteristics, which is not like the two hindrances; the functions of the two hindrances are distinct, and the nature of the hindrance, their suppression, and their abandonment are each different. Sūtras and treatises explicitly state that the substances of the two hindrances are distinct, but no text states that these three characteristics have distinct substances. Even if a text were to say so, it would still incur the previous fault. If one says that modal characteristics and substantial characteristics are combined to make three, that the self-characteristic has a substance is thoroughly established. But do the modal forms of cause and fruition have separate substances, or do they lack separate substances? If they have separate substances, the fault is the same as before. If they lack separate substances, they are precisely conceptual characteristics, which are named modal forms. This is just the previous cause—why labor to state it separately? And he answers himself: "Upon the single substance, three substances are conceptually spoken of; therefore, with respect to the self-characteristic, it is conceptually spoken of as thoroughly established."