成唯識論了義燈 4.27

4.27

西明云：勝軍論師立比量云：諸大乘經等，云有不定過。以《發智論》亦兩俱極成，非佛語所不攝。自救云：無不定過，彼有許發智是佛說故。今謂不爾，對彼小乘，自不許《發智論》是佛說者，豈無不定耶？又問：此因豈不有隨一不成失，小乘不許極成，非佛語所不攝故。唯大乘許不得云兩俱。若他許非外道語，云非佛語所不攝，則有不定，《發智論》等亦非外道語攝，若許是佛說故，云極成非佛語所不攝，即有相符失。如本疏立比量無過，判比量云：論第五因有相違決定云。諸大乘經，非至教量，樂小乘者，不許顯示無顛倒理契經攝故，如外道論等。今謂不爾，彼因一分違宗，即一分不成之因，何名決定？問：何名一分不成因耶？答：彼許三法印教，順於正理。今大乘教亦順三法印，何故不顯無顛倒理？若云：不順三法印者。此亦不爾，何者俱顯無我、諸行無常，何非順法印？若云：非全者，豈增一等，句句皆明無我等耶？若云：雖非句句皆明，然順無我等，大教亦爾，故不成因。設縱云非全，亦彼因過。不云一分不能顯故，又因明法立自宗義，自許言簡，共許得成，相違決定所立因、喻必須兩許。今因非共故，不得成決定相違。又判量云：勝軍量中三藏所加，亦有相違決定。云大乘教非至教量，自許非佛語攝故，亦不為過，理如前辨。又云有不定，為如增一等，自許非佛語所不攝，故至教量攝，為如色等，自許非佛語所不攝，故非至教量。此亦不爾，色等共許是非佛語攝，因於彼無不成不定。

Ximing states: Master Jayasena advanced a syllogism stating that all Mahāyāna sūtras and so forth have the fallacy of the inconclusive reason (anaikāntika), because the Jñānaprasthāna is also accepted by both parties as not falling outside what is the Buddha's word. He saves his own position by saying: There is no fallacy of inconclusiveness, because some among them accept the Jñānaprasthāna as spoken by the Buddha. I now say this is not so: in debate against those of the Hīnayāna, if one oneself does not accept the Jñānaprasthāna as spoken by the Buddha, how could there not be inconclusiveness? Furthermore, it may be asked: Does this reason not incur the flaw of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha)? For the Hīnayāna does not accept that it is fully established as not falling outside what is the Buddha's word; only the Mahāyāna accepts it, so one cannot call it accepted by both parties. If the other party accepts that it is not the speech of tīrthikas, saying 'it does not fall outside what is the Buddha's word', then there is inconclusiveness, for the Jñānaprasthāna and so forth are also not included in the speech of tīrthikas; if it is accepted as spoken by the Buddha, stating that it is fully established as not falling outside what is the Buddha's word, then it incurs the flaw of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). As in the basic commentary, the syllogism is established without flaw. Evaluating the syllogism, it states: The fifth reason of the treatise has a counterbalancing reason (satpratipakṣa), stating: 'All Mahāyāna sūtras are not valid scriptural testimony (āptāgama), because they are not accepted by those who delight in the Hīnayāna as being subsumed under sūtras that reveal the unerroneous truth; just like the treatises of the tīrthikas.' I now say this is not so. That reason contradicts the proposition in part, which means it is a reason that is unestablished in part (bhāgāsiddha); how could it be called a counterbalancing reason? Question: What is meant by a reason that is unestablished in part? Answer: They accept that the teaching of the three Dharma seals accords with correct principle. Now the Mahāyāna teaching also accords with the three Dharma seals; why would it not reveal the unerroneous truth? If one says: 'It does not accord with the three Dharma seals,' this too is not so. Why? Both alike reveal selflessness and the impermanence of all conditioned formations; how could it not accord with the Dharma seals? If one says: 'It is not entirely so,' does every single sentence in the Ekottarika and so forth explain selflessness and the like? If one says: 'Although not every single sentence explains it, it nevertheless accords with selflessness and so forth,' the great teaching is likewise; therefore, the reason is unestablished. Even if one grants that it is not entirely so, that too is a fallacy of their reason, for they did not state 'because one part cannot reveal it'. Furthermore, in the method of Buddhist logic (hetuvidyā), when establishing the tenets of one's own school, one's own qualifying phrase is concise, and establishment is achieved through common acceptance; the reason and example set up in a counterbalancing reason must both be accepted by both parties. Here, since the reason is not commonly accepted, a counterbalancing reason cannot be established. Furthermore, evaluating the syllogism, it states: What was added by the Tripiṭaka Master in Jayasena's syllogism also has a counterbalancing reason, which says: 'The Mahāyāna teaching is not valid scriptural testimony, because it is accepted by themselves as not subsumed under the Buddha's word.' This too is not a fault; the principle is as analysed previously. It is also said that there is inconclusiveness: Is it like the Ekottarika and so forth, which is accepted by themselves as not falling outside what is the Buddha's word, and therefore subsumed under valid scriptural testimony? Or is it like form and so forth, which is accepted by themselves as not falling outside what is the Buddha's word, and therefore not valid scriptural testimony? This too is not so: form and so forth are commonly accepted as being subsumed under what is not the Buddha's word; since the reason is absent from that, it does not constitute inconclusiveness.