成唯識論了義燈 4.25

4.25

第八理應下，餘辨量過云：有有法自相相違，應非第八識，是識性故。亦有有法差別相違，應不受熏持種。亦有法差別相違因，應不用第七為俱有依。《要集》云：前二對大有違宗過，第三量中同喻一分，所立不成。今謂有餘，若對小乘，前二何過，不違自故。又前已成第七識有別所依根，即是第八，故不諍有法。諍有法者，亦有宗中，所別不極成。故知不諍有法，又亦未諍受熏持種。《理門論》云：隨所成立說名為宗，彼非所成，故無差別。既立第八不依第七，依第七者，即是異喻。識性故因於異喻轉，有不定過。由前已成第六依七，故有不定，餘煩不指。又成第八云：應有俱有相續識為增上，不共俱有所依根。若言識性故，因有不定過。五是識性，不以相續識為不共俱有所依根。今云：自體恒續識性，故如第七識。問：此頌本明第八與餘為依，何故此中明第八識依第七耶？答：因言長理故便成立，為除他疑等。

On "The eighth by reason should..." below, others differentiate the fallacies of the inference, saying: "There is a contradiction with the essential nature of the subject (dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana): it should not be the eighth consciousness, because it is of the nature of consciousness. There is also a contradiction with the specific property of the subject: it should not receive perfuming and maintain seeds. There is also a reason contradicting the specific property of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana): it should not take the seventh as its co-existent support." The Yaoji says: "The first two have the fault of contradicting one's own thesis with respect to the Mahāyāna, and in the third inference, a portion of the similar example fails to establish the probandum." Now I say that this is incomplete. If addressed to the Hīnayāna, what fault would the first two have, since they do not contradict one's own doctrine? Furthermore, it was previously established that the seventh consciousness has a distinct supporting faculty, namely the eighth, so the subject is not disputed. If one disputes the subject, there is also the fault that the qualificand in the thesis is unestablished. Therefore we know that the subject is not disputed, nor is the receiving of perfuming and maintaining of seeds yet disputed. The Nyāyamukha says: "Whatever is to be established is called the thesis." Since that is not what is being established, there is no contradiction with its specific property. Since it is posited that the eighth does not rely on the seventh, that which relies on the seventh is the dissimilar example. The reason "because it is of the nature of consciousness" applies to the dissimilar example, so there is the fallacy of inconclusiveness. Because it was previously established that the sixth relies on the seventh, there is inconclusiveness; the rest are too tedious to point out. Furthermore, establishing the eighth says: "It should have a co-existent, continuous consciousness as its sovereign, unshared co-existent supporting faculty." If one says "because it is of the nature of consciousness," the reason has the fallacy of inconclusiveness. The five [consciousnesses] are of the nature of consciousness, yet they do not take a continuous consciousness as their unshared co-existent supporting faculty. Now we say: "because it is of the nature of an inherently continuous consciousness, like the seventh consciousness." Question: This verse originally clarified that the eighth serves as the support for the others; why is it clarified here that the eighth consciousness relies on the seventh? Answer: Because the reasoning arose naturally in the context of the explanation, it was thus established to remove the doubts of others, and so forth.