成唯識論了義燈 5.192

5.192

《論》：如餘蓋纏。《要集》云：有說不立量也。西明二量，一云睡眠非無體用；是蓋纏故；如餘蓋纏。今謂此量亦一分違宗之失，何以故？睡眠假實通名，今若成立假睡有體，即違宗失，猶言不簡。立量應言：實睡眠非無心位，因、喻可知，言實睡眠簡無心位，假名睡眠，不顯有別實體。以經部師觸、受、想外，並思分位皆是假故。取蓋纏喻，即有一分所立不成，意簡經部師於無心位實立睡眠故。又量云：實睡眠是心相應因，喻可知《論》中第二宗法，因、喻下安。文中故字應蓋纏下著，是因所須故。性相為文，非依次第。前云：有無心位者，立量應云：非無心位；文中略無宗中有法；前文彰訖故略不言。本《疏》云：非即無心必是心所；是二宗法；如餘蓋故，即是指喻。又云：非無體法；第三宗法；比量准知，故略不具。然論文中初二句會諸違，後兩句破異執。

Regarding the treatise's statement, "like the other hindrances and entanglements": The Yaoji says that some state no formal inference is established. Ximing gives two inferences; the first says: "Sleep is not without substance and function; because it is a hindrance and entanglement; like the other hindrances and entanglements." Now I maintain that this inference also incurs the fallacy of partially contradicting the thesis (pratijñā-virodha). Why is this? The designation "sleep" applies generally to both nominal and real; now, if one establishes that nominal sleep has real substance, that incurs the fallacy of contradicting the thesis, as the expression fails to specify. Formulating the inference, one should say: "Real sleep is not a state without mind; the reason and example are understood as above." Saying "real sleep" specifies and excludes states without mind and merely nominal sleep, and does not show that it has a separate real substance. For according to the Sautrāntikas, apart from contact, feeling, and perception, everything else consists of states of volition and is entirely nominal. Taking hindrances and entanglements as an example would entail that the probandum is partially unestablished, because the intention is to exclude the Sautrāntikas who maintain real sleep in a state without mind. Again, an inference says: "Real sleep is associated with the mind; the reason and example are understood as above." The second property of the thesis in the treatise is placed below the reason and example. In the text, the character "because" (gu) should be placed after "hindrances and entanglements," because it is required by the reason. The text is phrased in terms of nature and characteristics, not following formal order. When it was said before that there is a state without mind, the formulated inference should say: "It is not a state without mind"; the text omits the subject (dharmin) within the thesis, and because the preceding text has already displayed it, it is omitted and not stated. The basic Commentary says: "It is not the absence of mind, but must be a mental factor; these are two properties of the thesis; because it is like the other hindrances, which points to the example." It also says: "It is not a phenomenon without substance; this is the third property of the thesis; it is known by parity of inference, and therefore is omitted without being complete." However, in the text of the treatise, the first two clauses resolve various contradictions, and the last two clauses refute heterodox views.