成唯識論了義燈 3.83

3.83

問：既立第三，能證第二及第四分，第四復能證第三分，即心能自緣，云何不與世法相違？刀不自割，指端不能觸自指端。答：《佛地論》第三云：答：云不見燈等，能自照耶？何知自照，現見無闇，分明顯現。若不自照，應有闇障，應不現見。問：燈等非闇，何須照耶？答：如瓶、衣等，體雖非闇，無燈等照邊，有闇障不得現見。照令闇除，衣等現見，名為燈照。燈等亦爾。自體生時，邊闇障除，令現得見，故名自照。問：燈能照自，令現得見，證心能自緣。衣不自照，由他照見，證心不自緣？答：心性是照本極成，若例同衣不能照，彼有違自世間等過。問：量云心能自照；性能照故；如燈等。此量豈非法自相相違？因、喻所立不成過。答：取能照義。以燈為喻，故無有過。問：豈本不欲證心自緣？答：雖言緣自，意取顯證。今緣照雖殊，俱自顯證義。或但相例，不是立量，取彼為喻，故無有過。

Question: Since the third part is established as being able to verify the second and fourth parts, and the fourth is further able to verify the third part, so that the mind can cognise itself, how is this not contrary to worldly phenomena? A sword does not cut itself, and the tip of a finger cannot touch its own fingertip. Answer: The third fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: In answer, it says: Do you not see that a lamp and the like can illuminate themselves? How is it known that it illuminates itself? It is directly seen without darkness, manifesting distinctly. If it did not illuminate itself, there would be the obstruction of darkness, and it would not be directly seen. Question: A lamp and the like are not darkness; why would they need illumination? Answer: Just as with a vase, cloth, and so forth, although their nature is not darkness, next to where there is no illumination from a lamp and the like, there is the obstruction of darkness so that they cannot be directly seen. Illumination causing the darkness to be removed so that the cloth and the like are directly seen is termed the illumination of a lamp. It is also like this with a lamp and the like: when its own nature arises, the obstruction of the adjacent darkness is removed, causing it to be directly seen, and hence it is called self-illuminating. Question: A lamp can illuminate itself, causing it to be directly seen, which proves that the mind can cognise itself; cloth does not illuminate itself, but is seen through the illumination of another, which proves that the mind does not cognise itself? Answer: The nature of the mind being illuminating is fundamentally established by consensus; if one were to analogise it to cloth as being unable to illuminate, that would incur the fault of contradicting one's own [thesis], the world, and so on. Question: If the formal argument (prayoga) states: Mind is able to illuminate itself; because its nature is to illuminate; like a lamp and the like—does this argument not incur the fault of contradiction with the property of the subject (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana), or the non-establishment of the thesis by reason and example? Answer: It adopts the meaning of being able to illuminate. By taking a lamp as an example, there is no fault. Question: Could it be that originally one did not intend to prove that the mind cognises itself? Answer: Although it speaks of cognising itself, the intention is to adopt distinct verification. Now, although cognising and illuminating differ, both share the meaning of self-manifest verification. Or, this is merely an analogy and not the formulation of a syllogism; taking that as an example, there is no fault.