成唯識論了義燈 4.21

4.21

論無散動故，明佛果無尋伺。西明云：問：八地已上無分別智豈不發業耶？解云：無分別智有其二種：一、獨行；二、與後得俱。前不發業唯緣真故，後即發業與尋、伺俱。又解後得有二種：一與根本俱，一別頭起。初不發業，無分別故，後可發業。雖有二解，前解為勝。今謂不爾，尋、伺既與根本智俱。云：何根本不名分別。又若尋、伺與無分別同親緣如，不得名思惟真如。若不與同緣，豈王與所不全同緣耶？所餘心所，亦應不與同緣真如。餘若不然，尋、伺何爾？故後說正，與根本俱必無尋伺。西明云：若其不許根本智俱後得正智與尋、伺並，如金剛定必二智俱。豈於此時不起言說，言說必假尋、伺為因。若不起說，即此菩薩不及於前，云何剎那轉增勝耶？今謂雖許金剛定位起說增進，不必要與尋、伺相應。何者金剛喻定依第四定，尋、伺初靜豈下地心所，與上心王相應耶？若爾，便與《雜集》第五相應品違。又同分界地相應，非異分界地，如欲界、色、無色界不相應。初靜慮、第二靜慮不相應。今為二解：一云於藥、病未知據已前說。此位云等覺故，不假尋、伺；一云金剛定前起於尋、伺。觀藥、病等擊發語言，即入此定。故雖在定，而能說法。方便雖屬於前，正說法時在金剛定，能令增進何所相違。此解為正。

The treatise says that because there is no distraction or agitation, it is clear that in the Buddha-fruit there is neither vitarka nor vicāra. Ximing says: "Question: In the eighth bhūmi and above, how could the non-conceptual wisdom not initiate karma? Explanation: Non-conceptual wisdom is of two kinds: first, operating alone; second, co-arising with subsequent [wisdom]. The former does not initiate karma because it exclusively takes tathatā as its object; the latter does initiate karma and co-arises with vitarka and vicāra. Another explanation: subsequent [wisdom] is of two kinds: one co-arising with the fundamental [wisdom], and one arising separately. The former does not initiate karma because it is non-conceptual; the latter can initiate karma. Although there are two explanations, the former explanation is superior." Now I say that this is not so. If vitarka and vicāra co-arise with the fundamental wisdom, how could the fundamental [wisdom] not be called conceptual? Furthermore, if vitarka and vicāra were to directly cognize tathatā together with the non-conceptual [wisdom], it could not be called "contemplating tathatā". If it does not cognize the same object with it, could the mental king and its mental factors fail to completely cognize the same object? The remaining mental factors would likewise not cognize tathatā together with it. If the others are not like this, why would vitarka and vicāra be so? Therefore the latter explanation is correct: that which co-arises with the fundamental wisdom must be devoid of vitarka and vicāra. Ximing says: "If one does not accept that the correct subsequent wisdom that co-arises with the fundamental wisdom coexists with vitarka and vicāra, then, like the vajropamasamādhi, the two wisdoms must co-arise. How could one not produce speech at this time? Speech necessarily relies on vitarka and vicāra as its cause. If one does not produce speech, then this bodhisattva would be inferior to before; how could there be superior advancement from moment to moment?" Now I say: although it is granted that in the state of the vajropamasamādhi speech is produced and there is advancement, it need not be associated with vitarka and vicāra. Why is this? The vajropamasamādhi is based on the fourth dhyāna, whereas vitarka and vicāra belong to the first dhyāna; how could mental factors of a lower level be associated with a mental king of a higher level? If that were so, it would contradict the "Association Chapter" in the fifth fascicle of the Samuccaya. Moreover, association occurs within the same realm and level, not between different realms and levels, just as the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm do not associate, nor does the first dhyāna associate with the second dhyāna. Now I offer two explanations: First, it is spoken with respect to what came before, when medicines and illnesses were not yet known; because this level is called equal awakening, it does not rely on vitarka and vicāra. Second, prior to the vajropamasamādhi, one gives rise to vitarka and vicāra, contemplates medicines, illnesses, and so forth, stimulates speech, and then enters this samādhi. Therefore, although one is in samādhi, one is able to expound the Dharma. Although the preparatory application belongs to the preceding, when correctly expounding the Dharma one is in the vajropamasamādhi, which is capable of causing superior advancement; what contradiction is there? This explanation is the correct one.