成唯識論了義燈 3.6

3.6

《論》：所待因緣，應非本有者。疏答：外難云：虛疎之法，雖現有種，便無外緣，即不能起，以劣弱故。汝之實法，何得相例？《要集》云：此釋未能盡理，今謂種體雖恒，所待因緣，本無今有，展轉無窮，非恒具足，故非常生。故《瑜伽》五十一云：諸行雖有各別生因，然必待緣，方得生長，乃至故此。論云：不同外道，緣恒非無故，不頓生者。今將此釋，無異於本，更待外緣。外緣即是親種之外，外緣未合即不能生，即緣非恒有故，即前因。何勞別說？今更設難，如我識外，有外緣不具、不頓生。大乘唯自心，不假識外法頓起？答：所緣親境唯自識，不能緣外說唯心。不無增上他有情，此外不具非頓起。外又救云：汝種雖現有，虛疎待假緣。我法體實有，還待實外緣。若爾，即執二生，便為無用。

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The causes and conditions that are depended upon would not be originally existent": The commentary answers the external objection: An insubstantial and sparse dharma, although it presently has seeds, cannot arise without external conditions because it is weak and inferior. How can your real dharma be compared with it? The Yaoji says: This explanation does not fully exhaust the reasoning. I now say that although the substance of seeds is constant, the causes and conditions depended upon were originally non-existent and now exist; turning and revolving boundlessly, they are not constantly complete, and therefore they do not constantly arise. Hence the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 51, says: Although conditioned formations have their distinct productive causes, they must nevertheless depend upon conditions before they can grow and develop, and so forth, up to: therefore this. The treatise says: Unlike the tīrthikas, because the conditions are not constantly absent, things do not arise all at once. If one takes this explanation now, it is no different from the original text in needing to wait further for external conditions. External conditions are those outside the direct seed. When the external conditions have not converged, things cannot arise; that is, because the conditions do not constantly exist, this is just the preceding cause. Why labor to state it separately? Now let us raise a further objection: Just as for me, outside consciousness, when external conditions are incomplete, things do not arise all at once; in the Mahāyāna, where there is only one's own mind, does it not rely on dharmas outside consciousness to arise all at once? Answer: The direct cognitive object is only one's own consciousness; saying 'mind-only' means that one cannot cognize what is external. It is not that there are no other sentient beings as empowering conditions; when these external factors are incomplete, there is no sudden arising. The outsider rescues again, saying: Although your seeds presently exist, being insubstantial and sparse they depend on nominal conditions. My dharma-substances are real existents; they still depend on real external conditions. If so, then postulating the two births is entirely useless.