成唯識論了義燈 5.120

5.120

答：准論云：命者即身，計我有邊。命者異身，計我無邊等，准此有想八論。八無想、俱非，言有色有邊是即蘊，言無色無邊是離蘊。俱句是即離有想，餘八皆是即蘊。又解無色亦即蘊我，但執非色，即受、想等，故亦即蘊。有邊等四是離蘊，以《大論》第六云：執我隨身其量不定。俱通即、離，言少色等者。且據即蘊說，理實通二，准有我、有色，即執色為我。既言我一想等，應即執彼為我。四遍常中舉伊師迦，即僧佉類，應離蘊我。七斷滅者，應即蘊我。勝、數離蘊，皆計常故，分常不定。

Answer: Based on the treatise's statement: 'If the soul is identical with the body, one conceives the self as finite; if the soul is different from the body, one conceives the self as infinite,' and so forth: by this, among the eight doctrines of possessing perception, the eight of non-perception, and neither, the statement 'possessing form is finite' is identical with the aggregates, while the statement 'formless is infinite' is distinct from the aggregates. The 'both' clause is both identical and distinct. Of possessing perception, the other eight are all identical with the aggregates. Another interpretation: the formless is also a self identical with the aggregates, merely grasping that which is non-form, namely sensation, perception, and so forth, and thus is also identical with the aggregates. The four of finitude and so forth are distinct from the aggregates, because Yogācārabhūmi fascicle six says: 'Grasping the self as conforming to the body, its measure is indeterminate.' Both are common to identical and distinct; speaking of having small form and so forth is tentatively stated in terms of identical with the aggregates, but in principle it actually applies to both. In accordance with 'possessing a self and possessing form,' one directly grasps form as the self. Since it says 'I have a single perception,' and so forth, one should directly grasp that as the self. Among the four views of universal eternity, the mention of īṣīkā refers to the Sāṃkhya type, which should be a self distinct from the aggregates. The seven annihilations should be a self identical with the aggregates. The Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyas are distinct from the aggregates and all conceive eternity, so partial eternity is indeterminate.