成唯識論了義燈 4.31

4.31

《論》已引聖教等，《瑜伽》八證，《雜集》引同。《頌》云：執受、初、明了；種子、業、身受；無心定、命終。無皆不應理。初生、明了、業用，三義此論中無。趣生、壽識、互緣、依食、及心染淨，此之五種，彼論非有，餘五共同，然互廣略。《瑜伽》等中第一執受，二最初生起，謂有部等既諸識不俱，如六境齊至，應無初生識，根、境、作意緣皆等故，大乘許俱。故難於他無初生識，他即設難，若無初生許俱起者，應一有情二識俱起，以大乘許賴耶定有故。今外人且就此難，不爾，應難三四等俱，故下却難，猶如有一俱時欲見乃至欲識，隨有一識最初生起不應道理。問：設許俱生，如何能證有第八識？答：此非正證。因釋外難，故為一因，或應展轉立俱有根，證有第八，又解傳釋。外難：若有第八一切時行，最初生起識不得。我無第八初生可得。今牒外難云：云何不可得耶？有外難云：若許恒有第八識者，應有二識俱起之失。故初起識不可得義，應知容俱故有可得。問：若爾，第七亦復恒行，何有初起？答：以他未許有第七識，且八、六對許八初生證有賴耶，若他難七恒與八俱，無初生亦成我義。問：他救言，初生之位五根未成，意識初生此有何失？即應難言，有所依意與六俱生，故說初起義亦不立，前釋為勝。明了、作業亦是展轉，顯成俱起證第八義。然四業者初了器；第二了根、依處、種子；了我第七；了境第六，顯四業俱，故證第八道理稍隱。《攝大乘論》以染淨心總別合說，雜染之中定、散別故，初說欲界。欲界之中，初辨惑、業、生雜染三，生中復分色根執受，名色互依，及依食住；次辨色、無色界，惑、業、生三，生中復分滅、離二趣，又約二界明生死位，冷觸不成；次明清淨中分世、出世，出世之中明滅定證；次重顯前三雜染中，為種不成破上坐部，准彼但有此論八義。初持種義，即彼雜染清淨中攝，執受、名色、四食、趣生、生死、滅定七義名同，但開合廣略。異熟、壽識彼無此二，又復此論心染淨證，最在後明顯別依總故，彼即初明總離別故。

Treatise: Having cited the sacred teachings and so forth. The eight proofs in the Yogācāra[bhūmi] are cited the same in the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā. The verse says: 'Appropriation, initial, clarity; seeds, karma, and bodily feeling; the mindless absorption, and dying. Without it, none would be reasonable.' The three meanings of initial arising, clarity, and karmic functioning are absent in this treatise. Destinies and births, life-faculty and consciousness, mutual conditioning, subsistence by nutriment, and mental defilement and purification: these five are not in that treatise. The remaining five are shared, though mutually broader or more concise. In the Yogācāra[bhūmi] and so forth, the first is appropriation, and the second is initial arising: that is, since the Sarvāstivādins and others do not admit that the various consciousnesses occur simultaneously, if the six sense objects were to arrive at once, there would be no initially arising consciousness, because the conditions of sense faculties, objects, and attention are all equal; the Mahāyāna admits simultaneity. Thus, they challenge the opponent that there would be no initially arising consciousness; the opponent then raises the objection: 'If there is no initial arising and simultaneous arising is admitted, two consciousnesses should arise simultaneously in a single sentient being, because the Mahāyāna admits that the ālayavijñāna definitely exists.' Now the outsider raises this objection for the time being—otherwise, they should object to three or four occurring simultaneously; therefore, the counter-challenge below says: 'Just as when one simultaneously desires to see up to desires to cognize, it would not be reasonable for any one consciousness to arise initially.' Question: Even if simultaneous arising is admitted, how can this prove the existence of the eighth consciousness? Answer: This is not a direct proof. Because it resolves an opponent's objection, it forms one reason; or, by sequentially establishing simultaneous faculties, it proves the existence of the eighth. Another explanation passes down the interpretation: The opponent objects: 'If there were an eighth consciousness operating at all times, an initially arising consciousness could not be found. In our system, without an eighth consciousness, initial arising can be found.' Now, addressing the opponent's objection, it says: 'Why would it not be found?' An opponent objects: 'If a permanently existing eighth consciousness is accepted, one would incur the fault of two consciousnesses arising simultaneously.' Therefore, regarding the meaning that an initially arising consciousness cannot be found, one should know that because simultaneity is admitted, it can indeed be found. Question: If so, since the seventh consciousness also operates permanently, how could there be an initial arising? Answer: Because the opponent does not yet accept the seventh consciousness, for now, juxtaposing the eighth and the sixth, accepting that the eighth arises initially proves the existence of the ālaya. If the opponent objects that the seventh is permanently simultaneous with the eighth, having no initial arising also establishes our position. Question: The opponent saves their position by saying, 'At the time of initial birth, the five faculties are not yet formed, so the manovijñāna arises initially; what fault is there in this?' Then one should object: 'There is a supporting manas that arises simultaneously with the six, so the notion of initial arising is still not established.' The former explanation is superior. Clarity and karmic functioning also sequentially demonstrate simultaneous arising to prove the meaning of the eighth. However, of the four karmic functions: the first cognizes the receptacle world; the second cognizes the faculties, bases, and seeds; the seventh cognizes the self; the sixth cognizes sense objects. Showing that the four karmic functions are simultaneous proves the eighth, but the principle is somewhat hidden. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha explains defiled and purified minds by combining the general and the particular; because in defilement, meditative concentration and distraction differ, it first explains the desire realm. Within the desire realm, it first analyzes the three defilements of affliction, karma, and rebirth. Within rebirth, it further divides appropriation of the physical faculties, the mutual dependence of name-and-form, and subsisting dependent on nutriment. Next, it analyzes the form and formless realms, with their three defilements of affliction, karma, and rebirth. Within rebirth, it further divides the two destinies of cessation and detachment; moreover, regarding the two realms, it explains the states of birth and death, where cold sensation would be unestablished. Next, in explaining purification, it divides it into worldly and supramundane; within the supramundane, it explains the proof of the absorption of cessation. Next, it reiterates that within the preceding three defilements, functioning as seeds is unestablished, refuting the Sthaviras. According to that, it has only the eight meanings of this treatise. The initial meaning of maintaining seeds is subsumed under that defilement and purification; appropriation, name-and-form, the four nutriments, destinies and births, birth-and-death, and the absorption of cessation: these seven meanings have the same names, differing only in expansion, condensation, breadth, or brevity. Maturation and life-faculty with consciousness: that text lacks these two. Furthermore, in this treatise, the proof of mental defilement and purification comes at the very end to reveal that the specific relies on the general; that text explains it at the very beginning because the general is separate from the specific.