成唯識論了義燈 6.135

6.135

《論》：「雖各體一，而似二生」者。本釋如疏，《要集》云：諸釋言同，而意少別。有釋安惠相、見二分，從緣生者，是護法師據自抑他，非謂安惠許從種起，如云習氣，是相分攝，此意安惠種非相分，說相分者，護法依自而難於他。今謂安惠本計種子，依自證分功能義用，非相分攝。前第二云：假法如無非因緣故，若是相分，何得言如無？體既無故，復許自證分緣生非無，故有種子，種子既非是自證分，能所生別，因果性別，復自證緣，護法菩薩以此理遂非相是何？故作此難。若云見、相從種子生，亦非彼計，據何道理約自難他。故知云若緣所生，內相、見分非依他起，例彼自證，亦應是無，無異因故，是共許義，又前第四云：十八界種，應成雜亂等，故許相、見亦從種生。不爾，此言空無所益。問：安惠相、見既遍計所執，云何《攝論》云，唯量唯二，皆名依他。西明三釋：一云，識自體分與相、見種為依，假說自體名見、相分，非取見、相名依他起；一云，自證分上，依見、相現，由斯道理，說見、相分，名依他起；一云，據實見、相意取所依，非即二分為依他起。此之三釋，初由自證與見、相種為依，即假說自證為見、相。第二由見、相分依依他現，說此見、相假名依他。第三舉見、相二顯其所依，名為唯二。

Regarding the treatise stating, "Although their respective substances are each one, they appear to arise as two": The basic explanation is as in the commentary. The Yaoji states: The various explanations use the same phrasing, but their intentions differ slightly. Some explain that Sthiramati's two divisions, the objective part (nimittabhāga) and the subjective part (darśanabhāga), arise from conditions because Master Dharmapāla suppresses the other based on his own [system], not meaning that Sthiramati accepts that they arise from seeds; just as it is said that latent impressions (vāsanā) are subsumed under the objective part, this intention is that for Sthiramati seeds are not the objective part, and when speaking of them as the objective part, Dharmapāla refutes the other based on his own [system]. Now, I say that according to Sthiramati's original doctrine, seeds are based on the capacity and functioning of the self-verifying part (svasaṃvittibhāga) and are not subsumed under the objective part. Earlier, in the second fascicle, it says: Conceptual phenomena are like nonexistent things and are not causes and conditions; if they were the objective part, how could it be said that they are like nonexistent things? Since their substance is nonexistent, and he further accepts that the self-verifying part arises from conditions and is not nonexistent, therefore seeds exist; since seeds are not the self-verifying part, producer and produced being distinct, and the nature of cause and effect being distinct, and furthermore the self-verifying part is the condition, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, by this reasoning, [asks] if they are not the objective part, what are they? Therefore he makes this objection. If it were said that the subjective and objective [parts] arise from seeds, that is also not his doctrine; on what principle could one refute the other on the basis of one's own system? Therefore, we know that when it is said: If they arise from conditions, the internal objective and subjective parts are not dependent on others (paratantra), then by analogy with that self-verifying part, they should also be nonexistent, because there is no different cause—this is a mutually accepted meaning. Furthermore, earlier in the fourth fascicle it says: The seeds of the eighteen dhātus would become mixed and confused, etc.; therefore it is accepted that the objective and subjective parts also arise from seeds. Were it not so, these words would be empty and of no benefit. Question: Since Sthiramati's objective and subjective parts are the conceptually imagined (parikalpita), why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say that "mere measure" and "mere duality" are both called the dependent nature? Ximing gives three explanations: One says that the substance part of consciousness serves as the support for the seeds of the objective and subjective [parts], and the substance is metaphorically designated as the subjective and objective parts, not taking the subjective and objective [parts themselves] to be named the dependent nature. One says that on the self-verifying part, they appear based on the subjective and objective [aspects]; by this principle, the subjective and objective parts are called the dependent nature. One says that in reality, regarding the subjective and objective, the intention takes their support, not that the two parts themselves are the dependent nature. Among these three explanations: First, because the self-verifying part serves as the support for the seeds of the subjective and objective, the self-verifying part is metaphorically designated as the subjective and objective. Second, because the subjective and objective parts appear based on the dependent, these subjective and objective [parts] are metaphorically called the dependent. Third, adducing the two, subjective and objective, reveals their support, which is called "mere duality".